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ABSTRACT
Reputation - we all have one. We do not completely comprehend its workings
and are mostly unaware of its import until it is gone. When we lose it, our traditional
laws of defamation, privacy, and breach of confidence rarely deliver the vindication and
respite we seek due, primarily, to legal systems that cobble new media methods of
personal injury onto pre-Internet laws. This dissertation conducts an exploratory study
of the relevance of law to loss of individual reputation perpetuated on the Internet. It
deals with three interrelated concepts: reputation, privacy, and memory. They are
related in that the increasing lack of privacy involved in our online activities has had
particularly powerful reputational effects, heightened by the Internet’s duplicative
memory. The study is framed within three research questions: 1) how well do existing
legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and informational privacy in the new media
environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the
role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the man-computer interoperability
emerging as the Internet of Things? Through a review of international and domestic
legislation, case law, and policy initiatives, this dissertation explores the extent of
control held by the individual over her reputational privacy. Two emerging regulatory
models are studied for improvements they offer over current legal responses: the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, and American Do Not Track
policies. Underscoring this inquiry are the challenges posed by the Internet’s unique
architecture and the fact that the trove of references to reputation in international
treaties is not making its way into domestic jurisprudence or daily life. This dissertation
examines whether online communications might be developing a new form of digital
speech requiring new legal responses and new gradients of personal harm; it also
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proposes extra-legal solutions to the paradox that our reputational needs demand an
overt sociality while our desire for privacy has us shunning the limelight. As we embark
on the Web 3.0 era of human-machine interoperability and the Internet of Things, our
expectations of the role of law become increasingly important.
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CHAPTER 1
1.0

REPUTATIONAL RISKS ON THE INTERNET

Introduction
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash[.]1
Reputation is something we all have, treasure beyond wealth, and barely

understand. It is a social construct, emerging from our interaction with others. Its loss
provokes a profound sting to our sensibilities, but it is our society that feels most
betrayed in their misplaced esteem and trust. Reputation poses several ironies: while we
consider it our property, its control rests primarily with others. We strive to cultivate
favourable impressions through our social interactions, but also crave that private space
that hides from public view our more socially undesirable traits. We instinctively look
to our laws for vindication and to make our reputation whole when it is injured: law is
meted out in a very public forum, however, and so attracts the very publicity we shun.
Law takes a somewhat circumspect interest in reputation, contextualizing it within our
“family, home and correspondence”2 or looking for confidential relationships in order to
allocate blame. We are expected to provide proof of its loss, and a measure of our lost
opportunities when we enter the legal forum, but are usually unaware of its value until
it is gone. It is that drunken image the morning after, those shameful headlines that
grow more painful with each detail, that tell us we no longer have the jobs, friends, or
financial future we possessed the night before.
The Internet should have the capacity to make reputational damage go away.3
After all, it can take our explanations to most corners of the geophysical world and
convey our apologies in seconds. It can keep our denials and retractions available
indefinitely and for any viewer. It can even publicize our own version of events,
highlight our most admirable accomplishments, and manage our own rehabilitation
1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO: THE MOOR OF VENICE, Act III, Sc III, ll 155-157 (per
Iago) as reprinted in The Oxford Shakespeare, Stanley Wells ed. (2008) (Othello).
2
International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, S. Executive Rep. 102-23, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966, Article 17 (ICCPR).
3
‘Internet’ indicates a networking infrastructure connecting millions of computers. The World
Wide Web is an information-sharing model that is built on top of the Internet and uses only
one of the languages spoken over the Internet. ‘New media’ is used broadly herein to include
any means of mass communication using digital technologies.
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campaign. All on an anonymous basis if we no longer seek the limelight. Why, then, is
the Internet a contributory cause rather than the definitive answer to the most
undesirable of human commodities, the stained reputation?
Our general familiarity with the Internet suggests that the qualities of digital
media that make them most attractive for every kind of informational exchange also
contribute to the permanence and severity of reputational damage. The offending story
or image is conveyed instantaneously, anonymously if desired, in a fragmented fashion,
indiscriminately if not directed to selected recipients, without editorial or managerial
interception, and without significant cost. The purpose in choosing the Internet or other
digital media for inflicting reputational damage is its guarantee of desired results:
negative imputations go ‘viral’, are likely permanent, and appear unlikely to reflect
badly on the anonymous perpetrator as forensic efforts at identification are timeconsuming, expensive, and can involve even further invasions of the victim’s privacy.
Such efforts are, on balance, litigation-proof as victims of reputational damage are
reluctant to admit their own indiscretions or their lack of privacy mechanisms for their
online accounts.
Options for self-help are equally limited: containment (asking the author or
photographer or news source to stop the story) is not feasible in light of ubiquitous
distribution. Compensation is unlikely if the author of our misfortune is unknown,
unrepentant, or without deep pockets. Vindication is chancy if we must reveal more of
our private selves in order to prove the story’s falsity; and erasure is beyond the
technological capabilities of individuals and takes time if requested of the Internet
Service Provider (Bell Mobility, for example) or social networking service (Facebook,
for one). So we might be left to live with our past mistakes or vulnerabilities at the
hands of advancing technologies.
1.1

The Challenge

Close to half the inhabitants of this planet communicate through the Internet, an
information and communications system that, within the context of the planet’s
history,4 has only been with us for a very few seconds.5 Understandably, then, we have
4

Paul S. Braterman, How Science Figured Out the Age of Earth, SCI. AMER. (20 Oct. 2013),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-figured-out-the-age-of-the-

2

yet to devise a uniform code of online social behavior, either personal or communal.
There circulates throughout the new media environment6 much more of our private
information than we would recognize or ever sanction: we find ourselves in distinctly
new technological, cultural, and legal terrain. Online defamation and data disclosure
test our laws because their technologies are so novel and their damage so profound.
This dissertation examines individual reputation on the Internet using a wide
lens and an exploratory approach. More precisely, it sets as its aim the rethinking of the
role of law as a response to online breaches of our reputational privacy. I devise that term
to define a space we envision where our personally related information and data are kept
undisclosed to the wider public in order to avoid any compromising of our future
opportunities - social, professional, or financial. I consider two types of reputational
harm that might result from our activities or those of others: our exposure through
online postings that result in defamational harm; and the disclosure of our personally
identifying information7 or data without our knowledge or consent that impede our
privacy. While recognizing that not all reputational impacts are related to privacy
breaches, the latter are considered by this study because they put our private lives at
increased online risk, particularly in the hands of the state and other authorities.
This study deals with three interrelated concepts: reputation, privacy, and
memory. Those concepts are related in that the increasing lack of privacy involved in
our online activities has had particularly powerful reputational effects, heightened by
the Internet’s susceptibility to misuse by those in authority, among others. In short,

earth/http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-figured-out-the-age-of-the-earth/
(National Sciences Foundation in 1926 adopted the radiometric timescale with which the age
of the earth was calculated as 4.55 billion years). See further Appendix B, Map 1.
5
Timeline of Computer History, computerhistory.org,
http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/?category=cmptr (reporting the first modern
computer was built in 1939, was employed for Allied intelligence at Bletchley Park, England,
during World War 2, became available for office use in developed nations in 1966 and for
retail sales as a “personal computer” or PC in 1977).
6
An emergent, more inclusive term than Internet or the Web would be “new media”, defined
by the New Media Institute as “all that is related to the internet and the interplay between
technology, images and sound.” See Bailey Socha and Barbara Eber-Schmid, Defining New
Media Isn’t Easy, NEW MEDIA, http://www.newmedia.org/what-is-new-media.html.
7
See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel L. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011) (pointing out that Personally
Identifiable Information, the test for privacy protection under US law, is a concept exhibiting
a more nuanced meaning than legislators intended).

3

when it comes to individual reputation, the fact that information is accessed online
makes a difference.
My focus is the reputation we exhibit when among the larger public, the
“front stage” presentation of self that, with the emergence of our online
communications, seems to be invading our backstage life as well.

8

That

reconceptualization of the public/private divide is necessary because we are now in a
communications era where the Internet has added a layer of technological and
conceptual complexity for any user making best efforts to manage her social self.
Online reputational privacy presents a novel challenge for the legal profession
as well. For judges, lawyers, and legislators, the task of allocating liability regarding
breaches of reputational privacy involves a working knowledge of the online roles of
Internet companies, search companies, government regulators, third party Internet
users, and the individual cyber-citizen. Web behavior and digital speech present
policymakers with completely novel challenges: how to come to terms with a culture of
impetuous, unmediated, fractured, hyperbolic communications expressed on devices
with duplicative memory and global distribution.
This dissertation poses three research questions: 1) how well do existing legal
mechanisms address loss of reputation and informational privacy in the new media
environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the
role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the man-computer interoperability
emerging as the Internet of Things?9 I draw my legal analyses from international
treaties and case law related to the United States (US) and the European Union (EU)
and EU members. I choose those jurisdictions for three reasons: 1) the US and EU are
the current prominent players in the digital economy; 2) they stem from very different
cultural-legal traditions regarding reputation and privacy; and 3) they are under intense
political pressure to collaborate in finding solutions to new privacy demands for
individual Internet users now that we have entered the era of man-machine
interoperability and wearable technologies.
8

As explored in the pre-Internet world by sociologist ERVING GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
9
John Naughton, The Internet of Things: It’s a Really Big Deal, GUARDIAN (14 June 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/15/networker-internet-of-things-johnnaughton-hacking (providing a workable definition of the Internet of Things as a “machine-tomachine” connectivity without human interaction).
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The question of whether victims of reputational harm perpetrated on the Web
or the Internet would benefit from a discrete legal system, or would prefer a response
outside of the legal system altogether, has received relatively little academic attention.
Such an inquiry involves theoretical questions about the nature of reputation and how it
is affected by concepts of memory and privacy. It also raises practical legal questions
about proof of injury, choice of forum, and allocation of liability among Internet users
and corporate intermediaries such as Internet companies, advertisers, and content
carriers. The particular idiosyncrasies of Internet architecture play a significant part in
defining the measure of control the individual Internet user can achieve over her
reputation. It follows that the role of law regarding reputation calls out for
reexamination. It is my purpose in this inquiry to expand on the observation of Internet
scholar David Ardia, that “It’s time again to rethink defamation law.”10 As we have
moved out of the role of information acquisitor to content generator, and now face the
novel role of computer companion, it is time again to rethink law’s role involving
reputational privacy.
1.2

The Medium: A (very) Brief History of the Internet

The computer in the modern world emerged as an answer to such visions as a
“World Brain” by H.G. Wells in the 1930s,11 an “arithmetical machine of the future” by
Vannevar Bush in the 1940s, 12 and an arrangement of “man-computer symbiosis”
predicted by J.C.R. Licklider in the 1960s.13 Those pioneers of modern communications
envisioned man-computer cooperation beyond the mere compilation and storage of very

10

David Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation Law,
45 HARV. CIV. RTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2010).
11
H.G. Wells, World Brain: The idea of a Permanent World Encyclopaedia, ENCYCLOPEDIE
FRANCAISE (Aug. 1937), https://sherlock.ischool.berkeley.edu/wells/world_brain.html (calling
for a “unified, if not a centralized, world organ to ‘pull the mind of the world together’”).
12
Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, ATLANTIC (1 July 1945),
http://www.theAtlantic.com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/303881/. Bush was an
American engineer, inventor, and head of the US Office of Scientific Research and
Development during WW2.
13
Internet Pioneers, http://www.ibiblio.org/pioneers/licklider.html (describing Licklider as a US
computer scientist and psychologist who foresaw the need for networked computers with easy
user interfaces, such as point-and-click interfaces, digital libraries, e-commerce, online
banking, and software that could migrate to wherever it was needed.

5

large masses of information, what today we unimaginatively label Big Data. Licklider in
particular advocated collaboration between man and computer that would enable
decision-making as problems and variables emerged, not as a pre-set computer
function.14 He examined his own work habits and determined that “Much more time
went into finding or obtaining information than into digesting it”.15 Man-computer
symbiosis could augment human intellect by relieving it from mundane, administrative
tasks. Wells presciently foresaw that, “The whole human memory can be, and probably
in a short time will be, made accessible to every individual.”16
The most referenced beginnings of the Internet are the 1970s experiments by
the US Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Administration (ARPA)
to connect the military, defense contractors, and university researchers through
dedicated telephone lines with direct access to a few key computers throughout the
country.17 That collaborative approach reflected the perception of American scientists
who contributed their expertise to the World War 2 effort that winning the war was “a
battle of scientific wits in which outcome depends on who can get there first with
best.”18
The ARPANET continued to support the development of communications
protocols19 in order to transfer data between computer networks. It was just one of
many private and public initiatives, however, to shape the Internet. For example, in the
1970s numerous defence networks, the SAGE program that comprised the first airline
reservation systems, and the remote computer services industry all contributed to
14

J.C.R. Licklider, Man-Computer Symbiosis, IRE Transactions On Human Factors In
Electronics, 4-11(March 1960), http://groups.csail.mit.edu/medg/people/psz/Licklider.html.
15
Id.
16
Wells, supra fn 11.
17
This account is informed by the decision in Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 915, 925-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and A Brief History of the Internet & Related Networks,
Internet Society, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/briefhistory-internet-related-networks. An account by JOHNNY RYAN, A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET AND THE DIGITAL FUTURE, 8, attributes the origins of the modern Internet and
computer to the technological expertise that fueled President D. Eisenhower’s military
industrial complex during WW2.
18
Johnny Ryan, How the atom bomb helped give birth to the Internet, ARS TECHNICA (21 Feb, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/how-the-atom-bomb-gave-birth-to-the-internet/3/.
19
A protocol is a set of rules for transmitting data between electronic devices, such as
computers. In order for computers to exchange information using the same sized packets of
information, there must be a preexisting agreement as to how each side will send and receive it.
Protocols are established by international or industry-wide organizations.
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Internet development. The emergence of the persona computer (PC) in the 1980s
brought a basic online email service, information providers such as Lexis and Dialogue,
and the first global data communications networks to connect individual users to those
services. 20 Compuserve and Prodigy represented the first generation of consumer
networking services for personal computers in the 1980s. Videotext services formed the
basis for national information infrastructures in many countries during the same
period.21 Those examples point to the simultaneous development of many networking
activities, both commercial and private, and contribute to a more nuanced
understanding of the origins of the Internet.
As several universities and commercial entities began to link their computers to
various types of computer networks using OSI protocols,22 funds from the US National
Science Foundation as well as commercial communications enterprises helped build a
high speed dial-up ‘backbone’ (Sprint and IBM for example) to form a series of linked,
overlapping networks, the NSFNet.23 In Europe, major international backbones such as
NORDUNET provided similar connectivity to a growing number of computers on a
large number of networks.24 In Europe and elsewhere, support came from cooperative
international efforts or consortium networks and through national research
organizations, mostly non-profit entities with focused ideals about how the Internet
should run. Within the United States, much of this support came from the federal and
state governments for public access, but a considerable contribution was increasingly
20

Martin Campbell-Kelly & Daniel Garcia-Swartz, The History of the Internet: The Missing
Narratives, SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=867087 (2 Dec. 2005).
21
“A means of providing a written or graphical representation of computerized information on
a television screen”. (Dictionary.Com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/videotext.)
22
Perhaps the most important computer protocol is OSI (Open Systems Interconnection), a set
of guidelines for implementing networking communications between computers. The most
important sets of Internet protocols are TCP/IP, HTTP, and FTP. (Encyclopedia Britannica,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/410357/protocol.)
23
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Department of
Energy contributed additional backbone facilities in the form of the NSINET and ESNET
respectively.
24
Over 100,000 by 2014. The system of protocols which was developed over the course of this
research effort became known as the TCP/IP Protocol Suite, after the two initial protocols
developed: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). An Internet
protocol (or communicating systems using formats for exchanging messages) delivers packets
of data from the source host to the destination host solely based on the IP addresses contained
in the packet headers. Communications protocols have to be agreed upon by the parties
involved.
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made by industry for customer consumption. Private and public infrastructures were
not interconnected: frequently, however, public information services, available to any
organization with public members, could not afford to link to each potential customer
and had to rely on data communications supplied by private telephone and telegraph
monopolies.25
The original innovators, scientists, and agencies assembled the various
components of the Internet with very public goals in mind: the advancement of science
and national security.26 Early enthusiasts envisioned a virtual frontier, what cyber
libertarian John Perry Barlow would describe as a terrain “with no elected government,
no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks”, and a “global
social space…independent of the tyrannies [government seeks] to impose”. 27 That
idealistic rhetoric has been repeated as recently as 2010 with the description of the
Internet as “a centrifugal force, user-driven and open.”28
For other observers, however, such democratic promise quickly dissipated in the
early 1990s when The National Science Foundation was dismantled and the US
government “handed over the running of the Internet backbone to commercial Internet
service providers,”29 almost all of which locate their corporate headquarters in the
continental US. It was, in the words of venture capitalist John Doerr, “the largest legal
creation of wealth in the history of the planet.” 30 Also provoking considerable
controversy for its American power-hold on the assignment of names and numbers to
Internet sites is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
that “coordinates these unique identifiers across the world” in furtherance of a global
Internet.31 Standing at the forefront of the “thought experiment”32 that is the Internet is

25

Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, supra fn 20 at 13.
Michael Harris, Book review: ‘The Internet is Not the Answer’ by Andrew Keen, WASH. POST (2
Jan. 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-the-internet-is-not-theanswer-by-andrew-keen/2015/01/02/8627999a-7973-11e4-9a27-6fdbc612bff8_story.html.
27
John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, (8 Feb. 1996) as reproduced
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
28
Ryan, supra fn 18 at 8.
29
Harris, supra fn 26.
30
As related by Bill Davidow, The Internet Is the Greatest Legal Facilitator of Inequality in Human
History, ATLANTIC (28 Jan. 2014), http://www.theAtlantic.com/business/archive/2014/01/theinternet-is-the-greatest-legal-facilitator-of-inequality-in-human-history/283422/.
31
ICANN website at https://www.icann.org.
32
ANDREJ SAVIN, EU INTERNET LAW, x (2013) (Internet).
26

8

US industry; most of what other countries do is a response or reaction to that
dominance. The EU has responded to most of those challenges in ways that are
uniquely harmonized within its borders.33
The Internet of the early 1990s has been described as “a gray and dreary place
devoid of content – like a TV station without programs”.34 The emergence of the World
Wide Web in the mid-1990s, a multimedia interface that allows for the transmission of
text, pictures, audio, and video collectively known as web pages, popularized and
enlivened the Internet with search functions that could retrieve information on just
about any topic imaginable. With the arrival of commercial entities such as Netscape,
Microsoft, AOL, and Yahoo! the Web was transformed from “an amateur enterprise to a
robust commons”.35 For the individual user, the Internet had expanded its information
storage function to unlimited research capabilities and democratized information access.
In terms of its operating systems to serve individual users, the computer evolved
from a system of “punching up cards to feed into someone else’s mainframe”36 into a
network of PCs available on each worker’s desk or in individual homes, with installed
software that enabled users to give orders to the computer’s hardware. Files could be
saved on the PC’s desktop, distributed throughout the network, or copied onto an
external disc and distributed to others. While some owners showed initiative to
program their own computers, most simply bought software programmed by others and
downloaded it onto their PCs. Generally the computer was function specific, achieving
one task for its duration. It was prone to crash if too many complex commands were
inputted at too fast a rate. Jonathan Zittrain coined the descriptor “tethered” to
characterize the individual’s reliance on the network and pre-programmed software,
operations we have come to refer to as the Web 1.0. We can characterize the human
component in that era as primarily information gatherers.

33

For example, the EU has directives regulating e-privacy (2002/58/EC), legal protection of
databases (96/9/EC), distance selling (97/7/EC), data retention (2006/24/EC), electronic
commerce (2000/31/EC), data protection (95/46/ED), access to, and interconnection of,
electronic communications networks, domain name regulation (EC/733/2002), and
implementation of the European Top Level Domain <.eu> (EC 733/2002).
34
Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, supra fn 20 at 4.
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Id. at 5 (suggesting that the Web won out over several competitors).
36
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET – AND HOW TO STOP IT, 2
(2008) (Future of Internet).
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The next stage, what has been coined the age of Web 2.0, is marked by its
generativity. All users can assume the role of content publisher. Three interlinked
trends have emerged featuring the individual during that second more interactive or
generative phase: 1) the evolution of the individual from passive consumer to
participatory contributor of content; 2) increasing hazards to one’s good name prompted
by the regeneration of user information by third party users that is enabled by a
relatively open or unregulated Internet; and 3) the resultant tension between the
individual’s need for privacy and the constitutionally recognized right of others to free
expression. Regarding the first, individual access to content moved from mainframes
located at public institutions to independent network functioning.37 PCs defined their
individual owners as consumers whose tastes influenced a digital market and gave birth
to behavioral advertising, or the tracking of individual online search habits as indicators
of consumer preferences. In that way, the individual user became a principal component
of the digital economy with every excursion online. While those coordinates were
presented in code, they nonetheless provided key personal information to commercial
interests and to governments alike who sought to study and profile the interests, buying
preferences, and illicit intentions of online participants.
The Internet evolved during the 1990s and early years of the new millennium
from a limited operating system to one that encouraged generativity or user
interactivity. With the later arrival of social media, individuals became publishers in
their own right, often without mediation from traditional editing sources. 38 They
comprised the “essential quality animating the trajectory of information technology
innovation”. 39 PCs were connected to, and users communicated with, any possible
network of other PCs over the Internet. That generative quality Harvard University’s
Jonathan Zittrain defines as “a technology’s overall capability to produce unprompted
change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences.”40 When these “highly
adaptable machines” are linked to a network with limited centralized control, we get

37

Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HAR. L. REV. 1 (1974) (Generative).
See contra, Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697 (2010).
39
Zittrain, Generative, supra fn 37 at 1980. This paragraph follows Zittrain’s explanation on
the openness of the Internet.
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Id.
38

10

…a grid that is nearly completely open to the creation and rapid distribution of
the innovations of technology-savvy users to a mass audience that can enjoy
those innovations without having to know how they work.41
That development from information acquisitor to content publisher has involved
the innovation of numerous communications platforms (social media such as emails,
Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Instagram, as well as blogs and videoblogs such as
YouTube and Snapchat) and the use of a variety of individually owned devices for
searches and transmission (such as laptops and mobile phones). The openness and trust
preferred by users of such devices provides a formidable market force that resists
regulatory attempts at Internet control. However, as Zittrain observed as early as 1974,
that system is “increasingly at odds with itself”.42
As individual users become publishers of their own content, much of it
autobiographical and revealing, that information is consumed and retransmitted by
third parties with little regard for the context in which it was created. The ease with
which photographs can be taken on mobile phones, tagged with our names, and
transmitted to third parties, many of those recipients unknown to us, creates high risks
of reputational harm through embarrassment, shame, or the inability to stop an
unfavourable image from viral distribution across cyberspace. On the criminal side, the
hacking of websites using malicious code causes wide exposure of personally identifying
data by state and ‘dark net’ actors. As a result, the very users who benefit from the open,
generative Internet simultaneously seek stability through a more locked down system.
That creates an online environment that is the antithesis of that which fostered our
original participation. Rather than functioning on trust and collaboration, then, we as
consumers find ourselves losing control and demanding locked down encryption,
regulation, and the limiting of innovative participation.43
American Internet scholar Lawrence Lessig recognized as early as 2000 that
individuals could not have it both ways: untrammelled privacy and unlimited access and
innovation. Users would have to decide whether they desired a regulated Internet and,
if so, regulated by whom. In his words,

41

Id.
Id. at 1977.
43
The Internet governance debate, while critical to state and industry participation, constitutes
a very broad literature and, as such, is beyond the scope of this dissertation
42
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Under the influence of commerce, cyberspace is becoming a highly regulable
space, where behavior is much more tightly controlled than in real space. But
that's not inevi either. We can-we must-choose what kind of cyberspace we want and
what freedoms we will guarantee. These choices are all about architecture: about
what kind of code will govern cyberspace, and who will control it.44 [emphasis
added]
While Lessig attributes human choice with shaping the Internet in a major way,
commerce and institutions still contribute to the mounting tension between personal
privacy needs and the growing inventory of platforms available for online expression.
That tension encapsulates the third trend affecting the reputation of individual users:
the constant need to balance their need for privacy and the constitutionally recognized
right of others to speak their minds freely. Increasingly we look to law, rather than
computer code, to conduct that function.
The sudden growth of the Internet initially caught the American legal system
somewhat unprepared.45 Prior to 1986, the US Congress had introduced very little
legislation on electronic forms of telecommunication.46 In that year, Congress passed
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)47 that made illegal certain types of
electronic eavesdropping on private communications, such as unauthorized reading of
private emails as they were stored in transit. The ECPA extended to electronic mail
most of the protections already granted to conventional mail and encompassed radio
and data transmissions. Thus began a legislative practice of appending onto extant
legislation Internet and Web uses. Almost a decade later the US Senate, in turn,
introduced the Communications Decency Act in February of 1995 to target “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or indecent electronic communications”. That aim to protect the
individual Internet user from online obscenity was later found unconstitutional by the
US Supreme Court; similarly no was the impact of section 230 of the Act that
44

LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.O, 1-8
(2000) (Code).
45
This paragraph is informed by The Internet, Encyclopedia.Com,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/the_Internet.aspx.
46
See further Gina Marie Stevens & Charles Doyle, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes
Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, Report of the Congressional Research Service
of Congress (3 Dec. 2009), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-326.pdf (detailing US
legislative efforts to keep up with electronic communications innovation since the 1928
Olmstead wiretapping decision).
47
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701ff [1996] (ECPA).
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determined operators of Internet services were not to be construed as publishers and
hence not legally liable for the words of third parties who use their services. That
exemption would eventually transform into the widest possible exemption from liability
for Internet Service Providers (ISP)s regarding illegal or socially objectionable material
it disseminated over the Internet.48
It is important to point out that Internet regulation addresses two components:
the content that is transmitted, and the infrastructure on which content is transmitted.
The above legislation addresses the former and provides the subject of this dissertation
while a separate and relatively complex system of telecommunications law addresses the
latter and will not be covered herein. As suggested by one scholar of EU Internet law,
there is a conceptual difference between the regulatory environment which applies to
the wires as opposed to that which applies to the content and, although other media,
such as television or radio, share many features with the Internet, they are “noninteractive and distributed from the centre to the periphery and therefore subject to
different principles.”49
Lawmaking within the EU took a more administratively uniform and less
derivative route to Internet regulation than that of the US. Rather than applying
“inherited concepts to the digital world”, EU lawmakers showed recognition of the need
for “new rules, a new language and a new social context which do not easily lend
themselves to traditional legal classification.”50 The result of those intentions is a rich
compendium of directives and national laws that address many aspects of electronic
communications. That compendium is nonetheless confusing: “instruments are
numerous, policies difficult to distinguish, court decisions conflicting” and official
statements contradictory and often incoherent. 51 While the larger political and
economic framework is focused on a single market phenomenon, harmonization policies
are pursued within the EU not out of fear that disparity in laws between Member States

48

Section 230, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 infra.
Savin, Internet, supra fn 32 at x.
50
Id. at viii.
51
Id. at x.
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would slow economic development of the whole union but rather to achieve a coherent
vision to steer policy development.52
The Internet today is a very different space than that envisioned by its creators
and scholars – more regulated, more complex, and more integrated into our daily
interactions. In fact, the Internet has become so crucial to our knowledge-based
economy that “its preservation and operation is now an issue through which we see our
political, social and economic freedoms.”53 Dual expectations of unfiltered content and
security are high: as members of western democratic states, we look to our legal
systems for unrestricted Internet access and simultaneously for protection of every
private detail.
Efforts to produce a single worldwide Internet policy to address those risks have
not met with resounding success. Internet policy is comprised of myriad political and
economic interests that respond to local, national and international pressures.54 In the
real world, it is highly unlikely that Internet activities can be subjected to a single
policy framework across geopolitical boundaries. The EU has played a crucial part in
Internet regulation in Member states, however, and maintains a quasi-federal status and
so could potentially play a unique role if global regulation becomes the model.
The interests of individual users cannot always compete with those of industry
or other sectors. That fact is illustrated in the uneven progress of the US Congress and
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to enact laws addressing privacy and
Do Not Track mechanisms that would unite all states in a uniform, centralized response
to threats to individual online privacy.55 As well, US federal policies do not flow from
one source but receive input and pressure, for example, from offline mass media (print

52

Savin points out, nonetheless, that the European Commission often cites Article 114 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as legal basis for regulating the Internet
(ix).
53
Andrej Savin, How Europe formulates internet policy, 3 INT. POL. REV. (26 Feb. 2014),
http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/how-europe-formulates-internet-policy.
54
For an examination of the pitfalls of modern policy making in the UK, see Michael
Hallsworth et al., Policy Making In The Real World: Evidence And Analysis, Report of the Institute
For Government (Apr. 2011) (urging the construction of “a resilient process that can handle
such challenges and pressures. Such a process would be realistic enough to have a chance of
being followed in practice. In contrast, the current processes are too brittle – they break rather
than bend when put to the test.”)
55
See further Ch. 5 infra. In general, the FCC oversees Internet infrastructure while the FTC
regulates content. There is some confusion of roles when dealing with net neutrality.
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or broadcast) as well as utilities (telecoms, radio, cable and satellite). That fact is also in
evidence within the EU, where “different policy making efforts have taken place at
different directorates” within each member state.56 While recent harmonization agenda
in Europe are prioritizing Internet protections and data privacy, such efforts have
historically proceeded with little coordination. For both the US and Member States of
the EU, then, while changes to Internet technology and uses are rapid, policy changes
require political consensus and hence move at a slower and more cautious pace.
1.3

Law’s Purpose in Online Societies

Law in the service of Internet activity currently serves many purposes,
from pre-emptive action (perpetuating the status quo, standardizing industrial practices,
or protecting cultural norms) to post facto objectives (penal sanctions, remediation, or
ending high risk practices). The principal new question this dissertation asks is in what
way can law assist our reputational integrity as individuals regarding online activity. In
other words, as we enter an era of human-machine interconnectivity, what can law
contribute to our need for reputational privacy? While not all intrusions of privacy will
result in harm to our reputations, much of the activities involved in data collection and
use have to potential to reveal aspects of our private life that could diminish our future
opportunities if they are revealed. Within that frame, I ask two more specific questions:
1) in what ways do current legal systems respond to reputational risks; and 2) how can
we best engage the law and extra-legal mechanisms in maintaining our control over our
reputational privacy as we enter the era of the Internet of Things? I pursue two lines of
inquiry in order to establish where this dissertation might make a meaningful
contribution: 1) I review academic literature that builds a conceptual basis for the
interlinked notions of reputation, privacy, and memory; and 2) I examine policy
statements and memoranda, the text of specific laws, government debates, traditional
and new media accounts and analyses, empirical studies commissioned by governments
or privately conducted, and case studies (both in law reports and as discussed in new
media) that reveal doctrinal and legal reasoning as well as judicial decision-making at
the international, regional, and national levels.

56

Id.
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The key values that comprise the focus of my investigation – reputation, privacy,
memory – are social constructs, like law, and hence mu and in some state of flux. So,
too, is the technological infrastructure of new media whose rate of development is
frequently described as “exponential”. In fact, Internet technology might be
outstripping its own rules in terms of the pace of innovation and change.57 As much as
possible, then, I have selected observations and opinions that describe more general
trends than particular technological advancements. That treatment of the subject
matter results in coverage that is more inclusive than comprehensive. In other words,
this research casts its net of inquiry quite wide for contributions and possible influences
rather than delving more deeply into a smaller range of technologies or opinions.
1.4

Limits to the Study: Of Apples and Oranges

It is important at this juncture to establish what this inquiry is not. Its unit of
study is the individual: reputations of corporations, institutions, and state and
government entities are not the primary focus. Their activities are included, however, in
the context of their impact on an individual’s reputation and primarily through their
misuse of personally identifiable data. This dissertation also does not deal extensively
with state surveillance, but only as those activities constitute a backdrop to institutional
incursions on personal reputational privacy. This dissertation does not provide a
detailed analysis of the current status of Internet governance, although its infrequent
consideration is important to an understanding of the complexity of Internet regulation.
Further, this is not a major comparative study of two legal and political models:
one American and the other from the EU. While both models involve liberal
democracies with the largest stakes in the digital economy, and hence represent
important examples of different cultural approaches to reputation and Internet privacy
issues, they are not comparable in terms of political structures, constitutional make-up,
or legal systems. The US is a federal democracy, with power divided between a central
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The reference is to the observation of Intel Corporation co-founder Gordon E. Moore that,
over the course of development of computer hardware, the number of transistors in a dense
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progress in capacity of computer technology. See further Gordon E. Moore, Cramming more
components onto integrated circuits, ELECTRONICS MAGAZINE, 4 (1965).

16

or national government and 50 States in the Union.58 It was established in 1789 as a
participatory democracy with a common law system and federal constitution. It has a
bicameral legislature comprised of the House of Representatives (Congress) and the
Senate.59 A similar system is engaged within each state (Lower House or Chamber and
State Senate). Each state has its own legal system, judicial system, and case law as
mandated by the US Constitution. Judicial decisions from the highest court level in each
state can be appealed to the US Supreme Court; those rulings are binding on lower
courts regarding federal laws, such as the US Constitution. 60 Although laws of
Congress can be overridden by executive order of the President, they seldom are.61
Federal laws address trans-state issues within the country such as transportation and
communications, but states exercise considerable autonomy to implement their own
laws covering the same subject matter. As will be seen, that extra layer of legislative
action provides citizens with additional recourse if their first attempt at a federal bill is
defeated.62
Politically and constitutionally, the EU is more complex. It was created in the
aftermath of the Second World War to foster economic cooperation, primarily by
pooling coal and steel resources, and to reduce political conflict between nations within
Europe. It evolved from the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1958, with six
founding member states: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. Those states were known as the ‘inner six’ to distinguish them from the
‘outer seven’ states who formed the European Free Trade Association rather than
engage in supranational European integration: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The EU emerged from that
arrangement in 1993 as an organization sharing policy development on a variety of
issues from justice to the environment. It is now a political and economic union of 28
countries (excluding Norway and Switzerland) each with its own constitution. It is not a
58
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federation in the strictest sense, but not just a free-trade association either. The EU has
certain attributes of an independent nation: its own flag, currency for most members,
and lawmaking structures. It also enjoys diplomatic representation and a common
foreign policy when dealing with states external to the EU. 63 The EU operates through
a system of supranational institutions and intergovernmental negotiated decisions by
the Member States. Within the EU, many policies are formulated as directives that
serve as guidelines for national laws. Regulations, such as the proposed European
General Data Protection Regulation (EUDR)64 are mandatory in law and are formally
incorporated into national law in each Member State without the need for debate or
ratification within those states.
The EU is based on the rule of law and created by statute.65 It is foremost an
economic union (hence the ‘euro zone’ of 19 EU member states that have adopted the
euro (€) as their common currency and sole legal tender). It has created its own Central
Bank. It harmonizes national laws in areas of business, free trade, and the security of EU
citizens, but has so far been unsuccessful in harmonizing private laws, particularly in the
areas of contract, family, and property rights. Although both European and national
legislators share the legislative responsibilities, neither of those bodies has final
responsibility for the whole. There is no superior political authority which has the final
say on who is responsible for what, that is, no overarching authority over the European
63
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and national legislators. The European Court of Justice may, however, determine the
extent of harmonization when determining cases.66 The EU passes regulations that
substitute European law for some national laws.67 The legal system might be under
common law or civil law system. If the latter, precedent is not binding but case law is
taken into account by the courts. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is
located in Luxembourg and interprets EU treaty law to make sure it is applied in the
same way in all EU Member States. 68 It also settles legal disputes between EU
governments and EU institutions. Individuals, companies or organizations can bring
cases before the Court if they feel their rights have been infringed by a EU institution.
The bench is comprised of one Judge per Member State and eight Advocates-General.
Two other courts are located in Europe but are not EU courts. The European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) located in Strasbourg, France is an international court
set up under the Council of Europe that currently has 47 Member States. The Court
enforces the European Convention on Human Rights. The International Court of
Justice (ICJ), located in The Hague in the Netherlands, was founded in 1945 by United
Nations Charter. Its main functions are to settle legal disputes submitted to it by states
and to provide advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by authorized
international branches, agencies, and the UN General Assembly. Its jurisdiction
includes questions relating to the UN Charter, the interpretation of international
treaties, questions of international law, and the nature and extent of compensation in
the event of a violation of an obligation under international law. Only states can be
parties in cases before the Court. The US withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction of the
court in 1986 after the court ruled its covert war against Nicaragua violated
international law. The US now accepts the court’s jurisdiction only on a case-by-case
basis.

The ICJ is not a supreme court for appellate decisions from national courts; it

does not act as a court of last resort for individuals. Nor is it an appeal court for any
international tribunal. The court has no true compulsory jurisdiction, a matter that is
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often challenged by respondents. Enforcement is by the UN Security Council but weak
in that its five members can veto enforcement.
There are four institutional components to the EU. The Council of the European
Union (the Council) is called the Council of Ministers and is the central legislative and
decision-making body in the EU (comprised of one representative at ministerial level
from each Member State with the authority to commit their government, a composition
that varies depending on the subject on the agenda). In contrast, the European Council
consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, its President, the
President of the Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. It has no law-making powers but sets the EU's broad
priorities through national and EU-level leaders. The European Parliament represents
all European citizens through elected members. The European Commission addresses
the interests of the EU as a whole through members appointed by national
governments.69 Any regulation, such as the EUDR, must have the approval of the
European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council in order to become
law. In principle, the Commission proposes new laws, and the Parliament and Council
decide on their adoption. The Commission and the member countries then implement
them, and the Commission ensures that the laws are properly applied and implemented.
1.5

Methodology

Through a review of international and domestic70 legislation, jurisprudence,
and policy initiatives, as well as news accounts, studies, and current legal practices, this
dissertation explores the extent of control held by the individual over her reputational
privacy. This is an exploratory study in that it involves a search of an array of sources
dealing with reputation and Internet activities. It examines two emerging regulatory
models, the EUDR, and American Do Not Track (DNT) policies to assess the
improvements and challenges they pose over current legal responses. In order to stay
current with the pressing issues regarding individual reputation affected by new media,
I examine unmediated sources such as blogs, videoblogs, and other online peer
69
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contributions by a range of contributors from Internet scholars to professional
journalists to law firms to private citizens. Secondary sources include books and journal
articles, case commentary and book reviews, as well as online sources of traditional
news reportage and opinion, and online dictionaries and encyclopedia. To support
particular points I employ government, non-governmental (NGO), institutional and
commercial empirical study results, often in chart and graphic form as primarily
contained in the Appendices.
Since case law analysis forms an essential component of this inquiry, I will use
defamation and privacy cases decided by courts of all levels in EU Member States and
the US (both state and federal levels). Given the impossibility of covering all cases that
address harms to reputational privacy within the US and in Member States of the EU, I
will select where available decisions of the US Supreme Court and the CJEU, the
highest appellate court for EU member countries.71 I will make my case selection based
on two methods: an online law report search of cases featuring “defamation”,
“reputation”, and the “Internet”, followed by a review of high profile cases suggested by
traditional press and new media. Those cases will, in turn, refer me back to an online
law report search. That broad base of research method will produce a wider range of
cases that fit within the research agenda. In analyzing the cases, I will test those
selected for what they tell us about jurisprudential principles in the digital environment,
keeping in mind the balance judges must seek between legal tradition that affirms law’s
legitimacy and the “incrementalism” with which they approach new legal concepts.72
My analysis will lead to an exploration of emergent legal proposals, such as the EUDR
and DNT models I choose to analyze with closer scrutiny in Ch 4.73
I hope to discover information on how Internet companies make decisions on
takedown requests of subscribers in relation to the guidelines suggested by such
71
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decisions as the CJEU’s influential Google Spain ruling. I also anticipate, from current
news accounts of European reaction to behavioral advertising and online harassment
and luring of underage Internet users, a cross-cultural and transnational receptivity to
the DNT legislative prototype that is attracting considerable institutional attention
within the EU. Finally, I consider extralegal solutions to reputational privacy issues and
evaluate whether those remedies can assist us in handling the reputational privacy
paradox as we enter the Web 3.0 era of interconnectivity.
1.6

Scope and Outline

The subject scope of this dissertation with respect to technology and to legal
principles and practices is what is extant midway through the second decade of the 21st
century. The unit of study is the individual; 74 the “society” I study can be our real time
community or our online collection of peers, anyone who has significant influence over
the esteem in which we are held regarding our future opportunities. Similarly, I leave
open the possibility that we might have many reputations, one for each society within
which we function. I remain mindful, as privacy scholar Julie Cohen has noted, of the
socially constructed self “who is the real subject of privacy law- and policymaking…emerging gradually from a preexisting cultural and relational substrate”.75
My principal interest is in how our social presentation of self, as negotiated through
language, dress, and other cultural symbols within our personal control, becomes
vulnerable to the plasticity and tentative nature of online society.76 I am therefore
focusing on the individual who is tasked with balancing the new demands of an age of
technological interoperability with the need for personal control over the delicate
balance of self-imaging. My inquiry considers to what extent that control is forfeited to
a global, faceless, unknowable public whose impersonal curiosity and collective
judgment define our social significance. That question is later reframed within the
emerging world of “the Internet of Things”, man-machine collaborations where
integrated form and function complicates presentation of self as never before. When
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that codependency goes awry, and exposes our more private self to public scrutiny, I
question whether law can play a useful role in its reordering. I consider that occurrence,
to some extent, in legal systems in Asia, South America, and Canada but primarily focus
on the United States and select state members of the European Union.
This dissertation proceeds in six parts: Chapter 1 provides background on the
evolution of the computer from a compendium of readable electronic documents (Web
1.0) to an interactive space of peer-generated contributions (Web 2.0) to a network of
human-machine

interoperable

systems

(Web

3.0);

Chapter

2

reviews

the

interdisciplinary literature that conceptualizes reputation, privacy, and memory, calling
on contributions from disciplines as diverse as anthropology, urban geography, legal
informatics, legal theory, computer science, information systems, behavioral
psychology, and cultural studies; Chapter 3 provides an inventory of technical methods
and extreme online behavior by which our reputations can be harmed on the Internet
and the personal and professional cost of such invasive actions. I analyze two cases, the
Mosley case in Europe and the Martin case within the US, to personalize the ways that
legal systems respond to disclosures and exposure of personal information. I aim to
discover any differences in principles and practice shown in the different jurisdictions. I
also examine procedural considerations in choosing jurisdiction and law systems for
such cases. Chapter 4 provides a more in-depth and methodical examination of legal
responses at the international and national level, utilizing private and public law. It
considers less universally accepted responses, such as criminal defamation and insult
laws employed in non-democratic regimes, and employs a variety of cases to animate
particular legal principles or practices and their effect on individual suffering. In that
chapter I introduce the possibility of a discrete law of digital speech and non-legal
responses. In Chapter 5 the US Do Not Track model and the European Union Data
Protection model are analyzed more thoroughly for what they convey about preferred
policies and cultural-legal norms, focusing on unique mechanisms such as rights of
erasure and notice-and-choice self regulation. I consider what a new digital law would
look like in theory and practice, and pose new non-legal responses that are already in
use in some jurisdictions. In Chapter 6, I consider the emerging era of man-machine
inter-operability, as currently observable in technologies that are wearable and that
enhance human biophysical, sensory, and cognitive functioning. I suggest future
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research that examines computer enhancement as it relates to the societal presentation
of the individual. I conclude by considering whether the tyranny of the reputational
paradox needs to continue into a future of digital communications where public and
private are embedded, inter-operative, and collaborative.
1.7

Importance of the Study

This study is important for the individual because reputation is the grease in the
wheels of social acceptance and professional opportunity. We also accept its measure as
our self worth. It is important for our society of peers because, when it is gone, they
suffer the loss of trust they have invested in us. While reputation engages considerable
study within the corporate and international relations fields, individual reputation as it
relates to law receives less attention from academic thinkers, and individual reputation
in the digital world even less so. Its study is pursued somewhat obliquely within the
context of law and technology, defamation law, communications, computer design, and
privacy. This is not to say there is not a burgeoning academic literature on a wealth of
imaginable aspects of the digital environment and new technologies, whose
contributions are most no in their inter-disciplinarity.
This work differs from preceding academic literature in its combination of topics
around individual reputation and the Internet. Those topics include: a conceptual study
of reputation as it relates to memory and privacy; a consideration of new and extra-legal
mechanisms to address novel forms of speech existing in social media spaces; and the
contextualization of reputational privacy within the man-machine interconnectivity
emerging as the Internet of Things.
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CHAPTER 2
2.0

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction

In this chapter I review the literature on the conceptualization of three
interlinked entities: reputation, memory, and privacy. I will integrate into this review a
brief historical account of the societal values upon which reputation used to be
measured, first against the overreaching curiosity of one’s community members and
secondly regarding the non-consensual probing of the state into private affairs in the
name of security and sovereignty. My review of literature indicates that, while America
was familiar with the idea from France and Germany that a person had a right of
personality that the law could legitimate, Americans generally took a more proprietary
view of one’s name as an intangible but marketable commodity. As a result, the legal
systems in European states and in America to enable that process were quite different,
as was the jurisprudence that emerged. As well, the role of the state in recognizing such
rights was disparate from one side of the Atlantic to the other.
2.1

Theorizing Reputation
Character is much easier kept than recovered.77
***
O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself
and what remains is bestial.78
***
You are what Google says you are.79

Those who deliberate on the nature of reputation often comment on its
contingent quality. For Shakespeare’s Othello, for example, a good name was all that
stood between our human endeavours and the soulless morass of our baser natures. For
contemporary author Michael Iapoce, reputation is “character minus what you’ve been
caught doing,” – or what is left of your good name after society has caught you in all
THOMAS PAINE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE, vol. 1 (available
online from General Books LLC, 1870).
77
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your indiscretions.80 Recognition of reputation as a social construct dates back at least
to the early Greek philosopher Socrates who is reputed to have advised, “The way to a
good reputation is to endeavor to be what you desire to appear.”81 In a similar vein,
George Washington has been attributed with the advice that it is better to be alone than
found in bad company. A good reputation, then, can turn bad if secrets of our baser
natures emerge, our usual discretion fails, our public mask slips, or our companions
prove unsavory to public opinion.
Most factors that shape reputations are external to the individual: societal
perceptions, moral judgments of our peers, and public challenges to our honour and
dignity. The paradox or “mysterious thing”82 about reputation is that, as a social entity,
its worth to the holder resides in the estimation of others. It is that external element of
control that argues against treating reputation as personal property. We possess it, and
are ultimately responsible for its nature, but its creation and destruction can be
instigated without our consent or even knowledge. We might spend a lifetime,
therefore, striving to structure our behaviors according to certain externally determined
standards, only to have its ultimate shaping change course in an instant, leaving us
defenceless. Reputation can be a social good in that we emulate those noble attributes
assigned to us by others; it can also be subject to vicious and annihilating commentary
that, if untrue, moves us to legal action and other vindications.83 Additionally, the sting
we suffer is not only a sense of injustice and privacy deprivation but also our painful
awareness of all we have lost in social or moral status.84 To witness the diminution of our
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own esteem in the eyes of our significant peers can provoke the ultimate social
isolation.85
Our awareness of our need for a good reputation shapes our presentation of self
within that society. American social theorists George Herbert Mead and Erving
Goffman contribute to our understanding of the sociological underpinnings of
reputation. For Mead, the mind and self emerges out of the social process of significant
communication.86 A man’s society exists a priori: the man emerges from that society, not
the other way round. "In that way, the development of the individual's self, and of his
self-consciousness within the field of his experience" is preeminently social and cannot
be understood outside of that social context.87 According to Mead, our significant
communication is achieved through gestures (unconscious communications) and
language (conscious) wherein we can change the attitudes and positions of another. Our
role is not passive: we play the game in light of the attitudes of others.88 We maintain
control to the extent that the indeterminacy of others’ responses “gives the sense of
freedom, of initiative."89
To Goffman, our face-to-face interactions are theatrical performances wherein
we negotiate our control over the impressions others have of us. We accomplish this
through our choice of setting, appearance, and manners. 90 We live out our more
personal, idiosyncratic tendencies backstage. On stage, we keep “face”, that is, the
positive social value we claim for ourselves that shapes our roles during a particular
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contact.91 Our dramaturgical decisions comprise our performance that others see, just as
similar choices by others form their front stage presentation of self. Together, we agree
on the social limits of our performances and agency, and do our best to avoid
embarrassment. Goffman’s stigma arises from our inability to meet social standards,
something outside of each of us. We could say that Mead and Goffman believe we are
who we think other people think we are.
As we migrate online, elements from our backstage move to front stage, blurring
the limits of our public/private selves. In the absence of face-to-face communications
and immediacy of responses, our sense of social interaction is dulled. For example, in the
real world a social visit might include the sharing of conversation and a cup of coffee
simultaneously. It is generally clear that “the 'point' of the interaction is the discussion,
not the coffee making.”92 Online exchanges lose that element of richness and caring that
the mundane task of coffee making provides. We need to find other cues or gestures
(Mead) whereby we give off an impression (Goffman) of our sociality while online.
Psychology professor Hugh Miller of Nottingham Trent University suggested
as early as 1995 that there is liberation that comes with online communications, a
crossing of status lines allowing entry to “power bases” that might not be available to us
offline.93 Writing in an era that predated social media, he noted that access comes with
email and the creation of our own web pages, the latter being open for anyone’s
browsing. Our online interactions, however, might involve more circumspect
‘backstage’ preparations for self-presentation through our increased access to
information on our contact person’s institution, department, special knowledge, or
hobby interests.94 We are also less aware of any rebuffs to our invitations to interact; we
are also less likely to have anyone correct the gaffes we make in our online
communications. In that way, Miller notes, “It is easy to make a fool of yourself on the
Web” but “doing it will cause you little pain” because you are not routinely aware of
who is accessing your webpage.95
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Reputation – good reputation – depends on our compliance with social or moral
norms that are never static in any complex society. So while legal, religious or social
institutions are instruments to protect the status quo, the existing order works best for
the wealthy, Miller’s “power base”, whose values are perpetuated through those
institutions. As Lawrence Friedman summarizes, “The status quo freezes a certain
distribution of wealth and influence, of standing, reputation, and social capital.”96 Digital
communications are liberating us, through the particularities of their architecture, from
some of those social constraints.
Daniel Solove of George Washington University Law School has written widely
on reputation within the legal context. He offers the oft-quoted distinction, “a man’s
character is what he is, while a man’s reputation is what other people may imagine him to
be.”97 That assessment has also been attributed to Lord Denning of England’s Court of
Appeal. It is telling of the present day confusion over what constitutes reputation that,
in his 2007 text The Future of Reputation, Solove does not offer his own definition.98 The
author emphasizes that much rests on a good name: one false rumour can prove deadly,
as seen in the European witch hunts between the 14th and 17th centuries where over
500,000 people, mostly women, were burned at the stake on the hearsay of their
neighbours. Our efforts at reputational control are limited, argues Solove, as we are
jousting with innuendo, “a bundle of half-truths and incomplete tales.”99
Solove has observed the permanence of access that the Internet lends to personal
information, transforming it from something “forget and localized within small local
groups” into details of our private lives that are “becoming widespread, permanent and
searchable.” 100 Historically reputation has been assailable in three principal ways:
through our own actions or revelations, by surveillance, and by third party disclosure of
concealed information. Those behaviors persist into the Web environment. In the end,
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the personal damage is the same: inhibition, further self-censorship, embarrassment, and
a profound sense of lost self worth.
In theorizing reputation with a legal lens, we need to consider the nature of the
interest that we ask the law to protect. 101 The European law on the rights of
personality provides a conceptual starting point for how the law has dealt with the
increasing societal pressures to protect one’s good name. Concepts suggested by the
terms ‘inviolate personality’, the ‘rights of reputation’ and ‘rights to privacy’ all capture
the idea of individual and societal pressures on the law to recognize such interests as of
right. In this section Roscoe Pound and Robert Post provide much of the groundwork
on reputational theory as it began in Europe and influenced privacy law in America. In
this section, the contributions of Lawrence McNamara and Giovanni Sartor bring a
historical perspective to how reputation has been treated by law in European nations,
and Internet scholars Viktor Mayer-Schoenberg and dana boyd analyze how those ideas
have transformed with the migration online of many social communications. Those
authors represent an emergent literature on the interconnectedness of Internet
reputations and changing perceptions of the public/private divide. The ideas of Stijn
Smet and Laura E. Heymann are introduced for their questioning of that link between
reputation and privacy, a relationship that the Internet has recalibrated in light of the
widely expanded online audience to our communications.
Former Harvard Law Dean Roscoe Pound’s 1915 article Interests of Personality
can be considered one of the earliest serious investigations of reputation in the
American legal tradition. 102 It examines not the law itself, but the interests around
reputation that the law seeks to protect. Pound, like his Harvard contemporaries Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren, looks for inspiration to the principles of law on reputation
and privacy long developed within the European tradition. He concludes, however, that
each society translates into law very different interests it considers most worthy of
protection.
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The safeguarding of man from direct or indirect physical injury has historically
been one of law’s primary interests. In those situations, law is designed to ward off harm
and to maintain social order.103 Where individual, rather than societal, interest is
involved, Pound notes that the intangible quality of honour is the primary interest of
man: the “standing among brave men regardful of their honor” is an interest for law that
supersedes mere physical integrity.104

Pound suggests individual rights of privacy

were the first in western history to be recognized by law, primarily through the
personal interests of the sovereign.105 That concept became somewhat muddled in
European countries, Pound notes, when the sovereign simultaneously juggled
individual interests and societal interests as a regime head. Pound reminds us that
recognition of individual rights, which originated in ius natural or the natural law of
classical Rome, formed only the first step in protecting a societal interest in security of
the person. Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the whole course of the law had
been to disentangle individual interests from group or societal interests and to use the
law to secure those rights. Pound stresses that a bill of rights formalizes the assertion of
individual rights against those of the state and defines societal rights. 106
Natural rights are interests Pound feels the law should protect. But how, he asks,
do we construct a law that will protect the natural rights of honour or personality?
Here Pound calls on the German law’s concept of persönlichkeitsrechten that can be
translated variously as individual rights, rights of personhood, personal freedom, right
to personal privacy, or personality rights.107 The judiciary in Germany has played a
prominent or active role in the development of the law of personality. That development
has been the envy of, and inspiration for, some America legal thinkers. 108 An
examination of decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional
Court, both of Germany, shows a most critical role in the development of a right of
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personality through their interpretations of the Basic Law109 and the Civil Code. We
will develop that comparison more fully in Chapter 4 infra.
The thoughts on personhood and personal dignity as presented by Immanuel
Kant (1724-1804) have had a key influence on the German, and wider European,
concept of persönlichkeitsrechten. Briefly, as a disciple of humanism, Kant believed that
every rational creature exists as a goal onto himself, not as a “means for optional use by
this or that volition.”110 Kant conceived of what he called a Kingdom of Ends where all
inhabitants are treated as their own end, rather than as at the whim of other people’s
expectations or desires. That process is a rational one. Within the Kingdom of Ends,
Kant suggested, people could be treated with respect regarding their personhood and
dignity, and always as an end in themselves.111
Kant’s conceptualization of personhood or persönlichkeitsrechten found favour with
Brandeis and Warren in late 19th century America.112 In attempting to find a right,
beyond a proprietary one, that would forestall publication of personal secrets, the
authors promoted the principle of an inviolate personality.113 They argued such a right
already existed in the common law as a right of privacy, “as a part of the more general
right of immunity of the person – the right to one’s personality.”114 Those ideas found
renewed favour with legal thinkers in the aftermath of the Second World War in the
context of the horrors to human dignity perpetrated by Hitler’s regime and the
holocaust. As stated by German’s Federal Constitutional Court, citizens cannot be made
the mere object of the state, for “the intrinsic dignity of the person consists in
recognition of him as an independent personality”.115
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Pound’s Interests of Personality was published during the first World War,
however, and a right of privacy was not codified in America until 1974. Pound found
ways to subsume privacy rights in other causes of action. He separated interests in
honour or personality from what he called interests in substance or property. For
example, if an author uses real names and actual details about a third person in his work
of fiction, that third person has two interests: the personality interest in not having his
intimate life detailed in a work of fiction (related to honour or personality) and the
proprietary interest in the use of his name (substance or reputation). 116 Pound
recommended the first set of rights be asserted through the emerging law of torts,
following the recommendation of Warren and Brandeis, in order to protect the privacy
of man’s inviolate personality, and the latter rights through laws of property.117
Pound reminds us that American law, unlike European legal tradition, was slow
to recognize wrongs against one’s sensibilities, what in Roman law was termed
contumelia or injury to honour through insult. In the very early European tradition,
…the beginnings of [defamation] law measured composition not by the extent
of injury to the body, but the extent of injury to honor and the extent of desire
for vengeance thus aroused, since the interest secured is really the social interest
in preserving the peace. 118
Thus were linked the individual and societal interests in reputation. The law was also
protective of individuals suffering coercive actions that forced their will. One could be
coerced, for example, by having his honour tested, in which case he would be forced to
act out of revenge to recover that honour. The law of equity arose to deal with what the
Romans called metus or duress on the human will imposed by such coercive action.
As early as 1826 in England, lawyer and jurist Thomas Starkie challenged the
idea that law should confine itself to tangible property. He argued that reputation, as an
object of injury, owes its existence and importance to the various “artificial
relationships” that are created as society evolves.119 Attacks on reputation could thereby
create causes of action for injury within the professional sense, what Post identified as
any endeavor involving talent or industrious will. That theme was repeated in America
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by pastor Joel Hawes in his 1828 address to the young men of Hartford and New Haven.
He proposed that character is not inherited from parents nor is it a “necessary
appendage of birth, or wealth, or talents, or station; but the results of one’s own
endeavors.” 120 Armed with “good principles” as revealed through virtuous and
honourable action, men’s character can be viewed as a form of capital that builds societal
worth for garnering “patronage and support”.121
By Pound’s time in America, the early 20th century, legal recognition of
intangible harm was not formalized. In order to be recognized in law, such harm had to
be appended to actions for physical injury. Pound continued to promote reputational
rights when he spoke of having an interest in preventing “private personal affairs…laid
bare to the world”.122 For Pound, “a man’s feelings are as much a part of his personality
as his limbs” 123 and equity law should step in to safeguard feelings, primarily through
the granting of injunctions.
Throughout the 20th century, European efforts to protect reputation produced a
more uniform body of law than in America.124 The persistent influence over the ages of
the Roman principle of ius natural (natural justice) and laws on (insult) can be seen as an
enduring theme in the harmonization of laws requisite for the formation of the
European Union. Today, Europeans continue to look to statute law to protect their
fundamental privacy interests.125
In America, by contrast, the US Constitution does not directly address either
rights to privacy or reputation, although some state constitutions do. Reputational
privacy is dealt with through a more sector-by-sector and industry-specific body of
consumer laws, what co-authors Meg Ambrose and Jef Ausloos have called “situational
regulations”. 126 As a result, reputational privacy is addressed through the tort of
defamation that deals with untrue statements and the later emerging privacy torts of
120
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false light, public disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion and
misappropriation.127
Yale Law Dean Robert C. Post recognizes the proprietary aspect of reputation as
one of three categories addressed by the law of defamation. The other two are
reputation as honour and as dignity.128 Reputation has rarely been defined at common
law and Robert Post suggests it resides in the “social apprehension we have of each
other.”129 Post advises that we can come closer to a definition by examining the nature
of the injuries that defamation law is meant to redress as well as the nature of the social
relationship that reputation is meant to uphold.
Reputation as property encompasses the notion of one’s name as a marketable
commodity, what Post defines as “intangible property akin to goodwill”. 130 Such
favourable reputation is usually gained through manifestation of particular skills or
abilities and is developed through one’s efforts and labours.131 The conceptualization of
reputation as property was first explored at English common law in Gee v. Pritchard, a
case involving a threat of exposure by a son of his mother’s private letters.132 The case
stood for the proposition that there was relief in property, but not in equity, for injury
to personality. The court of Chancery granted the mother an injunction against their
publication.
Today, according to Post, reputation as property is based on the belief that
community members are linked to each other through the workings of the market. The
market determines the value of each person’s talents or labours. To untruthfully attack
another’s reputation within that context is to unjustly destroy the marketable worth of
one’s labour.133 Within that economic construct, Post points out that one can always
create a new reputation, given that our good name is our own creation in the first place.
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The making of reputation via the market is open to all; the evaluation of one’s
reputation on the market determines who shines, whose worth is more or less, and
whose name is devalued. Compensation is due directly to the person offended, but only
to the extent that the injury to reputation can be measured by market standards.
By contrast, reputation as honour captures the idea that our value is determined
by our personal identification with the normative characteristics of a particular societal
role. In return, we personally receive from others the regard, status, and estimation that
society accords to that role.134 We are not all equal under this scheme, unlike in the
reputation-as-property construct. Our reputation becomes tied to institutional roles
society assigns to us and is, therefore, not capable of change at our own hands. Our
value cannot be converted into a medium of exchange. Further, injury to one’s honour
creates injury to our societal status and thus to our entire social system.135 Post
analogizes that to challenge one’s honour through accusations is akin to defaming the
honour of the King that, at early common law, would have been viewed as an attack on
the entire government and on the relationship the monarch held with his subjects.136
Just as we cannot create our own societal worth, it is not in our hands to alter it
singlehandedly. Society has just as significant a stake in keeping our reputation
unsullied as we do as individuals.137 Post criticizes the judiciary for focusing, not on
pecuniary compensation, but on restoring our honour through apologies, retractions
and the publicity generated by the court decisions themselves. Most such activities have
been redressed in criminal courts “where the truth of the statement is immaterial and
the plaintiff’s redress is vindication” imposed through incarceration or hefty fines.138
Reputation as dignity focuses on the relationship between our public and private
selves, in Post’s view.139 As we connect socially to our communities, we internalize
those relationships to build our private selves. Public and private dignities are thereby
intertwined. Under the reputation-as-dignity construct, defamation law is the right tool
to address reputational damage, unlike in the honour scenarios. In the face of attacks on
our dignity, the law of defamation aims to (1) keep our dignity intact to maintain a
134

Id at 700.
Id. at 701.
136
Id. at 702.
137
Id. at 820.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 703.
135

36

positive personal identity while (2) protecting society’s communal identity.140 In that
respect, reputation as honour and reputation as dignity are similar, although the former
is framed as a social good and focuses on the individual’s contributing role to his society
while reputation-as-dignity is all about the individual’s inherent membership in the
community. Dignity in Post’s lexicon is not viewed as an acquisitive concept but
inherent or ‘intrinsic in every human being’.141 Compensation for defaming our dignity
must be of the rehabilitative kind, therefore, of giving back what we have always had.
That can be achieved legally through a declaratory judgment, to confirm our
membership within our community.142
Post also reminds us of the crucial role played by the 1964 US Supreme Court
judgment in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan as the first to bring defamation within the
wider framework of the First Amendment right of free speech.143 Defamation litigation
has been dominated by considerations of basic expressive freedoms ever since. 144
Sullivan had the potential to change the course of defamation law because the trial judge
instructed the jury that such statements were “libelous per se”, that legal injury could be
implied without proof of actual damages, and that compensatory damages could be
awarded because malice was presumed if unsavory statements were found to have been
published by the defendant relating to a public figure. The US Supreme Court disagreed,
however, holding that actual malice or knowledge that the statements are false or a
reckless disregard of the truth, must be proven to establish a case of defamation.
According to media rights scholar Lawrence McNamara of Reading University,
any development of the law of reputation is hampered by a lack of “sufficient attention
paid to the nature of reputation or to the relationship between reputation and
defamation.”145 How can the law protect what it has not defined? He focuses not only on
140

Alice E. Marwick et al., Youth, Privacy and Reputation (Literature Review) Berkman Center
Research Publication, 10-29. (2010).
141
Post supra, fn 82 at 712.
142
See also Amiram Yehudai, Informational Blackmail: Survived by Technicality, 92 MARQ. L. REV.,
779, 821 (2009).
143
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
144
Post supra fn 82 at 693. Sullivan, an elected public official in Montgomery, Alabama,
included in his duties the supervision of the police. He brought suit against the defendant news
service for libel contained in an advertisement in the newspaper with information, some true
and some not, that police under Sullivan’s control had attacked students and a civil rights
leader involved in a civil rights demonstration.
145
LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION, 1 (2007).

37

the legal tests as a means to that definition but also on the moral challenge such inquiry
sets. Regarding the former, a defamatory statement was determined at common law to
be one “calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule.”146 Into the twentieth century, the House of Lords modified the
severity of that test to a requirement that the plaintiff be lowered “in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society generally.”147 McNamara would agree with Post that
reputation is “intimately related to the concept of community” but focuses on the moral
values by that community.148 He reminds us of the more vernacular tone of the test in
Australia, that of the “ordinary decent or ‘right-thinking’ folk” who influence our
reputation depending on whether our statements or image would make them think the
less of us as a person.149
McNamara offers the following definition of reputation: a social judgment of the
person based upon facts that are considered relevant by a community.150 Unlike other
definitions that he believes focus on either property or personality, McNamara stresses
four components: judgment indicates a communal evaluation of the person; a focus on
facts encompasses both implications of something a person has done (such as taking a
bribe) or a characteristic they possess (such as sexuality); a reputation is social because it
is a product of association; and those facts must be considered relevant by a community.
McNamara reminds us that, prior to the age of Enlightenment of the 18th century,
knowledge about how one ought to live “the good life” was derived from traditional
institutions, most notably those focusing on religion.151 Moral judgments, and hence
reputation, were tied into how closely one aligned her daily life and deeds with the
precepts of the prevailing creed. The Enlightenment moved the fundamental source of
knowledge about the physical world to reason, with its emphasis on independent and
critical thought. People began to pursue individual freedoms of thought and action that,
in turn, reshaped their relationship with their communities. In practical terms, that
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pursuit led some to found the democratic community of early America, based on the
pursuit of human liberties and an escape from the older moral and societal tethers of
traditional Europe. Underscoring that transition was the technological advances that
re-defined working and socializing on both sides of the Atlantic. Looked at from
McNamara’s perspective, modernity was “an advance in the project of human
freedom.”152
McNamara suggests that moral judgment and the composition of community is
still crucial to our reputations because morals become visible when norms are contested.
Employing the example of homosexuality,153 socially transmitted diseases,154 and sexual
assault,155 he illustrates that values are not uniform from one community to another.
When comments are made or images created that raise allegations of defamation, a
court must form a view about who are the decent, right -thinking people who can serve
as a legal standard in that community. He rejects the older legal tests of defamation that
measured how a person’s actions caused his community to shun and avoid him, or to
ridicule him because those tests lack a moral component. The law can therefore only
protect reputation if it exists in a genuine moral community. The problem with late
modern life in western societies is that there exist competing moral taxonomies to
reflect moral diversity. Based on that shift, McNamara approves of the American
approach that a statement is defamatory if it would tend to prejudice the plaintiff in the
eyes of a substantial and respectable minority.”156
McNamara has developed his theories of reputation within the digital age; it is
significant to the import of his analysis, therefore, that his primary work, Reputation and
Defamation, published in 2007, makes no direct reference to the Internet community or
online social networks. He might be making oblique reference to online communities
when he concludes:
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…the courts are required to form a sense of how the jurisdiction forms a
community. This may not be straightforward because contemporary Western
jurisdictions are not easily seen as sharing a commitment to common values.
…They are not self-evidently ‘communities’. 157 [emphasis added]
Within the digital communications environment, reputation is integrally linked
to trust, according to Giovanni Sartor, Professor of Legal Informatics at European
University Institute. He finds an interesting, nurturing relationship between the two;
trust is necessary because social rules online are weak, especially between parties who
are distant in space and culture.158 Sartor defines reputation as “the evaluative opinion
people have of us, and the social mechanism that produces such an opinion”.159 Due to
the superficial nature of online conversations, and the fact that contacts are often not
likely to be repeated, we seek a rational basis for reliance on such contacts. That comes
from information about the individual counterpart, particularly reference to his or her
social consideration, that is, to reputation. Reputation emerges from shared beliefs that,
as McNamara warned above, are increasingly rare in the moral sphere of postmodern
life. Sartor advises we particularly need to rely on such reputational information as
specific attitudes and capacities (such as technical competence of a professional) and the
person’s propensity to act in a certain way, through indications of prior cooperation,
reciprocity, respect for existing conventions, and of other people’s interests. By relying
on an individual’s reputation, we gain a cognitive basis for our decisions to trust that
individual, and we induce that person to behave in a certain way, and to do so
consistently, so we can rely on his continued participation.
Sartor enters the robust debate about online rights of erasure by arguing
against an absolute right of the data subject to determine which data is made public. If a
person has an absolute right to self-determination over her data, that could “impair the
correct formation of reputation” by blocking the circulation of any negative information
regarding her, thereby making “reliable reputation unavailable”. Those who become
aware of the filtering of personal details will tend not to develop trust in her as a
resource of accurate information.
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Sartor cites US Court of Appeal Justice Richard Posner who views informational
privacy as an inappropriate subject of legal protection because, by allowing the data
subject to pick and choose the personal information about her that is released to others,
it encourages a type of self censoring that projects a false or incomplete reputation and
hence engenders fraud. That would amount, in Posner’s view, to a right to privacy
giving legal protection to deception. Further, it would lead to an erosion of trust and
would assert a paternalistic intervention that threatens the autonomous functioning of
the markets in a free market system. Sartor agrees: he sees a “double noxious effect” of
self-censoring: on the one hand it permits a person to manipulate his personal image,
and on the other it impedes the “autonomous formation of social opinion” that shapes
reputation.
Sartor admits that favouring privacy-as-data control protects certain important
legal values, such as freedom, intimacy and dignity. As well, it ensures the possibility
that one can change and that keeping certain personal information private can prevent
discrimination. The latter is particularly important for avoiding stigmatization, a
shunning that can influence others to discriminate, often based on erroneous
information. As well, Sartor sees virtue in controlling the revelation of certain data
about oneself to people who are able to put them into context. On the other hand, too
much context is the online norm when we just use a cursory search to familiarize
ourselves with a person and their deeds. With an overabundance of information
available, what Thierer recognizes as “an increasingly intractable information control
problem”,160 we tend to settle for just a few search entries that might give an incomplete,
biased or even false representation. More information might put those impressions in
context but it might, just as well, confuse or further bias the reader. Without individual
data control, warns Sartor, the sheer barrage of information overwhelms us or demands
too much time to sort through, so we revert to accepting the first few ‘facts’ and
descriptions to come to an assessment of a stranger’s reputation.
Internet scholar Mayer-Schonberger focuses on the negative effects brought to
reputation by the heightened visibility of the Internet. “Consider that in the analog age,
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if one had a dark side, he could hide it”.161 He agrees with author and legal historian
Lawrence Friedman’s aphorism “if you can’t be good, be careful”162 to point out the
enhanced transparency offered by the Internet. That has societal benefits for learning
more about each other and reducing people’s inclination to hide their dark sides. MayerSchonberger proceeds to show, however, that deception and creating a false reputation
is just as easy online as offline. Although digital memory is static and constant, and so
perpetuates any errors about our histories, we can easily manipulate our reputation by
selecting what information about us we post online in the first place.163 We therefore
retain some control over our public selves, although we lose the power balance when it
comes to the unilateral data collection by governments and corporations.
Reputation management has emerged as one solution to that control dilemma.164
As anyone exposed to digital natives will quickly affirm, “major aspects of their lives –
social interactions, friendships, civic activities – are mediated by digital technologies.”165
John Palfrey and Urs Gasser distinguish between a person’s personal identity and social
identity. Within the life of a 16 year-old girl, her personal identity might be
controllable, through her self-expression and interests. Her social identity, however, is
primarily beyond her control. Her social identity is visible to onlookers at any moment
from associations she makes on Facebook, MySpace and other social networking spaces
or links in blogs that become links in other people’s blogs. In turn, “the actions of her
friends, and their shifting reputations, can affect her identity and reputation in ways that
third parties can observe.”166
While messaging, posting and other user-generated activities have, to date,
come with little cost or apparent supervision, Internet scholars complain of one’s loss of
control of online identity. As social image-making migrates to the Internet, gossip and
shaming are shifting dimension. Particularly influenced are young Internet users who
rarely distinguish “the online and offline versions of themselves” when thinking about
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peer opinion of their identities. 167 Coupled with the instantaneous and worldwide
accessibility offered by digital media, the functional fluidity between real world and
virtual presentation of self creates new kinds of opportunities for youth to “connect,
communicate and develop their public identities”.168 Mizuko Ito et al. studied young
Americans under 25 over a 3-year period to learn how they were integrating new media
into their everyday agenda and practices, and how that changed their negotiations with
adults over literacy, learning and authoritative knowledge. 169 They found online
socializing connected peers through niche interests, but also afforded opportunities to
publicize themselves through their creative work, hence gaining new forms of visibility
and reputation.
Marwick et al., in their literature review of Youth, Privacy, and Reputation, found
young people were quite sensitized to reputational risks from marketers, online
predators, identity thieves, and future employers. They seemed less aware that their
private data could be manipulated or transferred from one source to another. While
acknowledging that young people go online to seek validation by their peers, they also
crave new spaces for socialization, exploration and experimentation. Those objectives
pose high reputational risks. Marwick et al. noted that youth’s perception of online space,
unlike that of their parents and other adults, is of a private social space; they regard
Facebook and other net platforms as virtual corners to hang out, engage in personal
talk and gossip, flirt, share secrets, and conduct all the other social behaviors that they
engage in offline. They therefore view any attempts at access or oversight by those
adults as a clear invasion of their private space. Palfrey and Gasser worry about youth’s
inability to distinguish between “the online and offline versions of themselves” as they

167

Marwick, supra fn 140 at 51.
Mizuko Ito et al., Living And Learning With New Media: Summary Of Findings From The
Digital Youth Project, John D and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital
Media and Learning, 9-10 (2008),
https://mitpress.mit.edu/sites/default/files/titles/free_download/9780262513654_Living_and_Le
arning.pdf .
169
Id. at 1 (The ethnographic study focused on various geographical sites and research
methods, ranging from questionnaires, surveys, semi-structured interviews, diary studies,
observation, and content analyses of media sites, profiles, videos, and other materials.
Collectively, the research team conducted 659 semi-structured interviews and collected 10,468
profiles of subscribers to sites such as MySpace, Facebook and Neopets, 15 online discussion
group forums, and more than 389 videos.)
168

43

establish and communicate their identities simultaneously in the physical and digital
worlds.”170
Social media scholar dana boyd points out that online networking is based on
the profile system, a use of the individual home page that allows users to create a
persona they choose to present publicly. Those data include a referential list of friends
and ample opportunity to comment on others’ profiles, friends, opinions, images and
other components of reputation building. The significance of those aspects of online
interaction is that they are very public in nature: “friends are publicly articulated,
profiles are publicly viewed, and comments are publicly visible.”171 The result is that, in
all cultures where Internet access is possible, every user has the potential to be a
celebrity. Consider the few who gained such fame or notoriety in Brandeis’ day: one had
to be significantly in the public eye through professional achievements, or the
vicissitudes of fame and notoriety. Only those few were gossiped about in any
significant public way: today all of us are learning to expect the scrutiny that was once
reserved for the “famous and infamous”.172 “You have movie-star issues,” commented
one such social media user, “and you’re just a person.” The sobering cultural impact of
such unprecedented voyeurism, exhibitionism and inadvertent publicity is that the
Internet’s constant remembering threatens, “at an almost existential level”, our ability
to reinvent ourselves and overcome our miscues of the past.173
Laura E. Heymann notes that beyond plaintiff and defendant, another interested
party in the matter of reputation is the audience or society whose judgments mold those
reputations.174 She observes that society holds a responsibility for the stability of
reputations and for encouraging community cohesion or in curbing the flow of false or
hyperbolic information. In Heymann’s words, “an audience-focused theory helps explain
the importance of truth to the construction of reputation.”175 It is socially problematic
for a society’s members to be generating false information about themselves or other
170
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members. Society also plays a role in fine tuning what speech it will tolerate in order
not to chill democratic participation: mere opinion, satire, and defamatory statements
about public figures will be tolerated to the extent they are not done with malice or they
do not incite violence.176
Finally, the ideas of Stijn Smet regarding the relationship between free speech
and individual reputation are important for what they reveal about adjudicating
opposing fundamental rights. Smet gives the example of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) that guarantees both the right of free expression177 and the
right to protection of one’s reputation.178 That information is important for the clarity it
can bring to judicial reasoning when both rights are recognized as having value. Smet
proposes a three-step model: first, determine whether the case presents a “false
conflict”. 179 Such a situation might occur when, for example, one party is under
procedural pressure that compromises his ability to adequately present his case. The
necessity to bring an action within a reasonable time might be represent such pressure.
A judge in that case can show some latitude in the procedural rules, thereby averting a
false conflict. Secondly, determine whether a compromise is available that will keep both
rights intact as much as possible.180 If no compromise exists, a judge must compare the
rights according to the following criteria: 1) which right, if denied, would create the
most serious impact; 2) does the infringement affect a core or periphery aspect of the
right; 3) are there additional rights in the balance for either party; 4) does either right
involve a general interest shared by other members of society; 5) is either right to be
exercised in a manner that is contrary to the very aim it is designed to achieve; and 6)
are both rights being exercised responsibly.181 Those concepts illuminate the values a
court would assign to reputation and free expression when faced with their conflict.
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2.2

Theorizing Memory

Has it ever struck you, Connie, that life is all memory, except for the one
present moment that goes by you so quick you hardly catch it going?182
***
The beauty of the human mind and human forgetting is that, as we forget,
we’re able to generalize, to abstract, to see the forest rather than the individual
tree.183
In this section we call on various theorists of memory, from both the
individual and collective perspective, to build an appreciation of the new face of memory
in the digital terrain. First, we consider the creative process involved in memory as set
out by British psychologist Reginald Bartlett in the early 20th century and how that
process reaches dramatic results in the 21st century with the activities that produce
false memory. Next, legal historian Inga Markovits develops a theory that our
memories, particularly as they recreate prominent people and events, are shaped and
manipulated by the powerful and political. Gary Fine, as behavioral scientist, illustrates
how moral entrepreneurs can manufacture disparate reputational fates for two historical
figures who, by all accounts, are very similar in make-up, experience and abilities.
Jonathan Zittrain shows how video images can distort memory and perpetuate
embarrassing or false stories that are best left unexposed. The work of Liam Bannon
discusses how both memory and forgetting are necessary to avoid the banality
introduced into our lives by man-machine interactivities. Perfect remembering is a
concept addressed by Internet scholar Viktor Mayer-Schonberger who emphasizes the
tasks required of online functioning that call on a healthy dose of daily forgetting. For
Canadian scholar Patrick Macklem, law is memory, as exemplified by the struggles of
the Brok family to gain restitution for property they owned in pre-war Prague. What
these various accounts tell us is that the way we remember might be as significant to
reputation as what we remember.
Liam Bannon admonishes us as individual Internet users for not fully
appreciating the beneficial necessity of forgetting. His studies focus on social and
cultural nuances that could keep our highly technologically-infused lives in the future
from a banal and barren pre-occupation with machines. Bannon suggests that we can
182
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fight such banality by grasping “the duality of human memory,” the equal importance of
forgetting and remembering.184 As a balance to the information processing skills that
we have all been taught since the arrival of the computer, Bannon sees a dire need for a
“judicious forgetting” that can ease our immersion into a future world where human
intervention in the interconnectivity of machines will be negotiated on a daily basis.185
Bannon frames his considerations of forgetting as a positive feature of present
and future life, not a default mechanism within the emerging technologies of ambient
intelligence and ubiquitous computing. The latter advances in communications
technology have the potential to enable most of our future functioning in society via
machines talking to machines, ideally in our service but without much human
intervention. That development, argues Bannon, has us thinking that forgetting is a
passive activity, something that occurs when there is a default in our abilities to amass
and remember unquantifiable amounts of information. Forgetting, Bannon argues, is an
active pursuit, not a mechanical erasure or failure to retrieve.186 He presents, as support,
the commentary of early 20th century British psychologist Sir Frederick Bartlett on the
less-than-perfect virtues of human remembering:
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable fixed, lifeless and
fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or construction,
built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass of
organized past reactions or experience, and to a little outstanding detail which
commonly appears in image or in language form. It is thus hardly ever really
exact, even in the most rudimentary form of rote recapitulation, and it is not at
all important that it should be so. 187
Bartlett’s thesis is that not only is human remembering imperfect but it is not a
full-package experience stored in the brain. It is comprised of various images that are
constructed in the moment. Remembering is a creative act, seldom a “fixed, lifeless”
copy of the original experience as was earlier thought.
Bannon concludes that forgetting is good for human well-being as it overcomes
the stultifying and paralytic effects of amassing so much accurately retained data. He
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recommends several technical solutions that will help Internet users to forget: marking
private emails and messages so that permission is required before anyone can pass them
on; constructing digital shelters within our community where electronic signals are
blocked within the shelter and people can gain some reprieve from always being
plugged in;188 creating personal sweeper technologies that would hinder the pickup of
meaningful signals from particular sites, akin to military jamming technologies; and
electronic tagging of information with ‘sell-by’ dates, after which the information would
self-destruct. Bannon is most insistent that, whatever our choice of technology to take
us away from total remembering, our ability to live in the moment indicates our comfort
with submitting to temporary oblivion which he holds as having positive benefits to our
social and economic lives.
Peter Fleischer, Chief Privacy officer for Google, suggests that seeking a clean
digital slate marks an attempt to let people “wash away digital muck”, or to “delete the
embarrassing stuff”.189 He plays down claims to a right to oblivion as a mere fashion,
what he calls the “new black of censorship fashion”. From his corporate perspective,
Fleischer sees privacy being used as a screen to justify online censorship or, in the case
of journalists and the First Amendment right, what used to be achieved by crying libel
or defamation. He warns that recognition of the right to censor opens up the floodgates
to Internet regulation, a possibility that the public have, to this point, ardently rejected
as repressing free speech.
False remembering is another facet of memory that draws suspicion and distrust,
and can be catastrophic for reputations. In the alternative, it can be met with
understanding or a willingness to explore further the processes of memory.190 Similar
experiences of two American public figures make the case. NBC Nightly News anchor
Brian Williams “misremembered” actual events when he reported being on a Chinook
helicopter in Iraq in 2003 that was forced to land under enemy fire. Further
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investigation in 2015 reveals Williams was on another helicopter that arrived one hour
after the event.191 Similar claims of having a different memory than the official story
were made by then-US First Lady Hillary Clinton in 2007. She stated she had been the
victim of sniper fire while disembarking from a plane in Bosnia; videos of the event
show no such disturbance.192 When faced with widespread journalistic accusations of
filing a false report 193 or “concocting war stories” 194 (in Williams’ case) or of
“mischaracterizing”

or

“overstating”

her

foreign

political

experiences

(in

Clinton’s),195both public figures admitted to telling and retelling the story over the
years to the point of believing their false accounts.
Similar observations were made of President Ronald Reagan who, according to
biographers, gave others the impression that he had been at Normandy and at the
liberation of the Nazi death camps when he had, in fact, spent the war making movies in
Hollywood. Reagan reportedly later told an associate, "Maybe I had seen too many war
movies, the heroics of which I sometimes confused with real life."196 While Brian
William’s employers speak of his “inexcusable” behavior and distance themselves from
his story by placing him under a period of suspension, Williams speaks of the incident as
where “we were all I think - scared…and it all became a fog of getting down on the
ground.” Regarding his false story, he stated, “I don’t know what screwed up in my
mind that caused me to conflate one aircraft from the other [sic]”197
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Clinton defends her recreated memory of the Bosnia event by stating she was
merely mistaken and subject to human error.198 Both explanations, if true, support
Frederick Bartlett’s assertion that memories are dynamic and mu reconstructions of
disruptive events, not static copies of their elements. Proof is elusive, however, as
memories can only be communicated through the holder’s recall, a process that is little
understood by medical science. Cognitive psychologist Christopher Chabris of Union
University in New York explains how memory distortion occurs: “each time you are
telling a story you are not pushing play on a cd player but reconstructing the event” and
the “information is assembled from different sources. You insert that into your story.”199
So you lose the ability to tell which part is false. The lesson overall is that memory is
less reliable than we think.
Julia Shaw, professor of forensics at the UK University of Bedfordshire agrees
that memory is constructive and might not signify an attempt to deceive or behave in a
way that is less trustworthy. 200 Shaw and Stephen Porter of the University of British
Columbia have implanted complex false memories of committing crimes into subjects
through guided imagery. In a recent experiment, they determined that of 30
participants who were falsely told they had committed a crime as a teenager 21 (71%)
were classified as having developed a false memory of the crime.
False memory research has contributed in some respects to our understanding
of our memory recreation processes. We are learning, for example that memory is
greatly affected by the choice of wording used by another when he questions our version
of events,201 and that false conclusions can be convincingly implanted for an event that
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never happened.202 The implications of such massaging of memories are profound for
our reputations and careers. Further research might help ease public suspicions of
memory that is inconsistent with the original event, such as learning that a good mood
is more likely to colour memory than sadness,203 or that false memory can be triggered
by sleep deprivation.204 For now, our understanding as a western society of the psychochemistry of memory, like the sociality of reputation, is disappointingly rudimentary.
Mayer-Schönberger posits that the difference between how humans remember
and how the Internet remembers is deep and fundamental: humans forget, or remember
selectively, while the Internet remembers everything in perpetuity.205 He points to time
and money as the factors that, in the pre-digital age, discouraged the storage of large
masses of information. With the arrival of digital acquisition and cloud computing,
storage of limitless amounts of data is possible. In the pre-digital era, storage of analog
information meant costly physical space, and costly retrieval. All of those objections
have been met by digital technology that compresses data infinitesimally, and makes
accessing that information far easier.
Mayer-Schönberger comments on the sheer bilge of online data that has
accumulated as a result: “now we are steeped, not just in knowledge, but in memory”.206
That development comes with problems of its own; primarily the difficulty of achieving
any systematic, depersonalized retrieval or analysis of such Big Data. MayerSchönberger highlights what we have lost in the progression to digital memory. Human
forgetting, he reminds us, both on the individual and societal level, allowed us to act and
think in the present rather than being tethered to an ever-more-comprehensive past.
For legal historian Inga Markovits, we can have private memories and public
memories. The law plays an important role in how we remember. It shapes our

202

Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jacqueline E. Pickrell, The formation of false memories. 25 PSYCH.
ANNALS, 720-725 (1995) (implanting memories in a 14-year-old of being lost in a mall as a
child).
203
Justin Storbeck & Gerald L. Clore, With Sadness Comes Accuracy; With Happiness, False
Memory Mood and the False Memory Effect, 16 PSYCH. SCI., 785-791 (2005).
204
Steven J. Frenda, et al., Sleep Deprivation and False Memories, PSYCH. SCI. (2014) (false
memory was noted where encoding occurred after a prolonged period of no sleep, not before).
205
Mayer-Schonberger, supra fn 161 at 32.
206
Id at 12.

51

recollections of the past to fit those who dominate the present.207 She points out that, as
individuals, we have no control over our memories. “We forget what we would like to
remember, remember what we would like to forget”, have memories triggered by what
we smell and taste, and must accept that “events become important because we
remember them”.208 For private, individual memory the past rules the present. With
Markovits’ public memory, however, the converse rules: the present rules the past.
Powerful public figures in each era determine which names and events survive as
worthy of remembrance. She gives the example of public monuments, which are chosen
by the political elite and strategically placed to perpetuate the public memory of a
particular individual and his/her particular deeds. No society prefers to memorialize its
bad deeds (slavery in the US) or people (holocaust perpetrators in Germany). Those acts
are excised as mistakes of history. In that respect, public memory legitimates selective
past acts and personalities.209
Law seems a likely candidate to assist with memory, argues Markovits. It has a
lot to do with legitimacy and it proto-typifies model citizens, such as the ‘prudent’ or
‘reasonable’ man and the ‘reckless’ driver. Informed by our likes, dislikes, moral wishes
and concepts of the norm, the law validates those past events of which we approve, and
punishes those we do not. Law, therefore, has developed rules on how to investigate the
past by discriminating what is legally ‘reliable’ from what is not.210 Law accomplishes
that objective by setting requirements for standards of proof, burdens of proof, fictional
ideals such as the ‘reasonable man’ or ‘right thinking person’, theories of the case and
stringent legal tests. Law has highly influential filtering powers when it comes to
memory. As such, it is an important medium for defining our past.
Markovits suggests that East Germany’s role in the holocaust is an apt example
of how collective memory can reshape history and dictate how we remember and forget.
There has been much recent talk in Germany about the Aufarbeitung, or ‘working over’
of past events of the Nazi regime. That word has become synonymous in modern
Germany with coming to terms with the past, or rethinking events that portray
207
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Germans in a negative light. Such an act calls on selective forgetting and remembering
that remakes the German national character like making old garments into new.211 In
other words, the past that Germany is trying to come to terms with has already been
preemptively construed by those in positions of influence.
Jonathan Zittrain notes, like Markovits, that it is the higher rung on the sociopolitical ladder that most influences what is retained and ‘remembered’ on the
Internet.212 He asks, what about historical events that, in retrospect, turn out to be
untrue; when an Internet user logs on twenty years after the posting of the inaccuracy
and there is no overriding notice that the account is in error? It is presented as if it just
occurred, and in a false light or with factual inaccuracies. The erroneous event has been
archived online in perpetuity, without any reference to its inaccuracy or
misrepresentation.
Zittrain gives as example a series of YouTube video stills portraying a bombing
in the Middle East that were photo-shopped to deceive the viewer; many years later
they persist online with no corrections or other indication that the representations are
inaccurate. The video stills show a rescuer, in a baseball cap, pulling the injured victims
of a bombing out of a rubble site. A second video still shows the same rescuer, himself
now a fatality, being lifted out of a similar pile of rubble. Through close examination,
Zittrain determines that the latter video was taken before the first still. In other words,
the photo of his removal from the rubble has been altered by photo finishing software; it
is a false portrayal of what happened. One detail that gives the duplicity away is that the
baseball cap, in the photo of the rescuer as a dead victim, is under the man’s arm and
quite obviously tightly pressed to his side. That erroneous series was posted and
distributed by Reuters, a reputable news service. Zittrain shows how, shortly after the
posting on YouTube, the fake series of images were removed from view, but are still
present in the online video archives and thereby, with a little work for the viewer,
accessible to the public. Zittrain concludes that, if it is privacy or accuracy we seek, the
Internet is not the place to find it. Even so, the offending or erroneous images persist
online into the future.
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Northeastern University behavioral scientist Gary Fine speaks of “reputational
entrepreneurs”, that powerful elite that are able to control public memory of historical
figures using their narrative facility and institutional placement. 213 Fine compares
Warren Harding and John F. Kennedy, both American presidents: the former was rated
the lowest in the estimation of historians and the public for his presidential abilities, the
latter rated near the top. Political opponents and the press set that agenda, Fine insists,
while neither colleagues nor public have risen to defend Harding. Both men were
outgoing, personally charming, popular in their roles as US Senators prior to their
terms as president, accused of sexual improprieties while in the White House, and
viewed as too close to their Attorneys General who were therefore considered political
liabilities. Both died during the third year of their presidencies. History judges Kennedy
as one of the best presidents in terms of civil rights record and overall popularity,
although Harding was equally so viewed during his tenure. In hindsight, however,
Harding is maligned as a failed president, the worst chief executive in US history.214
Fine reminds us of Durkheim’s principle at work here: that images of a highly
successful or a deeply flawed leader rallies social cohesion and communal solidarity. The
nature of that image is shaped by what Fine terms “reputational politics”. Reputations
are grounded in a social construction of character, subsequently generalized to policy
and thence to the character of the society itself.215 What politicians, competitors and
journalists determine to be the prevailing reputation of a public figure is generally the
persona adopted by historians and therefore by the public for succeeding generations.
Such manipulation constitutes collective memory.
Fine also speaks of moral entrepreneurs, those arbiters of social mores that
determine whether a historical figure has promoted or defiled the values that their
community holds dear. Over time, the evaluation of the moral worth of our leaders rests
less on their individual attributes or triumphs and more on the causes of their successes
or failures. To be recognized as a failure suggests the absence of supporters who would
propose a historical justification for a positive reputation. “[T]hus the figure is an
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‘orphan’, scorned by rivals and neglected by ostensible allies”. 216 The prevailing
impression of Harding was that he was an unintelligent man, too trusting of his cronies,
a passive leader, indifferent to corruption, and passive in execution of his duties when
the nation needed active leadership during the post World War I period. That
perception is achieved by attacking Harding’s agenda through his character, and by
controlling memories of Harding through those in command of public, collective
memory.
For Patrick Macklem of the University of Toronto, law is memory. He has
studied the struggles of the Brok family to gain restitution for property they owned in
the old city of Prague, Czechoslovakia prior to the communist takeover during the
1930s.217 The Broks owned the building and operated a textile business out of the
ground floor. They lived in a spacious apartment within the building and rented out the
remaining apartments to employees. As the Nazis began their ‘reconfiguration of
Europe’ in the 1930s, they confiscated the Brok property at Rybna 9 and transferred
title to a Slovakian company. The Broks emigrated to Canada, except for one son who
remained in the building as a tenant. After the war, Rybna 9 was treated as state
property by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and, in 1990, sold as part of the postcommunist, liberal democratic reforms, to an offshore holding company. One of those
reforms included an initiative to return property, taken by the Nazi and Communist
regimes, to their original owners.218
In contemporary Europe, post war restitution claims can be brought either
before the ECtHR or the United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘the Committee’).
The Brok family took the Czech government to court and their case was eventually
settled by the Committee in their favour under the guarantees of equality enshrined in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Macklem’s conclusion after
reviewing several restitution cases that have been decided by either fora is that the
ECtHR approaches its cases with “a modernist impulse to repudiate history” because it
refuses to entertain any equality claim under the European Convention on Human
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Rights (ECHR) regarding restitution rights in post-Communist Europe. The
Committee, however, is willing to “remember certain pasts as a matter of equality”.219
Macklem observes through the Brok case that international human rights law is
beginning to “construct legal spaces for the expression of collective memory”.220 Law
has the capacity to memorialize shared memories, a role that takes on particular
significance when a minority community is under pressure to put aside the social,
political and economic pressures of its shared past. In that sense law is “dialogical,
exercising an active and ongoing engagement with the past”. That role can justify
minority rights and prompt the larger community to respect a minority’s collective past
and present identity.221
In contrast, the ECtHR guarantees non-discriminatory enjoyment of rights and
freedoms as enshrined in Article 14 of the ECHR. The Court has long taken the narrow
view that, in order for judicial recognition as an equality right, claims must address only
those rights contained within the four corners of the Convention. By denying restitution
claims for the confiscation of property by the Nazi regime, the ECtHR has shown “a
modern impulse to repudiate Europe’s burden of the past”222 and a willingness to forget.
Macklem points out the danger in such forgetfulness: that the burden of Europe will
become heavier as it becomes “cloaked in darkness”, to the point where Europeans
might forget who they are.
In summary, the foregoing academic sources illustrate the intricate correlation
between the concepts of reputation and memory, whether within the context of a
community’s opinions that shape our individual good name or the societal and political
pressures to either remember or forget our collective pasts in order to address the
stigma created by a dark history. The significance of that symbiotic exchange is that
memory can be determinative of reputation, whether of an individual or a collective. If
those memories are complimentary, we tend to favour perpetuating them; if
unfavourable, we might seek forgetfulness or the right of erasure. In the next section,
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we explore literature that defines the role of law in protecting our privacy interest by
choosing those to whom we would reveal our personal identities and memories. We
begin with the efforts of Harvard law alumni Brandeis and Warren to import into
America the European right of privacy, with significant implications that endure into
the digital age.
2.3

Theorizing Privacy
Now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,
- the right to be left alone.223
***
Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes
of boundary management that enable and constitute self-development.
So understood, privacy is fundamentally dynamic.224

There is a considerable lack of clarity within American legal and philosophical
discourse regarding how to define privacy. American jurist Richard Posner noted in
1977 that the concept is “elusive and ill-defined”.225 Academics continue to disagree over
whether privacy is an instrumental term designed to protect core values or whether
there is something intrinsic in the concept itself that needs to be respected.226 To add to
the confusion, privacy as an academic consideration is often included under the rubric of
security, justice, liberty, or human rights.
The disparity in perceptions of the place of privacy in our lives is further
revealed by juxtaposing the above quotations, the first made in fin de siècle America by
Harvard law colleagues Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, showing hopeful
determination that one can reap the full enjoyment of life by closing one’s doors to
prying intrusions of press and government. The second quotation reveals the postmodern angst and nihilistic realism around the subject of privacy as provoked by our
entry into the digital age. Julie Cohen, in the third excerpt, is more hopeful as she
present privacy as a subjective entity we can manage and mold. In the simpler world of
223
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Brandeis and Warren, there is a clear public/private divide; in the 21st century view
that divide has collapsed or been eroded by technological gains in online
communications. Cohen speaks for the more cosmopolitan view227 that privacy is ours to
define but also to safeguard.
This section will examine that development, commencing with the seminal
contributions of Brandeis and Warren, of privacy as a legal right in America. We will
then move to Harvard Law Dean William Prosser in codifying those principles into tort
law. Prosser’s formulation will then be compared to the European, more unified
approach as exemplified in the German concept of personality rights. James Q.
Whitman will explain that comparison as the difference between a European respect for
personal dignity and the American safeguarding of personal liberty. Daniel Solove and
Lawrence Friedman comment on observable transitions between the analog and digital
worlds and the privacy challenges they pose. Helen Nissenbaum worries that the digital
world has erased context, a factor also incorporated into Jeffery Rosen’s discussion
about how one must jeopardize more of one’s privacy by revealing sufficient information
to contextualize inaccuracies that affront reputation. Dana boyd reveals a personal
digital experiment with her DNA that unwittingly exposes her extended family,
including the unborn, to unnecessary reputational invasion. She asks whether privacy is
an outdated concept that has no currency in an age of dystopian excess. Canadian
surveillance scholar David Lyon picks up that query and toys with the concept of
turning the state’s probing eye back on itself. He warns that surveillance is no longer
perceived as the horror we previously envisioned: for willing purveyors of others’
secrets, it is at worst an annoyance that has to be negotiated.
Any thorough conceptualization of privacy as a fundamental right within the
American tradition begins with two seminal articles: the first by American jurist Louis
Brandeis and journalist Samuel Warren, who urged in 1890 that privacy be cherished as
an individual civil right and its breach be a recognizable cause of action through US tort
law; and a comparative piece in 2004 by James Q. Whitman of Yale University whose
thesis is that cultural differences account for widely divergent views of privacy on each
side of the Atlantic. While American’s perception of the privacy right was founded on a
227
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culture of liberty, privacy advocates in Europe focus on the right to retain one’s
dignity.228 In Whitman’s words:
What is at stake are two different core sets of values: On the one hand, a
European interest in personal dignity, threatened primarily by the mass
media; on the other hand, an American interest in liberty, threatened
primarily by government.229
Those cultural distinctions define two very different expectations of privacy.
Brandeis and Warren remind us that the framers of the US Constitution introduced the
Fourth Amendment to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and the
unwarranted intrusion of the state into citizens’ property and private effects.230 To the
early framers of the constitution, such protection provided liberty. Those rights could
not be infringed by the state without a judicial warrant and probable cause, a
constitutional reminder that governors served at the will of the people. The roots of
privacy needs in colonial America began with conceptualizing the family home as “a
heaven for solitude and intimacy”, a barrier against the intrusion of unwanted outsiders,
including the state.231
In the early days of the American republic, expectations of privacy outside the
home were not high. With the mails as the primary communication method in the new
colony, citizens had dim hopes that their mail would arrive unopened. As first colonial
postmaster, Benjamin Franklin insisted on mail carriers swearing on oath not to open
the mails.232 Franklin’s replacement, however, in the face of the rising revolutionary tide
of 1776, warned that all mails were subject to inspection by ministerial mandate if
treason was suspected. Hence a system of Warrants of Assistance was implemented that
gave the young government wide powers of search and seizure. It was those excesses
that gave rise to the constitutional entrenchment of the Fourth Amendment and the
impetus for defining a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ for the private citizen.
228
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Through common law challenges, the public/private line has progressively blurred over
the intervening years to the point that, with the 21st century invention of wearable
technologies such as Google Glass, we can spy on each other with immunity, adopting
“participatory surveillance” that could render moot any privacy questions we might
have.233
Free speech, as protected by the First Amendment, provides the most formidable
challenge to privacy rights in America. Its development over the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries has occurred primarily through the common law. Laws have lagged
behind the development of institutional ways to access our private affairs, to the point
where technological advancement leaves our expectations acutely compromised, most
prominently by government and commercial institutions. That right is expanded by the
interpretation by American courts of the First Amendment as extending to
entrepreneurial rights as commercial free speech.
Another impediment to recognition of a right to privacy in American law was
the fact that privacy is an intangible, inchoate privilege, without physical attributes like
property, what Brandeis and Warren called the “products and processes of the mind”.234
The authors spoke of a growing desire for “the right to be left alone” from the prying
lens of photography and reportage of the news media. They had a particular aversion to
misuse of the photographic image; they were well aware of the ability of such images in
the wrong hands to foment gossip and defamatory statements.

They justified their

increased need for solitude by reference to “the intensity and complexity of life,
attendant upon an advancing civilization”.235
Brandeis and Warren proceed to establish that the law of defamation, focused as
it is on a person’s interrelations with his community, proves an effective legal
instrument to address injuries to reputation as a property claim, but insufficient to
shield a person whose feelings for privacy have been offended and who therefore seeks
to be left alone.236 They maintain that the common law protects a person’s right to
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determine when or if they wish to communicate their private thoughts and to whom.237
They insist such rights are distinct from copyright law and property law and allow for a
person to refuse publication or publicity and enjoy the “peace of mind or the relief
afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all”.238 Brandeis and Warren call
that allowance the right of “inviolate personality” and equate it to the “right to the
immunity of the person” or the German-based “right to personality”.239
Brandeis and Warren’s article is generally regarded as the impetus behind the
creation of the four privacy torts as set out in Dean Prosser’s Restatement of Tort.240
They envisioned tort law as the appropriate mechanism for asserting those rights
because the victim in a tort action could gain some satisfaction with remedies like
injunctions or monetary compensation through damage awards, unless the matter was
found to be so trivial that the court showed a preference for honouring free speech.
The interesting subtext of the article is that a seminal right to be forgotten is
being recognized and encouraged by an American jurist and a journalist as early as
1890, even if couched in the proprietary aphorism that a man’s home is his castle, a place
of respite from the public eye of the state and the media. To this day, the heart of
American privacy rights resides in protecting the sanctity of the home.
By the 1960s, Prosser had organized over 300 tort law decisions into four
discrete causes of action for breach of privacy, built upon the work of Brandeis and
Warren:

1) intrusion upon seclusion, 2) appropriation of the name or likeness of

another, 3) public disclosure of private facts “not of legitimate concern to the public”,
and 4) disclosure of private facts that portray the victim in a false light.241 Prosser
concluded that privacy law in America was best founded upon:
...four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which
are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the
plaintiff…"to be let alone."242
That observation determined that the course of privacy law would be through four
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disparate actions under tort law, not tightly bound to each other through any single
concept.
In commenting on Prosser’s achievement in clarifying privacy law, author
Samuel J. Hofstadter noted that, “the doctrine has had a checkered career”.243 Prior to
Prosser’s text, states differed not only in their view of the scope of the right of privacy
but even with respect to its existence. Prosser's classification proved “extraordinarily
persuasive for wavering state courts and legislatures”.244
Daniel

Solove

has

been

considered

the

modem

heir

to

Prosser’s

deliberations. 245 In Understanding Privacy, 246 he conceives of information privacy, a
broader field than tort privacy, in terms similar to Prosser’s approach but incorporating
“a plurality of different things” as inspired by interactions on the Internet and social
media. 247 Unlike Prosser, who imposed a pre-conceived framework of privacy principles
on different fact situations, Solove starts from the ground up, identifying the range of
harmful actions perpetuated online and arranging them into a taxonomy comprising
four privacy concepts:

(1) information collection; (2) information processing; (3)

information dissemination; and (4) invasion. Each of those groups leads in turn to
“different related subgroups of harmful activities.”248 For example, subcategories of
harm relating to information collection are (1) surveillance, and (2) interrogation.
Solove holds the belief, shared with Prosser, that privacy law concerns a range of
interests to be protected, only some of which overlap and only in certain ways.249
With the assistance of Brandeis and Warren’s historical perspective, the first
tort above, intrusion upon seclusion, tells of a right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure (as encoded in the Fourth Amendment); the second tort, the appropriation
of the name or likeness of another, suggests data appropriation that offends a right to
oblivion; the third tort, public disclosure of private facts is the clearest statement of a
civil right to privacy; and the fourth grounds, disclosure of private facts that portray the
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victim in a false light, suggests potential grounds for civil defamation suits and could
provide grounds for a right to be forgotten. Those actions are based in private law,
however, and are not actions against the state. Americans are therefore still left with no
definitive legal protection against challenges to personal privacy conducted by
government action. 250
James Whitman observes that continental European ideas of privacy even today
“are just not much at home in American legal culture”.251 While he views the Brandeis
and Warren article as an attempt to transplant a continental-style privacy law into the
American context, Whitman judges it a failure because the culture of privacy, and the
systems of law, rest on disparate principles on each side of the Atlantic. Such
discrepancies impede efforts to arrive at a definition of privacy that would be acceptable
on both continents.
Whitman reveals that the impetus for Brandeis and Warren’s article was a
report by the “yellow press” in its gossip column of a private party at the Warrens’
house, media coverage that the authors found very intrusive. 252 He suggests that
Brandeis and Warren, frustrated by the lack of protections in the extant American
common law for such intrusions on their privacy, researched the law then in vogue in
Europe and learned how it defined similar intrusions as insults to honour in French and
German law and provided grounds for offences against personality.
According to Whitman, Brandeis and Warren were aware that continental laws
could not be incorporated directly into America’s laws due to the different common law
and civil law traditions but, aware that privacy laws were not abundant in America,253
they nonetheless suggested that affronts to personality, artistic feelings and sensibilities,
like affronts and insults to one’s honour on the continent, justified actions for injury to
privacy. Tort law was the preferred forum, due to the growing reference in courts to
emotional and moral harms.254
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Whitman’s basic thesis is that American and European efforts to enact a
transnational law of “privacy” is deeply hampered by the deep-routed differences in how
privacy is perceived: in European culture it is based on a societal reverence for a
person’s dignity, closely tied to honour and addressed historically through the law of
insult, while in America privacy’s limits extend to one’s liberty and the public right to
know, as reinforced in the constitutional devotion to “life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness” and reflected in the common law and the First Amendment claims of free
expression.
Whitman points out that the cultural difference can be seen in something as
seemingly benign as the propensity of Americans to share trivial details of their private
lives to complete strangers. He cites as example the Monica Lewinski affair wherein the
most graphic details of then-American President Clinton’s extra-marital sexual
activities were front-page news. In Europe, such indiscretions by state leaders are
treated as private and not open to media exposure, unless criminal behavior is alleged.255
A more recent example that underscores Euro-American cultural differences
regarding the boundaries of private actions can be seen in the European reaction to the
New York arrest of Dominique Strauss-Kahn for sexual assault on a Sofitel domestic
worker.256 Responding to the television coverage of his arrest in handcuffs and his
parading in front of the press, Strauss-Kahn commented, “Beyond the fantastic - and
therefore incorrect - nature of this story, this is a despicable affront to my private life
and dignity”.257 To Strauss-Kahn, his reputation is tied into his dignity and honour,
matters directly connected to his private life.
A journalist for Le Nouvel Observateur, Laurent Joffrin, comments on the added
tension in France between a person’s right to privacy and the public’s right to know.258
That right to privacy instills in journalists not just a passive obligation to avoid stories
255
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that intrude on one’s privacy but an active responsibility to “protect people’s private
lives”. Strauss-Kahn was targeted by the press, not because of his sexual indiscretion or
even his alleged criminal intentions, but because his attitude toward sex and women
“smacked of a kind of ‘droit du seigneur’, a license for powerful men to have their way.”259
The line is crossed, Joffrin emphasizes, when an editor tells a journalist “to go
investigate a private life.” In America, by contrast, digging into the deepest recesses of a
public figure’s personal history for a story is just considered competent journalism.
In a similar vein, Whitman notes that Europeans perceive as crass and
outspoken the propensity of Americans to speak openly about money: salaries, property
values, business investments, to persons they have just met. The practice of reporting
credit information of private citizens to credit agencies particularly rankles the
European sense of propriety and privacy. Talking about money, and showing a
willingness to reveal very intimate information to people on the first encounter, shows
the reverence with which Americans hold rights of free speech and the primacy they
award to free enterprise and the public’s right to know, the latter usually with respect to
public figures. And yet, Americans seem deeply offended by nudity on public beaches, a
practice Europeans have taken for granted for generations. 260
In his conclusions, Whitman summarizes that Europeans value personal dignity
above all else, an intangible quality severely threatened by today’s mass media, while
Americans treasure liberty, threatened primarily by their government. Whitman
cautions that those values are neither absolute nor mutually exclusive. Nothing
prohibits safeguarding how we present ourselves while inhibiting the investigative and
regulatory excesses of the state.
Concepts of privacy continue to differ on each side of the Atlantic, however: that
might be because privacy law is the product of local anxieties and ideals. In America,
those anxieties focus on the police and other authorities who are viewed as the enemies
of personal liberty; in Europe, “they focus on the ambition to guarantee everyone’s
position in society, to guarantee everyone’s honor”, a fact about the Continent as true
today as it was in the time of the French Revolution. Whitman cautions that, whatever
position we support, we must urge jurists and lawmakers to move beyond the “shallow
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intuitionism” of decrying every invasion of privacy as “evil or horrible”. 261 In order for
law to function as law, it must work to protect what social tradition tells it is worth
safeguarding. That tradition simply does not recognize personal dignity in America nor
anti-statism in Europe.
The Internet activity of citizens of both jurisdictions does not alter those basic
values, but intensifies the opportunities for defying them through indiscriminate
voyeurism. As Solove states:
When it comes to gossip and rumor on the Internet, the culprit is ourselves.
We’re invading each other’s privacy, and we’re also even invading our own
privacy by exposures of information we later regret. 262
UCLA author Lawrence Friedman would agree that traditional patterns of
communication and hierarchies of control are no longer. As early as 1999, he observed
the passing of traditional societies, typified by European states, whose relationships
were strongly vertical and whose identity was fixed by one’s birth or social position.263
In its place was what he saw as a “horizontal society” with flattened relationships
between authority and the rest of society, and between the former titular and functional
tiers in society.

People were feeling freer to choose who they are and to form

relationships on a plane of equality, choices that relate to the former identity
determinants such as race, gender, ethnicity, and religion and that affect one’s relations
to politics, social structure, and the law. Over time, Friedman has noticed an
intensification of that horizontal reshaping of traditional life due to the Internet and the
social media networking it affords. As individuals now connect with like-minded others
across barriers of space and time, claims Friedman, global mass culture is redefining
community and replacing old loyalties and allegiances.
Similarly David Flaherty points out the linguistic complexity of thinking about
privacy in the digital age and calls for a semantic distinction between privacy protection
(a ‘broad, all-encompassing concept that envelopes a whole range of human concerns)
and data protection (a legal concern for our personal identifying data, such as birthdate,
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social insurance number, passport or credit card numbers, for example).264 With respect
to the latter, Flaherty has conducted a comprehensive study of five western democratic
states regarding the efforts of public sector institutions to protect individual privacy
from “the massive surveillance capacities of governments and corporations”.265 Countries
were chosen for their leading approach to privacy protection. He concluded that, despite
having the oldest national data protection laws, Sweden is the prototype of the
surveillance state; Germany has the most effective national privacy laws of the five
countries on the subject; Canada has the most developed system of data protection in
North America while America’s various privacy legislation is seen as practically
toothless in protecting individuals from growing personal data collection.
Privacy, Flaherty concludes, is a major human concern and people want to be
left alone with their secrets but, paradoxically, do not seem particularly vigilant in
exercising due care to protect them. Throughout the 1990s, privacy activists grew
increasingly concerned about the security of online transactional data available through
web browsing, credit-card use and intelligent highways. Today privacy scholars are
calling for a total reconsideration of the concept of privacy to reflect the increasing
technological impossibility of closing down all online platforms to the peering eyes of
corporations and the state in the name of enterprise or national security.266
The question of whether privacy matters anymore in the era of online image
management is tackled by a new breed of media scholars, well-represented by former
Microsoft researcher dana boyd. She has decided to test the limits of her networked
world “where boundaries are not so coherently defined and where entities are not so
easily articulated”.267 In a recent experiment, she provided a saliva sample for DNA
analysis. A digital reading of boyd’s DNA indicated some of her forebears probably had
origins “distinct from the family narrative”, that is, were secretly integrated into the
264
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family tree and contributed to the familial gene pool through extra-marital,
unacknowledged births. Biological indicators also told of disease probabilities that made
family medical stories either inaccurate or “statistically curious”.
In the process, boyd realized that her methodology compromised the privacy of a
large contingent of her family. By subjecting her DNA to laboratory scrutiny, she had
put not only herself under the microscope but the medical and other personal data of all
members of her extended family including children she had yet to produce. As her
biomedical data were part of the mega data aggregation that is archived within public
data collections, she had unwittingly exposed people she had never met to the prying
eyes of the curious. As boyd concluded, “[I]n doing so, I learned information about
them that they may not wish to know and may not wish me to know”.268
Boyd’s DNA experiment shows the heightened networked character of our
decisions and actions and the permanency of their results in the digital age. It illustrates
that pre-Internet concepts of privacy belong irrevocably in the past. As boyd notes
about personal links, “sometimes, as with DNA testing, we are linked by immu factors”
while other connections are social or locational.269The latter suggests we have a choice
in the matter, but boyd insists choices are long gone now that third parties can access,
copy, transfer or otherwise manipulate our data. “Learning algorithms” or programs
that carry out binary sorting without human prompting can collect and collate digital
information about us that can predict our tastes, habits and decisions about friends and
purchases and create our online personae. “How machines see us depends on how our
data connects to others,” boyd advises.270
Boyd warns that any model of privacy that depends on the individual’s control of
information will fail, because in current online environments users do not have enough
information of online interconnectivity to decide which data should be shared with
whom and when. Users also are aware that Internet companies like Google and
Facebook have limitless ways to share data without our approval. As well, given the
prevalence of data leakages and the architectural tendencies of the Internet to
arbitrarily link one piece of datum with others, absolute control is not possible. It is as
futile as trying to contain the poisonous ink from an octopus as it infuses surrounding
268
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waters. “Expecting that people can assert individual control when their lives are so
interconnected is farcical,” boyd asserts.271 The DNA experiment shows how people
who are not even born can be affected by online data creation. Social media is
particularly vulnerable to unconsented sharing, profile creation and aggregated linkage
of the sender with non-intended recipients.
Today’s privacy can best be approached by stepping outside of our obsession
with the individual as the appropriate unit of analysis in any privacy discussion. Of far
greater import on the Internet are groups, communities, relationships and networks.
According to boyd, only through the collective lens can we begin to model, and to
advise, with whom we wish to share and to understand how to share without
jeopardizing the privacy of others.272
Helen Nissenbaum of New York University agrees that the contours of our
privacy rights in the digital age are quite different from what we have come to expect of
our communications when offline.273 She characterizes our new right to privacy neither
as a right to control information nor a right to have its access restricted but the
qualified right to have our expectations about the flow of information met. The issue is
no longer should we share, because the architecture of the Internet and its governing
algorithms dictate that sharing is inevitable. Nissenbaum tells us that the direction of
sharing is guided by “key organizing principles of our social lives, including moral and
political ones”.274 It will be guided, not by our static expectations of privacy, nor by
societal norms, but by contextual norms. She invokes us to insist on “contextual
integrity”, the right to know in what context our data will be disseminated and re-sent,
so that we can request correction when that context misrepresents our image or other
personal data. She rejects the public/private divide of past times as a basis for what
should be kept private; old standards of what should be categorized as “sensitive
information demanding special consideration” have been swept aside by our need to
share openly online.275
Nissenbaum’s insistence on the critical importance of contextualization finds a
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precursor in the 2001 debate on the relationship between privacy and context among
Professors Robert C. Post, Lawrence Lessig and Jeffrey Rosen as sponsored by
Georgetown University School of Law.276 Both Post and Lessig propose that using
another’s private information out of context, and thereby misrepresenting some aspect
of another person’s character or personality, does not lead to an invasion of privacy, just
a misunderstanding on the facts as presented. They suggest, as corrective, adding
further information about the subject to enlarge the context and no harm is done. They
give the example of a requirement by the United States Supreme Court that journalists
who wish to cover trials must stay for the entirety of the trial so as not to misrepresent
the narrative, the parties or witnesses by cherry-picking certain information for their
publications.
Jeffrey Rosen counters that the only way to correct misrepresentation of another
person through a public account based on private information is to provide more private
information in order to create a broader context, to enlarge what the public knows
about a person’s life or circumstance.277 In that way, the harm of the original exposure
and misrepresentation is compounded by the addition of yet further information that the
subject would prefer to keep private and that creates harm to that person’s dignity and
sense of autonomy. One’s autonomy is involved because the subject is forced to lose
control over another piece of his private life in order to set straight the mistaken
perception created by the first revelation. In Rosen’s words, privacy as autonomy
presumes a “self-actualized individual self” as defined by its differences from, rather than
its similarities to, the relevant community. The injury to privacy is thereby compounded
by adding further context and that is contingent on more personal revelations.
Privacy, to Rosen, becomes the control of personal information we do not wish
others to know. The violation to privacy is the involuntary wrenching of that
information and dropping it into another context of information that might paint it in a
more accurate light. That offends the subject’s dignity, autonomy and wish to be
understood.278 Rosen defines autonomy as the private right to act outside of social
norms. He gives the example of President Clinton’s public display of infidelity while in
office via the Monica Lewinsky affair. Had the Clintons been allowed to resolve the
276

Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L. J. 2117 (2001).
Id. at 2121.
278
Id. at 2118.
277

70

matter outside the public eye, any range of solution could have been exercised. The
President’s publicists insisted, however, on the production of a video of the Clintons
dancing on a beach, in order to air the apparent resolve of the couple to work things out.
In addition, Hillary Clinton was booked on talk show circuits to discuss her decision to
stand by her husband. By playing out those choices in public, the Clintons were forced
to discuss the possibility of divorce in order to satisfy the public that they were
contemplating the normative solution to marital infidelity. A respect for their privacy
would have allowed them to structure their most intimate relations out of the confines
of social norms in a way that gave them autonomy over their reputations and public
image.279 Rosen argues that such exposure constitutes an offence against liberal freedom
in that it does not respect public/private boundaries.280
Canadian surveillance researcher David Lyon of Queens University joins the
conversation about changes to the public/private divide by agreeing with boyd’s
assertion that digital architecture is an uncompromising arbiter of how our online
identities are identified. Lyon reminds us that the starting point must be our assumption
that state and corporate surveillance is constant and all pervasive. 281 Data are
aggregated, he explains, to compare populations, to sort people so they can be treated
differently. State and corporate profiling is a given, in the name of free enterprise and
national security. “So in a sense you are already a suspect,” Professor Lyon said. He
marvels that most people seem enthusiastic about submitting themselves to those
surveillance regimes, from personal updates online to customer loyalty programs.
“We’re going through a cultural change,” he notes, where “big surveillance is still there,
but we need to be aware of our own responses and our participation in surveillance.” He
says further, “The social calculus is in flux…and the boundary between accep and
intrusive surveillance is fluid and dynamic”.282
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Lyon also addresses what he calls the “fun surveillance” of social media, what
Mann et al. saw as the more fanciful aim of sousveillance. 283 The surveillant
opportunities afforded through the workings of social digital messaging can
“domesticate” other more nefarious forms of state monitoring of its citizens that we
might want to challenge on civil liberties grounds. We are thereby lulled, says Lyon,
into that erroneous aphorism that we have nothing to hide and therefore nothing to fear.
Lyon is critical of the blasé attitude many assume regarding government surveillance:
“For many people…surveillance is at worst an annoyance that has to be negotiated,” he
says.284 In the next section, we explore how a in very different culture, that in the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), individual Internet users are beginning to respond to
the intensifying prying by the state into online activities.
2.4

Privacy as a Social Construct
If you don’t want anyone to know, don’t do it.285

A reputable text on Chinese architecture advises that concepts of privacy, or yinsi,
have been part of discourse in China from the earliest recorded times to the present,
with varying functions and values.286 Such discourse has found little reflection, however,
in the laws of China until very recently.287 The term ‘yinsi’ carries treasonous or
criminal overtones, indicating undesirable behavior such as the harbouring of illicit
secrets or selfish and conspiratorial actions. Such connotations suggest that the concept
of privacy has long been suspect in China.288
In a practical comparison of Western and Chinese concepts of privacy, someone
from the US or Europe might be offended at practices at Chinese public lavatories that
283
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are “open-plan affairs” where locals unconsciously squat elbow-to-elbow. Similarly with
Chinese hospital treatments that are carried out amid crowds of observers; people think
nothing of asking strangers about myriad details from their incomes to their weight
that in Western societies are perceived as no one’s concern.
With rapid commercial and residential development and hence with the
proliferation of intrusive employers, data-mining marketers and invasive surveillance
cameras, modern China is witnessing invasion of privacy Western-style. Stories are
legend of state use of Yahoo! and other Internet companies for censorship activities and
for delivering up people sought for criticizing the state. US Internet company Google
became aware of such state intrusion on individual Internet users in the PRC when
Chinese officials requested the US company hand over information on individual social
media communications; Google subsequently withdrew its holdings from the PRC to
Hong Kong in April of 2010.289
State spying enjoys a long history in the PRC: when Communist leaders first
came to power in 1949, they exercised limitless prying into civilian affairs. State
intrusions that would never have been acceptable in the West were commonplace: for
example, women of childbearing age had their menstrual cycles recorded by state
authorities to monitor whether they were getting pregnant without state permission.
This became particularly critical during implementation of the one-family-one-child
state policy. More recently, police have come under particular regulatory scrutiny in
cities like Nanjing where a municipal law requires that they report when they marry,
divorce, travel outside the country, purchase a car or invest in property.290
The PRC also must deal with the socio-economic pressures of a population
growth that outstrips all other countries in the world, challenging all aspects of state
rule, from feeding its people to maintaining a probing eye on all citizen actions that
reveal even a whiff of individual dissidence.291 Massacres at Tiananmen Square signaled
the winds of political dissidence in the PRC and its iconic message is not lost on privacy
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and human rights advocates around the rest of the world. Throughout its comparatively
long history, the PRC has shown only brief interludes of open foreign policy that have
afforded western eyes a glimpse of the intense authoritarian practices and iron rule of
the PRC.
Chinese individuals increasingly express their concern that privacy rights enjoy
only the flimsiest of legal protections in their country. Privacy is mentioned little in
China's constitution, labour law or medical law, and the few provisions are vaguely
worded and are all subject to the “notoriously arbitrary workings of the Chinese legal
system”. 292 Under government pressure, employers continue to monitor their
employee’s activities on the Internet and marketers document potential customers’
buying preferences and credit ratings. In response, individual citizens are voicing their
displeasure.
Surveillance is both an internal practice and a trans-state activity in China. In
imitation of Britain’s prodigious use of surveillance cameras, China is installing security
and traffic-monitoring cameras on all its main streets. Most Beijing cameras have nightvision capabilities that can track speeding drivers and notify them of their infractions
via text messages sent to their mobile phones. China’s practice of hacking foreign
computer systems was recently documented by surveillance scholar Ron Deibert,
former director of University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab. He conducted studies into the
Stuxnet virus that crippled Iran’s nuclear program and temporarily disabled State data
collection functions in several countries including Canada.293 Deibert traced the massive
hacking activities to a location in rural China.294
Kenneth Farrell of the University of Pennsylvania’s Communications faculty
tackles the “dynamic interrelationship between American and Chinese cultural and legal
approaches to privacy”. 295 Global privacy, he insists, is under threat, but simply
equating the English “privacy” with the Chinese yinsi restricts dialogue between the two
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cultures.296 Much more meaningful is to examine cross-cultural differences regarding
individual expectations of privacy and discrepancies between the public/private
divide.297
Differences in public/private concepts of privacy can be culturally determined as
we see with semantics. For example, unlike the “public square” implications of the word
public in English speaking cultures, the equivalent gong in Chinese refers to shared
societal interests, a difference that might indicate a more shared privacy interest in the
PRC. 298 Farrell cites the concern amongst Chinese citizens about unauthorized
transference of their personal data to authorities and corporations, compounded with
the worry about cell phone and Internet spam, as more conducive to fashioning national
legal solutions than in America where “business interests have a more direct claim on
politics”.299
In summary, distinctions between perceptions of the public/private divide in the
lives of individual Internet users in China and in America can be attributed to cultural
expectations and societal conditioning. Despite the ready inclination among preInternet Chinese citizens to share what, in the western view, is very private information
in public situations Farrell sees such communal openness waning as communications
move online. Whether that observation can be linked to the accelerated growth of
consumerism and private ownership, or to the growth in new media use, are questions
that await further empirical studies.
In America, individual perceptions of privacy are changing as well. In a 2009
academic collaboration between political scientists at the University of Connecticut and
the University of Rhode Island, public opinion about state intrusions on personal
privacy since 1990 was surveyed and support was found to be in decline, despite a
prominent surge around the 9/11 terrorist attacks.300 Farrell believes there is room for
a “common, abstract principle of privacy” that Chinese and American Internet users can
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share, but it must continuously negotiate the tension in personal privacy versus the
need for information. As more Chinese gain affluence and thus access to physical
property, the possible expansion of an expectation of privacy to include that tangible
space is very real. Americans, in contrast, have seen concepts of real space diminish as
perceptions of virtual space grow in what Farrell describes as an “intensifying rupture”
between territorial and informational privacy.301
2.5

Gaining Oblivion: The Right to be Forgotten

Spirits they are, to whom second bodies are owed by Fate, and at the water of
Lethe’s stream they drink the soothing draught and long forgetfulness.302
In Virgil’s mythical world set out in the Aeneid, souls of the dead are led
through a cleansing of memories of the present world prior to their entry into the next.
They readily drink of the waters of Lethe to wash clean the memory slate of past cares.
In a striking example of life imitating art, the concept of forgetfulness has arisen in legal
drafting circles as a solution to the alleged permanence of our digital footprints.303
There is an emergent literature that debates the contours of a right to be forgotten and
a corollary right to oblivion. The concept of a human right to disassociate oneself from
past mistakes or misrepresentations can be seen as both “intuitive and appealing” in
Europe;304 so too in America, given that the possibility of second chances was an ethos
from which the new nation was forged.305 The legal form that forgetfulness will take,
however, and its practical implications, are issues currently under vigorous debate by
governments, Internet companies, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic.306 Such
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activity has been spurred by the proposal to update existing European law on data
retention practices in light of the emergence of the Internet and other new media. Those
revisions are highlighting the differences in US and EU concepts of privacy and free
speech and their interaction, particularly online. Any meeting of the minds promises to
have profound consequences on the American participation in the digital economy and,
on the individual level, on the reputational risks to which we are exposed when online. I
will now outline the conceptual background of forgetfulness and then detail its practical
application and criticisms.
The French concept droit à l’oubli has a longer history than its English
counterpart,307 as does the Italian notion of reinventing oneself or il diritto all'oblio. At
its most basic, forgetfulness allows us to revise our past in light of present knowledge or
perceptions. Promotion of the concept of forgetfulness appeared in law and technology
literature as far back as the 1990s in what David Flaherty called “one of the admirable
products of European thinking and lawmaking”. 308 Those who write of Internet
regulation, however, are not in accord as to whether forgetfulness should be a “right,
interest or value”.309 The conceptual distinctions between the ‘right to be forgotten’ and
the ‘right of oblivion’ have also not been clarified nor related to the right of personality
or the right of reputation. Pere Simon Castellano suggests the important distinction
that will influence any law of forgetfulness is that Europeans tie the right to the issue of
consent to use one’s personal data while Americans focus on the societal entitlement to
second chances.310 Nor does there even appear to be a satisfactory English translation of
le droit à l’oubli.311 Ausloos suggests that the French term encompasses both forgetting
and oblivion into the notion of ‘forgetfulness’. In summary, it is not clear whether any
of the foregoing concepts exist in law (de lege lata) or whether they are best debated as a
future right (de lege ferenda or the law as it should/could be). 312
The debate about the legal status of the right to be forgotten and the right to
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oblivion is quite active, driven perhaps by a considerable lack of legal clarity around the
concepts. Is it a natural right, inchoate but recognized, or a legitimate interest, an
ethical aim or social value313 or a virtue or policy objective? All that is certain is that the
concept has not crystallized as a generally accepted legal principle in either the
American or the European legal tradition.314
As early as 1972 and long before the introduction of the PC, Alan Westin and
Michael Baker of the University of Michigan recognized that the American value of
allowing a fresh start was under siege because of the immense and accelerating storage
capacities of computers.315 They observed that anyone seeking to reform their lives for
“religious, humanistic and psychiatric” reasons would be “barred by their past mistakes”
because of the indelible memory of computers. 316 “The computer is assumed not to lose
records,” they observed, “to forward them efficiently to new places and organizations”
and to “create an appetite in organizations for historically complete records.”317 It is
those organizations’ voracious appetite for our personal facts, then, and their
institutional preference to “preserve and evaluate” that poses the major threat to any
forgiveness principle.318 In hindsight, as became clear in the analysis of the intelligence
failure around the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the evaluation or analysis function fell victim
to the sheer bulk of preserved data by the NSA and other authorities.
In a 1998 policy paper on forgetfulness, American science and technology
scholars Jean-Francois Blanchette and Deborah Johnson presented the issue as one
involving the obligation of the state to deliver social goods. 319 They identified the
principal social goods that needed balancing against individual rights of privacy as the
efficiency that computerized data collection brought to law enforcement, government
service, and national security. Blanchette and Johnson conclude there is a general
consensus in America that “too little is being done to stop the onslaught of personal
313
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data collection” and that privacy protection policy has been ad hoc and piecemeal. It is
the act of retention, not the ubiquity of surveillance, they worry about, the social
implications of a lack of institutional forgetfulness. They note that if a cost benefit
analysis were conducted of personal privacy versus national security, institutional needs,
law enforcement or government efficiency, privacy would be the loser.320
Police scholar Gary Marx takes a more cultural-historical perspective. He has
noted that ‘starting over’ or moving to a new frontier is a powerful concept in American
culture, given the history of the nation’s founding.321 “The beliefs that once a debt has
been paid to society it is forgotten and that people can change are important American
traditions.” 322 He worries that surveillance information obtained via computers
transcends time in that “it is available for analysis many years after the fact, and in
totally different interpretive contexts.”323 With the “mass of easily accessible files, one’s
past is always present” and that undesirable permanence applies to erroneous or
sabotaged data, as well as debts that have been paid.324 Marx warns that such hoarding
of data can create a class of permanently stigmatized persons within society.
The practical urgency in understanding the precise parameters of the
forgetfulness right is that, as Jeffrey Rosen warns,
Unless the right is defined more precisely when it is promulgated over the next
year or so, it could precipitate a dramatic clash between European and American
conceptions of the proper balance between privacy and free speech, leading to a
far less open Internet.325
Georgetown University Professor of Law Franz Werro perhaps comes closest to
linking forgetfulness with reputation when he considers such a right to be encompassed
within the more general right to personality, to demand the erasure of archived data by
authorities once they are not longer of legitimate use in order to “keep their activity
trails private”.326
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In terms of the individual user and forgetfulness, authorities in the European
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) worry that privacy advocates’ promotion of
the concept creates unrealistic expectations in the public of revisionist possibilities. 327
Instead, suggests the ICO, the focus should be on the ‘right to object’ to how personal
data is used, as that emphasis would place the onus on the collector, primarily the
corporate and security sectors, to justify their collection and transfer policies regarding
citizens’ data:
It is a reversal of the burden of proof system used in the existing process.
It will strengthen the person's position but it won't stop people processing their
data.328
A further objection of the ICO is that the right to be forgotten is currently unworkable
given disagreement from one country to the next on how to define sensitive personal
data, a term used in explanatory literature accompanying the proposed EUDR text.329
In the area of collective memory, there exists some resistance to revisionism as well.330
The interest in forgetfulness has proven to have more currency in Europe than
in America, perhaps because “Europeans concede more than Americans to the public
realm and look to the state to secure more of their rights and liberties”.331 For example,
in a 2004 selection of civil service personnel in Greece, the country’s Data Protection
Authority recommended to the national selection committee that only the names of
successful candidates for appointment to public service positions be publicized, not the
names or details of those who were rejected.332 Specifically, the Authority reasoned that
it would be disproportionate to the aim of government transparency to publish exam
failures that could come to public notice by pure chance. In addition, the Authority has
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generally recommended a time restriction on the publication via Internet of
unfavourable administrative acts such as demotions, suspensions and dismissals.333
Another example is the decision by French courts to anonymize their published
decisions by deleting reference to the parties and other personally identifying
information before it is made public. The CNIL, as oversight authority,334 has also
invoked the violation of the right to be forgotten in the inclusion of litigant’s names on
a webpage available to the public335 as well as dissemination of litigants’ identification
via publicly available legal databases.336
The enthusiasm in Europe over the EUDR, and the equally vocal opposition
expressed by American observers, (as will be developed further in Chapter V infra)
indicates that deep-seated cultural differences could delay any meeting of the minds..
Adding to that potential impasse is the paradoxical relationship presented in the
twenty-first century between privacy and publicity. In the last century, “the golden age
of public relations”, publicity and engaging the attention of the press came to be
something that many private citizens sought out and even paid for.337 This has led in
present times to an American culture obsessed, at once, with being seen and being
hidden, “a world in which the only thing more cherished than privacy is publicity.”338
Further to certain public policy concerns, forgetfulness is considered not only
acceptable and socially useful, but necessary. The prospect of having a criminal record
for life provides one example. European criminal law and regulations provide for the
erasure or at least a public ban on access to records of minor offences through the
regime of pardons. Similarly, American criminal records for youth are routinely
abbreviated and accessible only to government officials in some states. In certain EU
Member States, such as Germany and France, criminal records are automatically
removed from the public record after a pre-set length of time and remain unavailable to
prospective employers and credit rating agencies so as not to taint their future
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success.339 The rationale is that minor or youthful mistakes should not interfere with
one’s social and professional opportunities. It offers an escape from “the persecution of
the past”.340
The right to oblivion, in contrast, is known within data retention practices as
tied to unwarranted data retention. Conceptually it does not differ from the French le
droit a l’oubli, according to University of East Anglia Professor Paul Bernal; it relates to
the right to silence on past events in life that are not longer occurring, primarily in the
criminal sanction context.341 It is mainstream media, in Bernal’s view, that has added a
more alarmist interpretation involving historical revisionism, Internet censorship, and
the suppression of free speech. The real evil that legislative mechanisms are meant to
address is the languishing online of digital evidence of who we are and where we
navigate; that information is of immense value to hackers, over-zealous bureaucrats, and
others of indifferent or adverse interests.342 Bernal illustrates how easily such data is
accessed: he cites the 2011 mining by a PhD student of personal information of 35
million Google users from its databases, including names, email addresses and
biographical details. The mining did not break any of Google’s posted rules and was
assessed by the student as “completely trivial” in terms of the technological skill
required.343 Shortly thereafter, Google introduced a social networking platform that
turns users into gleaners of friends’ personal information and compilers of such profiles,
all in the search for social “circles” and without the illegal hacking implications.344
In light of the unwitting and seemingly benign ‘outing’ by new media users in
search of social connection, the distinctions between various types of forgetfulness fade
in significance. More pressing are current hurdles to protection of the individual user:
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the practicalities of acquiring consent, detecting misuse, and enforcing workable privacy
standards.
The concept of forgetfulness has some detractors and William Dutton of Oxford
University’s Oxford Internet Institute expresses the most frequently voiced objections:
that “erasing history is not only Orwellian and unfeasible, given the scale of the web,
but it will have a chilling effect on freedom of expression,” legitimizing government’s
role in censorship in liberal democratic societies.345 It will also create a “legal swamp” in
the privacy and data protection area that is already fraught with uncertainties. Dutton
argues that privacy and data laws already cover any abuse of personal privacy that is the
target of right to be forgotten rules. In Dutton’s words:
[Y]ou are asking for a right to purge a service of all information they
[service providers] might hold about you. I don’t think this policy
would or should reach so far.346
In practical terms, debates over the nuanced meanings and historical referents of
a right to be forgotten have cast a shadow of uncertainty that extends over more
altruistic digital activities such as data conservation and digitization projects.

Its

practical significance to memory and reputation will expand as the EUDR enters force
and implements a right to erasure, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5.2. The need
for forgetfulness to protect reputation and status could become increasingly undermined
by the tyranny of online architecture that enables some of the more invasive misuses of
the online environment as I discuss next.
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CHAPTER 3

3.0

THE TECHNOLOGY AND SCOPE OF REPUTATIONAL
HARM
Introduction

In this section I examine how our reputations are damaged online – the inner
workings of the Internet and the Web that make reputational damage possible. I first
consider the idiosyncratic features of new media that achieve the type of harms I will
further describe, with legal responses, in chapter 4. Next I canvass various actions, by
ourselves and by third parties, that compromise our reputational privacy. I organize
those actions into exposure harms (involving online personal content) and disclosure
harms (representing non-consensual data collection and dissemination). This section
concludes with two cases, the Mosley case tried in various EU member state
jurisdictions and the Martin case in the US. Those cases illustrate the discrepancies
between a plaintiff’s expectations that extant laws will restore lost status and the legal
and personal-life repercussions that fall short of those goals. I incorporate into those
considerations a discussion of whether digital speech is a profoundly different method of
communication online than off, warranting a different legal or other response as
explored in Chapter V.
3.1

Technological Idiosyncrasies of Digital Media

a

Reconfiguring of Information Bits

Digital information is aspatial and hence easily transported. That is why
material that is stored on a computer on the other side of the world can be accessed as
easily as material located next door. Digital information is divided into packets of binary
digits (‘0’s and ‘1’s in computer code) known as ‘bits’; packets comprise the smallest unit
of transfer, which are disseminated in any order and recombined at the receiving end.
That system of transmission facilitates a much speedier conveyance of message than the
analogue system that must be sent and received in the same sequence of information.
Transmission can also be described as non-rivalrous, meaning that its consumption by
one person does not diminish the possibility of its subsequent (or simultaneous) use by
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others.347 Digital transmission also provides easier access to the individual user; one
way to measure the effort that we expend to access information on the Internet is to
consider its ‘ontological friction’ or the forces that create resistance to information
flow.348 Analogue means of transmission involves a much higher ontological friction
than that for digital information. It has been argued that easier access through a lower
ontological friction means increased risks to personal privacy.349
As each packet travels through the network, it passes through a series of
specialized computers or ‘routers’ that determine the most direct path for the packet to
travel from sender to receiver. Routers must make a copy of each packet in order to read
and direct it. The life-span of these copies is limited to a fraction of a second. When we
search information, we enter search words into a search engine, such as Google, Yahoo!
or Mozilla Firefox. Those Internet service providers (ISPs) have an allocated website
with a domain name, such as <http://images.google.ca> that serves as the entry point
to information stored on Google as contained on the World Wide Web (www).350 The
Domain name is an alias for a number which is what the computer uses to find the
location of the website, such as <www.1acc.com = 207.159.89.66>. Once the website
has a domain name it can then be accessed by any user on the World Wide Web (www).
In theory, search results are non-discriminatory: any user should be able to
enter the domain name above, type in a search word or phrase, and receive the same
search listings in the same order as any other user who enters those search words. The
search engine even autocompletes partial entries and suggests the highest-ranked
responses to those search words, even those we have not anticipated. Through autocorrection and search order a serendipity factor is introduced into online searches that
expand our bank of desired information. Such autonomous architectural features can
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have dire consequences, however, for individuals who are misrepresented in web
searches, as will be discussed further under Chapters 3 and 4.351
Access is augmented within the digital world for audio and video information
stored online because it can be stored in greatly compressed files on a user’s hard drive.
When using file-sharing hardware such as Napster or Netflix, an audio or video file can
be ‘virally’ shared with unlimited users within seconds.352 Once downloaded, those files
can be ‘burned’ onto blank CDs or DVDs for offline use, for redistribution, or illegal
sale. Unlike real time sales, digital products can be offered in a wider selection because
storage is cheaper and of much increased capacity than when dealing with physical
storage space in the offline world. Content can be kept temporarily or permanently, or
be accessed when the user is mobile through mobile devices or por flash drives (USB
keys) to be accessed through other devices, either wired or wireless. Users may also
choose to stream audio or video offerings without storing them at all. Streaming
services can also be interactive, allowing the receiver to choose which audio or video
streams she wishes. All of those affordances illustrate the growing ease of distribution of
content from one source to many, a key factor in the dissemination of prejudicial, secret,
or defamatory content. In that way, the same technologies that enable wide
accumulation, access, and distribution are the ones that service the viral dissemination
of content the data subject would find objectionable.
With the amount of traffic generated by steady growth in Internet use
worldwide,353 network breakdown is avoided through the technique of ‘caching’ or the
automatic storage of material searched by a user.354 When a user first accesses a
webpage offered by a server, key elements of that page are retained and more easily
351
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produced the next time the user requests the same information. On the second try, it is
not necessary to transmit the data packets all the way from the original hosting
computer, and very little demand is placed therefore on capacity in the core network.
Caching can be managed through the use of metatags, inserted into a document’s
URL355 that describe its attributes and which can create a set of instructions for a search
engine or Web server on retrieving the desired content. Meta tags can also be used to
mark a document as uncache-able, so that a web server will not save or archive the
document, or will cache it for a specified period of time, so it is not used when it is too
old. It has been suggested that Internet companies could meet obligations under the
EUDR principle of the right to be forgotten through expiry dates set on cached data.356
Generally, data subjects should have concern over online data that has been ‘decontextualized, distorted, outdated, no longer truthful (but not necessarily false)’.357
b

Cloud Storage, Anonymity, and Attribution

Digital data is capable of cloud computing, a concept with three components:
storage on a location independent of the device from which it is generated; sharing of
that storage as a fungible resource358 with other customers; and charging for access
based on resources used.359 Responding to user demand often involves an overlay of
those services, a process not always known to that user. For example, a user might
subscribe to the data storage services of Dropbox that, behind the scenes, uses
Amazon’s infrastructure or those of other commercial service providers. The user
herself might combine services, such as when involved in analytics monitoring or cloud-
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based billing, creating an integration of systems that shows the growing
interconnectivity of cloud services. The precise nature of services becomes critical when
attempting to define a ‘controller’ of digital data, as required by both US legislation on
data protection and the EUDR.
There are three general types of data that might be involved in cloud computing:
anonymized and pseudonymized data, encrypted data, and sharded or fragmented data.
Those distinctions will be considered in turn as they are important in determining
whether data should be treated in law as ‘personal data’.360
i

Anonymity and Attribution

There are two principal ways in which a user can be identified: through her IP
address361 and through her digital search history. Here is how it is done: a user enters
search terms into an Internet search engine, such as Google. The query terms are
logged or tracked by the search engine. The log data also includes such items as the
type and version of web browser of the user, her IP address, and other information
gleaned by cookies that are inserted each time the user conducts a search. That
information routinely includes an ID for the computer, the date and time and duration
of each site visit, the path to and from the site, the time spent on each page, and the
links that are clicked during each visit. 362 Cookies retain that information about
previous searches for speedier access each subsequent visit. That information can be
combined with other fragments of personally identifying data to arrive at a more
accurate profile of the user. Anonymization removes information obtained from cookies
as well as from the IP address.
Anonymizing and pseudonymizing processes conceal the data subject’s identity.
To anonymize a person’s identity is to remove sufficient identifiers so that identification
360
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is not possible through discrete bits of information. To pseudonymize an identity is to
substitute one ingredient - a name, for instance - with numbers or other characters that
can deflect direct identification. Identities are disguised, therefore, not removed. That
process is of particular interest to researchers and statisticians, as they are able to
collect different information relating to the same individual without having to know her
name, thereby complying with privacy laws.
Those processes are conducted before data is stored or otherwise dealt with in
the cloud. Data is frequently anonymized or pseudonymized before sharing or selling it
to another entity, although much personal data sold to commercial advertisers do not
go through such preliminaries. For example, some US companies that sell health related
data would anonymize or pseudonymize such personal data prior to selling it to
research companies, but others would not. In another example, the EU company
HipSnip enables mobile phone users to ‘snip’ and save offers from consumer product
brands, a process that permits owners of those products to trace the consumer due to a
lack of anonymizing activity.363 Often only part of the data is altered or deleted,
however, and only some identifiers are disguised or altered by cryptography. Other
information, such as a usage trail or test results associated with a name are left intact, a
matter of concern to privacy advocates and policymakers. The degree of anonymizing
and pseudonymizing becomes a critical factor in determining what is ‘personal data’,
‘personally identified information’, or ‘personally identifiable information’ when
constructing privacy or data protection legislation. Those definitions, and hence the
type of data that is regulated, differ from one country to the next, a matter of grave
concern to privacy scholars like Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove.364
Technology that enables deanonymization, or the reversal of the anonymization
and pseudonymization process, is now readily available. That reality has mobilized
legislative efforts at data protection. De-anonymization is achieved by assigning
sufficient identifiers (numbers or other symbols) that disclosure of an individual is
achieved. Identifiers can also be comprised of different pieces of information about a
person which, when taken individually, would not lead to her identification. So
removing direct identifiers, (such as names, email addresses, IP addresses, or medical
363

Id. at 9. HipSnip’s terms of service permit it to ‘share, rent, sell, or trade aggregated or
anonymized data.’ See HipSnip’s Legal Statement at https://angel.co/hipsnip.
364
Schwartz & Solove, The PII Problem, supra fn 7.

89

device identifiers) might not achieve complete anonymity if indirect identifiers can be
collected that, in the aggregate, lead back to identification.
The concept of attribution is simply the determination of user actions online as
can be traced to that user. Anonymity and pseudonymity would be used, therefore, to
escape our attribution by a third party. Our vulnerability to invasive technology at the
hands of the state is accelerating at an alarming pace in the digital era. Through use of
deanonymizing technology and the combination of seemingly discrete bits of
information,365 data analysts can pierce the public/private divide we believe we enjoy as
citizens of a democratic state. For example, we have been told that our gender and
sexual preferences can now be ascertained from a mere examination of our use of the
‘like’ function on Facebook.366 Similarly we have been alerted that we are only four
mobile phone conversations away from government identification.367
ii

Encoding, Encryption, and Hashing

The principal function of encoding, encryption and hashing is to transform data
into another format. The first two methods are reversible; hashing is not.368 A user
would encode data to ensure its consumption, in a proper and safe format, by a different
type of system.369 The algorithm used is publicly available, so secrecy is not the
objective. For example, if you are trying to submit your curriculum vitae in application
for a job and the intended recipient asks for the document in ASCII, he is asking for
plain text without formatting such as pre-set tabs, bolding, or italics, in order to
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smoothly facilitate importing your information into his applications. Encoding does not,
as a rule, involve privacy issues and hence does not pose a risk to personal content or
reputation.
Encryption, on the other hand, strives for secrecy. Encrypted messages can only
be accessed via a de-encryption key and involves the transforming or converting of an
entire data set in order to keep it secure from unwanted access. It is achieved by
applying an algorithm to the data, which functions as a ‘foreign language’ that remains
inaccessible to those who do not speak that language. The popularity of the BlackBerry
mobile phone, for example, particularly within political and corporate sectors, was due
in large part to the encryption system that was sourced offshore. Only designated
recipients with the de-encryption key could return a message to plaintext. Blowfish is
an example of an encryption cipher, available in the public domain; the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) is another. Encryption malfunctions pose a serious risk to
data security and, hence, to reputation.
Hashing is a system that allows detection of any tampering with the integrity of
your data. In order to establish that data has not been modified, methods are used to
compare data input with data output. The sender performs a ‘hash’ function by taking a
group of characters and mapping it to a value of a certain length, called a ‘hash value’
that represents that string of characters. The intended recipient uses the same hash
function to generate the hash value and compares that to the one received with the
message. 370 Hashing is critical in detecting efforts at identity theft, hacking, and
nonconsensual surveillance. On an individual level, hashing names or passwords can
make theft of passwords more difficult, even for users who employ weak or identical
same passwords for several accounts. While the process will not render their database
or website any more secure, it offers some damage control in the event of a security
breach.
iii

Sharded or Fragmented Data

Those terms refer to an automated procedure of breaking up data into fragments
for storage in different storage facilities or locations. The procedures depend on the
370
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storage provider’s sharding policies; cloud storage providers can usually meet requests
for storage within a desired geographic area, such as within continental Europe.371 Kuan
Hon et al. raise an issue of interpretation that is critical to the EUDR: if unencrypted
data uploaded to the cloud is automatically sharded for distributed storage, can a cloud
user who accesses or uploads the personal data, and who might run applications in the
cloud that operate on, and change that data, be considered a ‘processor’ of personal data.
The EUDR potentially imposes strict accountability on that user-producer regarding
the protection and retention of that data.372
c

Geo-location and Other Surveillance Capabilities

Keeping in mind that the focus of this dissertation is the individual Internet user
and her reputational privacy, I include this section on state surveillance methods to
review ways the state can collect and use personal data that creates privacy risks for the
individual.
Many of our digitized devices have built-in geo-location mechanisms that
autonomously map our usage through the location of our devices. Those capabilities
allow benign uses such as device location when we have misplaced our mobile phones or
ts, or mapping services to direct our travels from one physical location to another. They
also, however, form part of a larger data collection program by state authorities under
the rubric of national security. It is known, for example, that since 2011 Apple iPhones
and iPads routinely record the position of our devices and save the data in individual
files at Apple Inc. storage facilities for the growing circumstances that allow
warrantless searches by government.373 Such accessibility has privacy and personal
security implications, as that data is apparently unencrypted and hence unprotected
from third party access. That digital disclosure extends to any device with which we
synchronize our mobile phones, such as our laptop computers or t devices.
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore the political agenda
behind such activities, we will provide a brief description regarding US government
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surveillance and identification practices involving our digital device communications
that has an impact on access to our personal data.
Historically, state surveillance has been concerned with “ascertaining and using”
specific information about targeted individuals who are of political or criminal menace
to public order or safety.374 State authorities accomplish that by watching us, through
human agents and digital monitoring of our “data doubles”, created via the mandatory
disclosure of such personal information as our banking activities or use of government
services. With the expansion of national security agenda in western states leading up to
the new millennium, as expanded by the need for a formalized internal and foreign
policy response to the Twin Towers attacks in 2001, governments in the US and EU
have taken unprecedented steps to monitor, identify, and profile users of digital
communications. That security net has scooped up not only foreign communications
transmitted to the US but, within the continental US, communications between and
among American citizens. How is that technically accomplished?
Since 2005, the US government has required major telecommunication
companies in the country to hand over the call-detail records of their customers.375
Such data includes customers’ names, street addresses, times of calls, and other personal
information including “detailed records of calls they made – across town or across the
country – to family members, co-workers, business contacts and others.”376 Further, the
National Security Agency (NSA) is reported to be in receipt of copies of American
citizen’s telephone and other communications records.377 Such surveillance activity is
conducted primarily using devices called fiber optic splitters that make copies of all
emails, web browsing activity, and other Internet traffic to and from its customers and
provides those copies directly to the NSA.378 This copying includes both domestic and
374
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international Internet activities of phone customers. The disclosures of whistleblower
Edward Snowden identify PRISM as an NSA program devised to receive such copies
taken from “emails, video clips, photos, voice and video calls, social networking details,
logins and other data held by a range of US internet firms.”379 A leaked government
PowerPoint presentation identifies the Internet firms as Microsoft and its Skype
division; Google and its YouTube division; Yahoo; Facebook, AOL, Apple, and chat
service PalTalk.380
The British news media reported similar activities by Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), based in Cheltenham, through access to the
NSA system employed since at least June of 2010. That piggybacking on NSA
capabilities reportedly generated 197 UK intelligence reports in 2012 alone.381 Such
access would appear to “allow GCHQ to circumvent the formal legal process required to
seek personal material such as emails, photos and videos from an Internet company
based outside the UK.”382 Google has denied they provided a back door to governments
for surveillance but suggests it has cooperated with legal requests for consumer data.
The PowerPoint establishes that the NSA has had access to both stored
communications and real-time collection of raw data “‘for at least six years, without the
knowledge of users, who would assume their correspondence was private.”'383
In terms of individual disclosure risk, the British Broadcasting Corporation
warns Internet users that when they visit a website their IP address, type of device, and
screen size can easily be ascertained.384 In households with more than one device, it is
the IP address of the router, and not the individual device, that is traceable, although
law enforcement agents have facilities to trace an individual’s geo-location from his IP
later admitted - that the government is mass collecting phone metadata of all US customers
under the guise of the Patriot Act. Moreover, the media reports confirm that the government is
collecting and analyzing the content of communications of foreigners talking to persons inside
the United States’.
379
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address.385 The website can also see what search term or former website brought users
to the current website. An individual’s geo-location can be determined by crossreferencing the IP address with other data and, if access was obtained using a work
computer, the name of the employer. All those details are automatically identified and
recorded. Internet service provider British Telecom suggests that, unlike its American
counterparts, it does not keep a record of customers’ browsing activity.386
After such metadata has been obtained by the NSA or other intelligence agency,
it begins to data mine and analyze it for evidence of activities that threaten national
security. Data mining involves the search for key words and connections of ideas or
persons. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the specific equipment
installed at telephone facilities includes a machine called the NARUS Semantic Traffic
Analyzer387, a powerful tool to conduct deep packet inspection (DPI). The latter is a
method of information extraction that filters packets of data as they reach inspection
points in their transmission. DPI collapses firewall security programs as it searches for
breaches of protocol, viruses, spam, or other predetermined criteria and redirects such
data for closer inspection.388 Good uses include cleaning up spam and viruses and
helping with traffic disruption. Bad uses include totalitarian-type surveillance by
governments, including the copying of data. The NARUS machine forwards such
communications to a central location for storage and analysis. The Electronic Frontier
Foundation estimates the NSA installs several such storage facilities across America.
Author James Bamford estimates a $2 billion running cost for the Utah facility back in
2006 which housed data the NSA has collected for the past decade, including “the
complete contents of private emails, cell phone calls, and Google searches” and personal
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data trails composed of parking receipts, travel itineraries, bookstore purchases and
other “digital pocket litter’’.389
It is important when discussing Big Data collection practices of state authorities
to distinguish between those used for statistical and demographic purposes (which are
helpful to the data subject and research generally) and those employed for citizen
profiling (generally perceived as exploitative in the hands of state authorities).390 The
latter function is more worrisome in the breach: analytics are often misapplied or
results contain errors that could have grave consequences for the data subject. In the
following account of a researcher at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet
& Society, profile indicators have led to an erroneous ‘personalization’.
Google thinks I’m interested in parenting, superhero movies, and shooter games.
The data broker Acxiom thinks I like driving trucks. My data doppelgänger is
made up of my browsing history, my status updates, my GPS locations, my
responses to marketing mail, my credit card transactions, and my public records.
Still, it constantly gets me wrong, often to hilarious effect.391
The researcher suggests we all have a data doppelganger somewhere in the digital
universe, due to the sheer amount of processing of Big Data that is being conducted day
to day. The menacing aspect of that possibility is the data disclosure we undergo
continuously at the hands of unknown third party agencies.
d

Distinguishing a Processor, Controller & Publisher

Identifying the role of the Internet company becomes crucial when attempting to
allocate liability for the placement or carriage of libelous or other damaging
reputational content. This area of law is in flux in both the US392 and EU,393 generating
389
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a large body of litigation for the courts and government watchdogs such as the FCC in
America and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Europe. US
industry leaders maintain either that their role is confined to acting as intermediary
between those who post the content (publisher) and the subject of the content
(individual user), or that they are data processors under an agency arrangement with
the publisher. The EUDR defines a processor as a “separate legal entity with respect to
the controller who process [sic] personal data on his behalf”;394 a controller is any body
that “determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”395 Those
definitions suggest that processors act as agents for controllers who decide what
information is processed and how. For example, SNS providers offer online
communication platforms that enable individuals to publish and exchange information
with other users. In this respect, under the EUDR, it could be argued that they are data
controllers because they determine both the purposes and the means of the processing
of such information.396 In a more complex example, a public health authority might
work jointly with several hundred agencies to transmit personal health data; in that
situation, both agency and authority could be considered joint controllers.397 The
decision-making by controllers would seem to involve more autonomy and hence attract
more legal liability. For their part, ISPs and the public health authority could argue
they are merely processing information or data that is conveyed to them by data
controllers; they do not have an active role in determining the ‘purpose and means’ of
what is published online.
The concept of ‘publisher’ within the online context is more complex. With
Google, for example, the role of an active publisher of online content focuses primarily
on active editorial decision-making. In a 2012 White Paper on the issue commissioned
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by Google Inc., legal practitioners Volukh and Falk advise that liability can be
sidestepped by focusing on the ‘mere communicator’ role:
To be protected by Safe Harbor laws, and free from copyright and libel suits, it
often works best for Google to be a mere communicator of information, and not
responsible for the information people put online.398
That characterization might involve disproving that Google’s activities involve editorial
judgment. We know, however, that Google determines the content and order of search
results based on which items most accurately respond to the nature of the search
query.399 Volukh and Falk conclude that Google’s exercise of editorial judgment in such
cases is analogous to, and could attract liability for, the activities of traditional book and
other media publishers.400
The CJEU judgment in the 2014 Google Spain case indeed identified Google Inc.
and its national divisions as controllers under most conditions, subject to liabilities for
constructive knowledge of content.401 That judgment is persuasive, not binding, on the
final form that the EUDR will take; it is also not binding on US jurisdictions. It remains
to be seen how legal and market pressures around such liability issues raised by Google
Spain will affect individual applications for content erasure.
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The Speed and Ambit of Dissemination

The speed and reach of online transmissions provides another unique feature of
web-based content, improving on such attributes of telecommunication cables and
telephony transmission to an exponential degree. 402
Internet speed can be measured by megabits per second,403 information that can
be seen in the downloading activities of users. Figure 1 illustrates, under ‘speed’ in the
right hand column, the minimum megabits per second (Mbps) at which emails are
downloaded (0.5), content is downloaded from a browser (less than 0.5 to 1), a video is
streamed (0.7), a high definition movie is streamed (4), videoconferencing occurs (1), and
tele-learning materials can be downloaded (4). Those figures indicate a transmission
speed often faster than the time it takes us as humans to find the ‘send’ key on a
particular page. The figures also indicate that the downloading speed for email and
government information sites were relatively the same in 2013 and can be accessed in
half a second, the fastest access of any shown, except for streaming radio content. The
latter function requires uploading time, however, which routinely slows down the
transmission. Although those results are contingent on the bandwidth, time within the
24 hour clock, and type of device used, they indicate that gossip, lies, doctored content,
and other reputational damage can be disseminated with menacing speed.
Translating those figures into meaningful descriptors of speed can be achieved in
a relational sense if we consider the example of the use of Twitter to warn others about
impending natural dangers. For example, when examining the transmission of tweets
during an Earthquake in Virginia in August of 2011, one author suggested that their
speed (200,000 kilometers per second) actually overtook the seismic event and arrived in
neighbouring states before the earthquake (traveling at 3 to 5 kilometers per second).404
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Those comparative figures convey the speed of reputational damage that new media
offers.

Table 1: 2013 Broadband Speed Guide (excerpt)405
In addition to the speed at which a defamatory posting can cause injury is the
ambit of its reach. At the close of the first quarter of 2014, for example, Facebook was
reported to have 1.28 billion monthly active users. 406 Unlike in Brandeis’ day,
405
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embarrassing or degrading material is not just disseminated to a limited circle of friends
or newspaper subscribers: viewers of the Star Wars Kid YouTube video, for example,
posted in 2002 by rancorous classmates of a 15 year-old awkward teenager, reached
over 29 million viewers as of June, 2014.407
One of the more prominent examples of the instant interoperability of media in
today’s event coverage occurred on March 2, 2014 with the Oscar Awards ceremony in
Hollywood. A media conversation occurred as 43 million viewers watched the event in
person or on television and transmitted and re-transmitted SNS commentary with other
viewers using social media accessible on their tablets and smartphones. The discursive
level was record-breaking for the secondary transmissions of a public media event:
Twitter claimed that 14.7 million tweets mentioned the Oscars during the telecast and
Facebook reported 25.4 million interactions overall that mentioned the show. That
simultaneous conversation resulted in the highest television ratings for the Oscar event
since 2004. In addition, the ‘selfie’ photograph tweeted by Oscars host Ellen DeGeneres
was retweeted within the subsequent twenty-four hour period 2.8 million times.408 That
messaging traffic caused an overload disruption of Twitter service for about 20 minutes,
generating even more publicity for the event.409 The Oscar moment illustrates the high
value in the news and entertainment business of interconnected participatory media that
can orchestrate simultaneous real time grassroots and networked conversations that are
regenerated by journalists and anonymous tweeters within a few hours, with live
commentary about the secondary traffic during the event. The speed and ambit of
transmissions detailing the event comprise the story as much as what unfolded within
the Dolby Theatre in Los Angeles. The event created a “landmark social media
moment”410 with real time observation, by television and SNS users, of a digitally
transmitted event going ‘viral’ through the secondary interactivity of social media
most popular SNS for youth overall, eclipsed by Hyves in the Netherlands and SchulerVZ in
Germany).
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transmission. While no quantum of viewers is used to define when a video reaches viral
status, the term in general use conveys the idea that an event has been viewed by more
than a million people in less than a week.411
The widespread and immediate implications for personal reputation of viral
transmissions are illustrated by a split-second comment: Oscar host DeGeneres made a
derogatory quip to guest Liza Minnelli suggesting she looked like a drag queen as a
result of recent plastic surgery.412 That comment was streamed live and subsequently
carried on social media, print stories, and video and audio clips, provoking the largest
Twitter traffic to date of any public figure.413 A Google search of ‘Liza Minnelli at
Oscars’ the same evening delivered hundreds of search results of the remark within
seconds.414 Many of those stories characterized DeGeneres’ comment as ‘transphobic’, a
pointed reference to the self-identified gay entertainer; other commentators label the
remark ‘transmisogynist’, 415 ‘disrespectful’, 416 and ‘mean-spirited’. 417

The comment,

defended by DeGeneres as humourous, illustrates the fragility of reputation, those of
both DeGeneres and Minnelli, and the unimaginable breadth of potential stigma caused
by the out-of-control social media frenzy that reaches millions of viewers in the blink of
an eye.
In gauging the ambit of harm, one should also consider the dissemination of
insulting or defamatory content accessed through the serendipity of the search function.
Search results can offer a wealth of information we did not even know existed and were
not looking for, and can provide new insights simply through their random
combination.418
411
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Memory and Durability: the Half Life Debate

The question of how long online content endures is of critical importance to
sufferers of a derogatory remark or untrue accusation within new media.

Much

literature addressing new media communications has us believing that reputationdamaging postings are permanent or at least highly persistent. Hence there is potential
for deeper and more enduring harm than offline defamatory statements because of the
expanded audience and its protracted access to our data. Internet users, particularly
young ones, receive ample warnings of the permanence of online memory from industry,
educators, and family. In contrast, among those who study the Internet is a group of
digital communications-savvy scholars who maintain that online content is short-lived.
Texting and SNS communications as well seem to remain on our smart phones or other
devices despite promotion of their perishability.419 We speak of their evanescence, a
feature that “eases the force of the blow” of defamation.420 It has become, in some circles,
the ‘half-life’ debate of digital communications.
Among proponents of content evanescence is Harvard history scholar Jill Lepore
who assesses the Web as ethereal, uns, and unreliable. She cites two studies that
empirically establish the transience of online sources. In the first, a 2013 survey of legal
policy-related journals identified a near-fifty percent loss in workable URLs over six
years. 421 The second study, at Harvard Law School, found over 70% loss of URLs cited
in Harvard Law Review and other journal articles, as well as a 50% attrition of URLs
within US Supreme court opinions. Lepore notes the frequency with which the error
message (Page not Found) is the result of our online search efforts and concludes,
“[s]ocial media, public records, junk: in the end everything goes.”422 Both of those
studies relate half-life to the amount of time that content remains accessible and
functionally useful while online. The term does not describe the value of the underlying
knowledge conveyed.
Within the contingent of social network scholars who argue that the durability
of information via Internet does evaporate over time are Daniel Gomes and Maroi
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Silvia. Their studies suggest that, in 2006, just over half (55%) of content remained
online after one day, 41% after a week, 23% after 100 days, and 15% after a year.423 Meg
Ambrose of Georgetown University in turn suggests that “information is not
permanent, no matter the medium” and calls for principled information storage
practices.424 She attributes disappearing content more to technological malfunctions
such as media and hardware errors, software failures, network service failures,
component obsolescence, operator errors, natural disasters, internal and external
attacks, and organizational failures. 425 Interestingly, a search of one of Ambrose’s
articles posted on her Georgetown University website brings up an error message
suggesting its evaporation, or at least disappearance, from a reader’s view.426
Those observations of disappearing articles, eroding links, and faulty URL
address the technical decay of online access. Another view of the half-life debate is the
diminishing value or usefulness of knowledge or content over time. The half-life of
knowledge can be defined as the time span between its attainment and its
obsolescence.427 Software trainer Cathy Gonzales of the University of Northern Texas
pointed out over a decade ago that half of what was known in the world had not been
known ten years prior. In other words, the amount of online-accessible knowledge in
the world had doubled over those ten years.428
Marketing professionals assign another meaning to the half-life of digital
communications: the waning of public interest over time in particular technologies or
platforms. It is appropriate, in marketing terms, to speak of emails reaching a half-life as
a social networking preference as a large percentage of users have migrated to Facebook
and other SNSs. Similarly the usefulness of data sets might be described as reaching
their half life with time, as possessing only half their scientific usefulness compared to
when they were first compiled. As much of learning is now online as a shared activity
423
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rather than an internal, individualistic experience in a library stall, the study of the
persistent value of knowledge is an important pursuit; knowledge acquisition is altered
to some extent every time new tools are utilized and skills developed.
g

Is Digital Speech Different?

Who among us has not been alarmed at the bluntness of expression used in the
texting or YouTube commentary authored by digital natives? If the compression of
words and fragmentation of meaning has you scratching your head, consider this
fictional text authored by an adult to suggest how a casualty of the massacre at Bull
Run might have communicated to his wife on the evening before his death if texting had
been available 60 years ago:
“rly scrd. mite not mk it. luv u. C u on otr side.”429
As every prosecutor and defence counsel is aware, trial outcomes can turn on the
indecipherability of one term or line in a social media message (SMS)430 that frustrates
attempts to successfully link cause and effect. When SMS users suggest that they
employ two languages to communicate with their close communities, the truncated,
rebus-like form used for social texting and a more grammatically correct form for more
professional or academic communications, a recent study supports their claim.431 Study
participants spoke of their ability to speak two languages, to effortlessly move from one
to the other depending on the medium. As the study reported,
students are generally aware of the context in which they are writing and they
can switch to the appropriate register or style when writing formally for
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academic purposes despite the fact that texting is their common way of
communication.432
Those results pose the question: might digital language comprise its own form of
communication?
In canvassing the harm that we need to prove for legal actions in reputational
damage, it is relevant to consider whether new norms should be adopted for
characterizing speech on the Internet. Given the democratization of online speech (free,
spontaneous, and open cultural expression) it has been suggested we allocate less
probative weight and meaning to such utterances. 433 The human sources of
communications, so critical to acceptance of traditional media accounts, are often
suppressed online. Cues about authority and status can be hidden, as one psychological
study of Internet behavior points out,
Although one’s identity in the outside world ultimately may shape power in
cyberspace, what mostly determines the influence on others is one’s skill in
communicating (including writing skills), persistence, the quality of one’s ideas,
and technical know-how.434
With the lack of editorial second thought for bloggers, tweeters, and other participants
in virtual reportage and other new media uses, it becomes practically infeasible to read
the tone of derisive material. The normative debate usually goes like this: the Internet is
a communicative tool with a wireless method of transmission but otherwise of similar
purpose and method as offline communications, and so the customary societal norms
should apply; on the other hand, Internet content is “located in another time and zone”
and therefore not subject to the norms of traditional journalism.435 Yuval Karniel of
IDC Herziliya in Israel takes the position that “an anonymous, instant, unfiltered and
unmediated statement” for which there is no source and “which does not make grounded
factual claims” should not constitute a cause of action for defamation.436 He views the
role of blogs and other informal journalism as the preliminary flagging of issues that the
mainstream offline press later might assess as worthy of more formal investigation, as
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was the case with the Clinton-Lewinski allegations.437 Such investigations could lead to
publication in traditional media, argues Karniel, but are not to be valued as authentic
information source in themselves.438
A counter position has been taken by Meg Ambrose who suggests that the
purpose of self-publishing online is to express opinions and convey news in the
language of traditional media but using electronic platforms. That opinion holds that,
for the digital author, all online speech maintains a fluidity due to its ad hoc, unstudied,
and unedited nature and is itself a contributor to our moral autonomy, to our selfpresentation. Our expression via online blogs, chats, commentary, and emails affirms
our own moral career, and that justifies constraining others ‘in their attempts to
engineer and directly, or indirectly shape’ our identities.439 Texting, therefore, is its own
means of expression, its own language.
Ethan Zuckerman, founder of Facebook, points out that the difference with
online comments (within the context of the hate or ‘dangerous’ speech incited by trolls)
can be characterized as one of access: the Internet creates an environment where we are
aware of speech we would not hear otherwise. Most of us in pre-online times, he argues,
would not have been aware of what speech is shared at a KKK meeting, and many of us
would not have heard the sexist jokes that were told in male-dominated locker rooms.
Online speech permits a crossing to formerly closed communities.440 Researcher Susan
Benesch of the Berkman Center of Internet & Society at Harvard University defines the
online-offline speech discrepancy involved in hate or dangerous speech as one perceived
in the effect such speech has on people. With online speech environments we can
examine the effect of speech on people through tracking both responses and effects. In
offline environments, however, ‘it’s very hard to measure what reactions dangerous
speech leads to’.441 Zuckerman and Benesch’s comments introduce the constitutional
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parameters of freedom of expression in more ad hoc forms of online expression, a
discussion we shall take up more vigorously in Chapter IV.
3.2

How Harm is Done

a

Exposure Harms: the Technology and Case Examples

In terms of how reputational injury can be practically achieved using the Web, I
examine three sources that, either through attributed or anonymous postings, inflict
shame or ridicule than can be easily ascertained by other members of a virtual
community. Those sources include: exposure by other users; exposure by ourselves; and
exposure by journalists. 442 My focus continues to be the individual Internet user:
reference to corporate, government, or other institutional activity is used to survey the
extent of the threat to that user’s reputation.
i

Exposure by Other Users

The most common, and probatively useful, online activity by other users that
damages reputation involves ‘flaming’, ‘outing’, tagging, and creation of false ‘mirror’
social networking sites. 443 Flaming can be defined as the hostile and insulting
interaction between Internet users, often expressed through profanity. Flamers
subscribe to forums, chatrooms, email, Xbox or PlayStation interactive games and
video-sharing sites with the intent of embarrassing other players by revealing their
identities and personal information to pierce the anonymity of their chosen pseudonyms
or avatars. Flaming is routinely generated by political, religious, or philosophical topics
and the objective is to impose emotional and reputational injury for all participants to
see.
Some websites create an interactive environment that attracts the participation
of flamers or ‘trolls’, 444 sowers of discord through their deliberate, inflammatory
messaging. Such online provocateurs are increasingly the subject of social science
442
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research, and developing theories to explain flaming or trolling include deindividuation
(a psychological state where inner restraints are lost when individuals are not seen or
acknowledged as individuals), 445 and the disinhibition effect (the de-inhibiting of
behavior prompted by anonymity resulting in more aggressive or punitive activity).446
Such behaviors can attack the emotional integrity of others either through individual
action or group behaviors. With the latter, individual identity is absorbed by the group,
and individual responsibility for actions is diffuse due to the number of actors. One way
to reduce deindividuation is to make group members more self-aware by addressing
them by name, pointing out the harm they are doing.447 Another is to report (or selfreport) such anonymous attacks online, as this former troll reports:
After processing what I did, I was disgusted by how I acted and I sent [the
victims] a message and talked to them in private. I did apologize … You are
proving nothing when you use someone's personal information for your own
vandetta.[sic].448
Outing originally involved “an act of telling the public that a person is
homosexual when that person does not want the public to know”449 For example, in a
survey of studies exploring the low reportage levels in same sex domestic assault cases,
the authors determined that threats of ‘outing’ the victim’s sexual orientation is used by
the abuser to isolate the victim even further.450 The threat to go online with such
personal information compounds the shame. It could also bring fear of loss of family
emotional support or the ability to sustain oneself financially.451
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The meaning of ‘outing’ has been expanded through popular usage. It now
conveys the more general idea of exposing undesirable aspects of a person’s self or
experiences and includes the activities of Anonymous, an international collective of
activists and hacktivists,452 whose rationale is to cause the public exposure of personal
secrets or public wrongs. For example, a news article has described as ‘outing’ the
Anonymous identification of the man who taunted Canadian teen Amanda Todd into
performing sexually explicit acts on her webcam, ultimately resulting in her suicide.453
In a show of similar journalistic altruism, the media blog Gawker claimed to be the first
to ‘out’ Toronto mayor Rob Ford’s use of crack cocaine by blogging about its viewing of
a video showing Ford’s indiscretion. 454 The Gawker founder claimed his ‘outing’
contributed to Ford’s confession of illicit drug use.455 Those examples suggest outers
might be motivated by a sense of noble cause, of exposing evil and righting an injustice.
Gamer ‘outers’ give no such impression, however, although their incentives remain
relatively unexplored by research.
There appears to be an unwritten social code amongst bloggers that anonymous
contributors will not be exposed. The reaction of a science writer to the outing of a
fellow writer explains the preference for anonymity:
There's still a lot of fudging around, figuring out the boundaries of our online
interactions. When people play games like outing someone who's using a
pseudonym, they're … declaring to the community that "I believe that our
community standards should say that this is an appropriate way to deal with
conflict".456
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In some instances, anonymity is a safety precaution:
Some people [choose anonymity] to avoid professional retaliation…there are
tenure committees at many universities that would hold blogging against a
junior faculty; there are companies that don't allow employees to blog under
their real names; there are people who blog under a pseudonym in order to
protect themselves from physical danger and violence!457
Within that frame, to expose a fellow participant is to breach an unwritten code of
mutual trust and support.
‘Tagging’ represents another potentially harmful activity. It serves the same
function as keyword searches by attaching a word or phrase to a digital object, such as a
document or photograph, for easy retrieval. Facebook reported in 2011 that “Every day,
people add more than 100 million tags to photos on Facebook.” 458 The social
networking server (SNS) promotes tagging as “an easy way to share photos and
memories” because, unlike photographs that get forgotten in a camera or an unshared
album, “tagged photos help you and your friends relive everything.”459 Tagging occurs
in two ways: through the identification of individuals in a photograph by a user that is
then locked into the memory of networking sites through facial recognition software;
and the insertion of single words on a site that provides a link to that photograph. Both
methods instantaneously create a tracking system of images. For example, when you
post a photograph on your Facebook, MySpace, Instagram or other SNS, and tag
persons in the photograph, those tags create a link to your SNS account, in Facebook,
for example, through your Facebook Timeline.
You can also tag by creating a status update, letting friends know who you are
with at any given moment. That update is conveyed instantaneously and with your
implied consent: unless you opt-out of such tagging in your privacy settings, each time
you enter a message or image on your FaceBook or other social messaging account, that
SNS autonomously sends an alert or update by email to each of the subscribers within
your bank of ‘friends’. Anyone who sees that update can click on any of your friends’
name and go to their Facebook Timeline without invitation, unless your friends have
457
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indicated in their privacy settings that they do not welcome such access. Facebook does
warn against that activity: “if you or a friend tags someone in your post, the post could
be visible to the audience you selected plus friends of the tagged person.”460 The friend
you have tagged will also receive notice via their Facebook account or email that they
have been tagged. And so the depth of their exposure grows. 461 While Facebook
architecture provides for reversing tagging of your photographs, it is not at all a
straightforward or visible process.462
The facial recognition involved in Facebook tagging is controversial for its
automatic default. As well, in order to access privacy settings on the SNS to delete your
photograph, you must subscribe to that system, a requirement that artificially inflates
the subscribership figures of that SNS and that assumes a certain technical facility on
your part. Another concern is that the facial recognition technology resides in
Facebook’s servers and not on the user’s laptop, giving de facto control of the content to
the server, not to you.
EU policymakers in the area of online privacy are more proactive in their efforts
to warn subscribers about such privacy hazards as tagging,463 while Americans prefer
the “notice and choice” system in keeping with the US entrepreneurial perspective. One
commentator notes that such facial recognition technologies create “the biggest creep
factor” if it were to fall into the hands of governments.”464 That fear might already have
been realized as government databases already include sufficient facial data of our every
mundane function from renewing our driver’s license to updating travel documentation.
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Tagging presents exposure risks in job searches, university admissions, 465 and
other opportunities.466 A 2013 commercial study of personal postings incurred as much
damage as those describing illegal drug use, sexual behavior, gun use, and alcohol
consumption.467 Tagging is also an enabling tool for cyberstalkers and identity theft
perpetrators. As Pew Internet’s Lee Rainie summarized the exposure of tags: “It’s hard
to have privacy and be social at the same time. It’s the classic human
struggle/tension.”468 The future of tagging might be secure, however, if only because
there is no community norm discouraging it.469
Revenge porn and the creation of false social media accounts comprise another
category of online vindication that risks reputational harm in several ways: through
defamatory content, the intentional infliction of emotional harm or the enabling of
identity theft.470 In both activities, an anonymous user posts nude or compromising
images of others for their embarrassment potential or creates a false account using
profile and other personal information that mirrors a valid account. In the latter case
the perpetrator uses the bogus site to duplicate the target’s contact list in order to send
false and damaging content. Offending posts might even involve false information about
the recipient, damaging her reputation at the same time. False trust is built by engaging
the target’s list of ‘friends’ in order to announce the new account and attract input by
well-intended personal and professional contacts. That information can further expose
the target. This ruse is notoriously employed by ex-spouses or former friends aiming to
diminish the professional or social credibility of the target.
465
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The practice is sufficiently widespread that social networking innovators are
publicizing the extent of the problem.471 While laws dealing with mirror sites vary from
one jurisdiction to another, search companies are taking some responsibility for the easy
access of personal information by employing facial recognition technologies or other
authenticating precautions.472 Social media sites are also instilling policies about the
acceptable parameters of posts, with Twitter, Reddit, and Blogger announcing privacy
changes.473 Empirical evidence is starting to emerge assessing the extent of the damage:
a 2012 study of discrepancies in authentic and fake Facebook accounts determined that
1) almost 60 percent of fake Facebook creators claim to be bisexual, 10 times more than
real users; 2) fake accounts indicate having six times more friends than real users; 3)
fake accounts use photo tags over 100 times more than real users; and 4) fake accounts
claim to be female in 97 percent of the cases, as opposed to 40 percent for real users.474
The ultimate aim of such fake ‘friending’ is to create the widest possible networked
audience to damage the target’s reputation.475
Anonymity for social or professional reasons provides legitimate reasons for
maintaining fake accounts. For example, a performance artist creates a work that delves
into issues about being black and queer within an Islamic environment, a pursuit she
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does not wish known to friends and family; 476 or police create false accounts to
investigate political subversives or online child stalkers. 477 Discrediting a Facebook
user to family and former friends through malicious fake social networking accounts is
criminalized in some jurisdictions under laws of personation and identity theft. The
arrest of a New Jersey resident was an event highlighted by Facebook authorities as an
opportunity for users to comment on the issue. The tactic garnered 150 responses, most
opposed.478 The story was similarly posted on the American Bar Association website to
alert practitioners in criminal law to the difficulty of prosecuting out-of-state offenders
as only the states of California and New York have laws specifically banning online
identity theft.479 Such public education aims at deterring fakeries through an emphasis
on shaming and the reputational repercussions of crime itself.
ii

Exposure by Self

The term “user-generated content” (UGC) describes self-created and selfpublished online content.480 It can be distinguished from engineered content from an
established authority with a high level of oversight that created credibility with public
readers.481 UGC is the primary source of self-exposure. The myriad forms in which that
can occur include photographs, videos, podcasts, articles, and blogs. Social networking
is completely user-generated and regenerative, in that they provide hyperlinks to other
social network accounts and UGC.
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UGC is technologically possible due to the Web 2.0 second generation of
services that enables user collaboration and sharing.482 With Web 2.0 our computers
and mobile devices become platforms for producing, consuming, exchanging, and
remixing data from innumerable sources. Those functions expand our role from content
consumer to producer, publisher, critic, journalist, public performer, confidant,
commentator, broadcaster and, when our activities cross the boundaries set by law,
perpetrator. The cultural ethos behind Web 2.0 is collaboration, cooperation,
interactivity, and social networking.483
UGC also includes the concept of sourcing from a crowd, or the harnessing of
the power of users. For example, with peer-to-peer (P2P) technology every participant
becomes a server; the BitTorrent website, for example, promotes itself as offering a
protocol484 that enables users to download files quickly and to upload or distribute parts
of them at the same time. BitTorrent is often used for sharing very large and popular
files as it is a lot cheaper, faster and more efficient than a commercial download.485
The resultant surge in Web 2.0 distribution and sharing of content has both
positive effects, such as the empowering of ordinary citizens on a previously unimagined
scale, and negative repercussions, including the creation of content that harms the
creator’s reputation and potentially breaks the law. On the face of it, such self-exposure
would seem to have two principal causes: user ignorance of the background mechanics
of ‘free’ online services, or an impetuous response to socializing cues that we later regret
or outgrow. Regarding the former, ignorance could be related to unfamiliarity with
privacy settings offered by site administrators. For example, when creating a Facebook
account, the subscriber is prompted to answer a number of questions regarding
intended recipients, specific conditions for sharing, and duration. If those questions are
not addressed, the default action is full exposure to anyone who searches the homepage.
482
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Adjusting those settings takes thought: studies exist that suggest younger subscribers
are more adept at orchestrating such privacy settings, but also increasingly more prone
to over-sharing with their circle of ‘friends’.486 In Figure 2 below, the comparative
results of a Pew study of what teens were posting on social media in 2006 and 2012 is
presented.

Table 2: Social Media Profiles: what teens post – 2006 vs. 2012
As indicated, teenagers from 12 to 17 are sharing more personal information in
all categories than those surveyed six years ago. That change indicates a major shift in
486
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attitudes about privacy, particularly regarding photo-sharing which have become the
preferred currency of social exchange. The significant surge in sharing email addresses
and mobile phone numbers suggests a general relaxation in personal standards of
privacy amongst friends. Results were also analyzed along gender and racial lines, with
boys showing a higher tendency to share their mobile phone numbers than girls and a
less likelihood of African-Americans disclosing their real names on their social media
profile than white teens.487
Opportunities for exposure are significant: in 2011, for example, 85% of US
college students spent an average of 6.2 hours per week on Facebook488 and 77% of
college students in another study used Snapchat on a daily basis during the first few
months of 2014.489 Despite the requirement that all new subscribers to social media sites
read and agree to Terms of Use to reduce privacy risks, the attraction of socialization
through such platforms and devices seems to cloud the prospect of subsequent regret,
embarrassment, or loss of opportunity.
Socio-psychologists question why social media users display a propensity to
over-share personal details. A self-reporting study suggests motivations include vanity
that exceeds caution, and extroverted needs to maintain social ties.490 Rather than
escaping from or compensating for their offline personality, social networking service
(SNS) users appear to extend their offline personalities into the online domain. So
extroverts seek out virtual social engagements that “leave behind a behavioral residue in
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the form of friends lists and picture postings.”491 The study concludes that, rather than
characterizing over-sharing behavior as an escape from reality, SNSs exist as a
microcosm of people's larger social worlds.
Such behavior can have therapeutic value as well, especially for emotionally uns
or apprehensive individuals.492 Online interactions offer a non-threatening experience,
social bonding, and a buffer for negative feelings in the short.493 On the other hand,
psychological theories of disinhibition and disindividuation, as discussed above, also
throw light on the propensity of some SNS users to post selfies in socially questionable
situations.494 Social psychologist John Suler speaks of “toxic disinhibition”, the elevated
tone or uncharacteristic behaviors exhibited online. In his words,
We witness rude language, harsh criticisms, anger, hatred, even threats. Or
people visit the dark underworld of the Internet—places of pornography, crime,
and violence—territory they would never explore in the real world.495
And yet to choose not to be on SNSs has its social costs as well.496 Postings that are too
antithetical to the social expectations of our peer communities create exclusion, as was
apparently experienced by Canadian teenager Raeteah Parsons when photographs of
her alleged gang rape were posted online.497 Oxford University’s Lillian Edwards is
more circumspect about the causes of such anguish: she suggests SNSs have become the
whipping boy for “almost every possible social blight imaginable by the mass media”,
491
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especially in relation to young people, from encouraging social predators and sexual
grooming to inciting and enabling fraud, deception, stalking, harassment, bullying,
abuse and victimization. SNSs are also blamed for “encouraging young people to inflict
antisocial behavior on each other.”498
The trade-off for social media companies offering convenient technologies is the
use of our content for marketing purposes. For example, Facebook Terms of Use claim
that subscribers own all personal information they post on their profile page, including
photographs. That statement contradicts another Facebook provision that, upon
subscribing, users “grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free,
worldwide license to use any intellectual property (IP) content that you post on or in
connection with Facebook’. 499 That IP License should end when you delete your
content, except for third party access that is not retrievable and probably has been
retransmitted to unknown recipients.
SNSs also freely use the email addresses of subscribers and their ‘friends’ to
inform them about new content postings, endorsements, and changes in location.
Facebook and LinkedIn subscribers receive an average of two emails per day notifying
them of new endorsements or postings by friends. That routine has been challenged in a
San Jose, California district court regarding the practice of professional networking site
LinkedIn to send several sequential emails to friends of its subscribers, inviting them to
endorse those subscribers.500 The judgment determined that, while the initial email is on
consent from the account holder as per the terms of the user agreement, subsequent
requests are not. Those emails could injure users’ reputations by giving the impression
they are harassing their contacts or that they are the type of people who spam their
contacts.501
In contrast, the same San Jose judge denied certification for a class action
against Google Inc. that would have marked the largest class action case in US
litigation history. The complainants were disgruntled email users who accused Google
498
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of intercepting, reading, and mining the content of their email messages.502 The Court
denied certification on the basis that consent is an individually determined matter and
cannot be pleaded on a class action basis. Similar cases accusing Yahoo!, Facebook, and
Hulu of monetizing personal content for an online advertising market are pending.503
iii

Exposure by Journalists

The speed of news coverage is also accelerating to meet viewer demand for
social media as a source of up-to-the-minute journalism. Mainstream news services,
such as major television networks, have responded by using software to incorporate
social media reports, via Twitter and Facebook, into their real time news broadcasts.504
Such media integration allows more accurate and timely coverage from the field, as seen
in the 2011 Tsunami in Japan, and the 2013 US presidential elections. A ‘social media
newsroom’ is evolving where journalists develop stories by engaging with communities
on Twitter, YouTube, Google+ and anyone with an Internet connection. Those sources
then feed into live onscreen television coverage, along with items from news services
like Reuters and newspapers such as the New York Times, Le Monde or The Guardian.
505

That integrated approach maintains the impression that major networks remain the

official information source.
Digital news media has expanded from a corporate-controlled entity to
unmediated citizen journalism. That shift raises the risk of hyperbole, inflammatory
speech, and libelous commentary. In addition, a declining readership and failing
economic model of traditional newsrooms puts into question the ongoing viability of a
mass media based on advertising and circulation. In response, many journalists have
created non-profit news sites seeking support from foundations and viewer donations.
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Such entrepreneurial journalism challenges journalistic standards of impartial coverage.
Equally at risk in this new arrangement are journalistic reputations.
b

Disclosure Harms and Case Studies

This section will detail the three most prevalent opportunities for disclosure of
personal information generated online: the mishandling of Big Data; activities of data
brokers; and the refusal of take-down orders. Reports of studies and cases will be used
throughout to illustrate key principles and to personalize the harm to reputation
suffered as a result.
i

Mishandling of Big Data

Big Data can be defined as data sets with sizes beyond the ability of commonly
used software tools to capture, curate, manage, and process within a tolerably elapsed
time.506 Descriptions of Big Data capabilities and collections are replete with aweinspiring quantifiers, as seen in this excerpt from Science Magazine in 2011:
Data sets grow in size in part because they are increasingly being gathered by
ubiquitous information-sensing mobile devices, aerial sensory technologies
(remote sensing), software logs, cameras, microphones, radio-frequency
identification (RFID) readers, and wireless sensor networks. The world's
technological per-capita capacity to store information has roughly doubled every
40 months since the 1980s; as of 2012, every day 2.5 exabytes (2.5×1018) of data
were created.507
The terms ‘exponential’ and ‘ubiquitous’, so favoured by researchers of Big Data, are
inadequate to describe the size of the data collection activities that infuse our daily lives.
Authors Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier suggest that, with the onslaught of such
‘datafication’ of our every move and preference, the entire gestalt of information
collection and analysis has altered:
In the spirit of Google or Facebook, the new thinking is that people are the sum
of their social relationships, online interactions and connections with content. In
order to fully investigate an individual, analysts need to look at the widest
506
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possible penumbra of data that surrounds the person — not just whom they
know, but whom those people know too, and so on.508
The authors speak of entrepreneurs of Big Data having a big data mindset’, devoted to
the belief that certain data can be mined to reveal valuable secrets.509 From that
vantage, data gains in optional value as it is put to new purposes. The authors examine
the three components of the Big Data enterprise within such industries as
pharmaceuticals, financial services, and manufacturing: the collector of the information;
those skilled with data; and the innovators who can foresee the novel ways that data can
lead us to new information. The latter professionals are in most demand as they have
the ability to extract wisdom from banks of raw data. 510 Their innovations are
anticipated by political and financial leaders who have watched the bulk of
manufacturing migrate to developing parts of the world. The good news that MayerSchönberger and Cukier can offer about Big Data is that, for the present, firms will gain
by tapping data in clever ways.511 Benign examples they offer include Google search
algorithm’s use of subscriber data for behavioral advertising, and Germany’s use of car
parts data to improve automobile components.512 Market research as well is greatly
advanced by Big Data analysis: the authors speak of the discovery by Walmart stores,
through data analysis of their sales patterns, that customers purchase Pop-Tarts in
greatly increased numbers just before a hurricane. That information was used to
position Pop-Tarts beside flashlights and other emergency products in hurricane-prone
locations with favourable sales results.513
The risks associated with the autonomous compilation of Big Data are many.
For instance, state espionage agencies are no longer our major intruders: that
distinction goes to our neighbours, service providers, and retailers. A second shift is
that privacy has become a dominant social good that counters values of free speech,
508
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including commercial free speech or enterprise. As well, big data analytics means we are
judged more by propensities, and by indicated preferences, than by completed acts.514
Amazon and Netflix think they know more about our next consumer selections than we
do from data that is autonomously collected each time we browse a book or movie
online. Prediction and pre-supposition have supplanted analysis of done deeds.
Big Data use is encouraged by free storage costs and unlimited space, surgically
adept technologies, and all the idiosyncrasies of the Internet we have listed above
(section 3.1). While not all collected data is personal, such as algorithms that deliver
better-refined oil or more precise predictions about airport weather, the triangulation of
seemingly disparate bits of data can produce conclusions about individuals that could be
personally devastating. A simple example is the autonomous correlation of three bits of
information that could lead a potential employer to conclude (erroneously) that a job
applicant has a fatal illness: 1) she has contributed to a Run for the Cure in the past; 2)
she visited Princess Margaret Cancer Care Hospital twice over the past two years; and
3) she has conducted online search queries on vitamin therapy in the past year. Under
such informational scrutiny, former US President Woodrow Wilson would never have
been permitted to complete his last term due to a stroke he suffered, known at the time
only to his personal physician and his wife.515
As an indication of public awareness of reputational risks associated with Big
Data collection, three in five British citizens believe the general public has lost control
of the way its personal information is collected and processed by others.516 Those results
are included in a 2013 study reported to the United Kingdom’s Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) that also found 88% of respondents listed the protection of
people’s personal information as the most urgent issue affecting the public at the hands
of government. 517 As if to substantiate those fears, two incidents of inadvertent
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disclosure of sensitive personal data involving EU citizens were reported within months
of the ICO study.
In the first, German language news service Neue Zurcher Zeitung reported the
anonymous delivery to its editorial staff of data tapes belonging to Swisscom, a
Switzerland-based telecommunications provider. The tapes contained private employee
data from 2008 to 2010, including 14,500 emails from Swisscom employees, 600,000
phone numbers, and other private and business contract details.518 Specifically, the NZZ
claimed its editorial office was in possession of four data tapes originating from
Swisscom data centres. Swisscom immediately filed a criminal complaint against
persons unknown for data theft. The NZZ went on to analyze the data further and
revealed the names of a number of customers in a subsequent article in 2013. Swisscom
sought an injunction against further publication, arguing the ongoing release of such
personally identifying customer data served no public interest. Not all data sets were
checked, however. Swisscom took the view that a comprehensive and time-consuming
check of all data sets, which in total contain more than a terabyte of data, was “not
expedient”, even though it could have allayed fears of its customers.519 That decision left
much personally identifying data open to data theft or other exposure, so Swisscom
eventually demanded that the NZZ release and destroy the data still in its possession.520
The second incident involved the Bank of Scotland’s erroneous misdirection of
faxes to an unsuspecting third party several times over a four-year period that contained
sensitive customer data. Home addresses and telephone numbers were disclosed, along
with pay-slips, bank statements, account details, and mortgage applications.521 The
documents’ misdirection was caused by staff error in using a fax number one digit

518

Adam Greenberg, Telecommunications provider Swisscom investigations stolen data, SC
MAGAZINE FOR IT SECURITY PROFESSIONALS (18 Sept. 2013),
519
Judge Rules on Temporary Injunction, Swisscom (14 Feb. 2014),
http://www.swisscom.ch/en/about/medien/press-releases/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201698.html/.
520
Id.
521
B. Davidson, Bank of Scotland Receives 75K GBP Penalty Notice for Misdirected Faxes, PRIVACY
ADVISOR (IAPP) (27 Aug. 2013) https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/uk-bank-of-scotlandreceives-75k-gbp-penalty-notice-for-misdirected-faxes ; Bank of Scotland Fax Blunder leads to
Fine, BBC NEWS (5 Aug. 2013) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23572574. Although the
Berne Commercial Court has now overturned the injunction, it clearly states in its reasons for
judgment that any further piecemeal publication of information gained from these data tapes
may constitute a breach of the Swiss Unfair Competition Act.

125

different than the one intended. The receiving organization first alerted the bank to its
error in February of 2009, but the bank continued to send out the private information
over three more years. When reported, the lack of response by the Bank of Scotland
prompted a report to the ICO; the subsequent investigation revealed that a further 10
documents went to a member of the public due to another faxing error. The ICO official
commented that sending a person’s private financial records to the wrong fax number
once was careless but ‘to do so continually over a three year period, despite being aware
of the problem, is unforgiveable’ and in clear breach of data protection legislation.522 No
further action was taken against the bank.
ii

Studies of Big Data Vulnerability

Both incidents highlight the growing vulnerability of Internet users to careless
disclosure of their sensitive information to third parties despite legislative efforts to
curb such activity. Similar disclosure dangers related to the use of mobile devices is
reflected in opinions expressed in a 2010 Eurobarometer study. 523 Nine of ten
Europeans reported their concern about mobile applications collecting their data
without their consent, and seven Europeans of ten expressed concern about the
potential use that companies might make of the information disclosed.524
Our vulnerability at the hands of institutional and corporate data collection
practices and analysis is also alarming. Through use of de-anonymizing technology and
the combination of seemingly discrete bits of information,525 data analysts can unearth
very private information. For example, we have been told that our gender and sexual
preferences can now be ascertained from a mere examination of our use of the ‘like’
function on Facebook.526 Similarly we have been alerted that we are only four mobile
phone conversations away from government identification.527
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The degree of apprehension on the part of citizens appears to differ from one
side of the Atlantic to the other. A survey of Internet users in the US found a much
lower level of alarm than in the EU: despite revelations in 2013 that the NSA has been
monitoring Americans' activities online and increasing backdoor access to Internet and
telephone records, US Internet users appeared not as concerned as British citizens about
the government having access to their home computers or email accounts, nor as
concerned as other Americans had been in 2000. Only 35% of Americans expressed
concern in 2013, compared with 47% in 2000.528 Concerns were higher for software that
enabled governments to tap into all Internet email searching for incriminating
information of any type (51% in 2013 compared to 63% in 2000). Study analysts suggest
that US Internet users might be more resigned to the idea that, in an advanced
technological age, monitoring is inevitable whereas in 2000, the relatively new medium
of the Internet “might have caused more concern about privacy than today when 87% of
Americans use the Web.”529 The study report also suggested that Americans might be
less concerned because they support the government's pursuit of foreign or domestic
targets suspected of terrorism. The discrepancy might also be explained by the fact that
America was the site of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, although England has suffered a
chronicle of discrete national security incidents as well. Further study into this
discrepancy holds promise for understanding public awareness of disclosure risks.
When it comes to users’ knowledge of remedies for the harms of data disclosure,
a 2013 study by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (the FRA Study) determined that
only a third of EU citizens were even aware of their right to data protection530 or of the
existence of Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) within their country to assist them in
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accessing those protections.531 The FRA study also found a significant lack of legal
expertise in the privacy and data protection fields.532 The policy context for the study
was built around two fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (The Charter): the right to the protection of personal
data (Article 8)533 and the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal (Article 47).534
Most data protection violations in EU Member States were found to arise from Internet
based activities, direct marketing and video surveillance with closed circuit television
cameras.
FRA study participants in Europe stated they were aware of the following
sources of Internet violations: social media, leakage of personal data from e-shopping
sites, hacking of email accounts and databases, identity theft, security breaches and
misuse of personal data by global Internet companies. Of particular concern were
unauthorized data transfers of personally identifiable information from data controllers
(employers, public authorities, Internet service companies, mobile operators, credit
companies) to unauthorized third parties (such as online commercial enterprises and
debt collection companies); nonconsensual data retention by police, other government
agencies, and supermarkets; and unauthorized disclosure by the justice system of
confidential personal data from criminal and divorce proceedings to the media and
Internet sites.535 Victims stated they became aware of the disclosure violations by
receiving marketing emails and other spam, experiencing difficulty when accessing their
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held by companies might be used for a purpose other than that for which it was collected.
533
As distinguished from the Charter’s right to private life (Article 7).
534
Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The European Union, 2010/C 83/02, EC 2012/C 326/02
(final 26 October 2012) (the Charter) codifies all rights found in 1) the case law of the CJEU;
2) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); and 3) other rights resulting from
the common constitutional traditions of EU countries and other international instruments.
535
Id. at 26.

128

online banking accounts or government websites, and discovering that personal data
had been conveyed to third parties that were outdated, inaccurate, or false.536
A study of Americans reveals more public acceptance of Big Data practices. A
2012 Pew Internet/Elon University survey of American Internet experts, observers and
stakeholders537 measured opinions about the potential impact of human and machine
analysis of newly emerging large data sets in the years ahead. The study revealed that
US users are less pessimistic or suspicious about Internet data collection at the hands of
authorities. Some 53% of those surveyed predicted that the rise of Big Data is likely to
be “a huge positive for society in nearly all respects” by the year 2020. Respondents
predicted that the continuing development of real-time data analysis and enhanced
pattern recognition could bring “revolutionary change to personal life, to the business
world and to government.”538 For the 39% of participants who stated they saw Big Data
as more menacing in the hands of unauthorized authorities, concerns included the fact
that governments and businesses had their own agenda for the use of Big Data, worries
about the shortage of human analysts qualified to sort data, and the possibility that data
could be manipulated or misread.539
In summary, all studies indicate a much more acute awareness by individuals of
the misuse of personal information by authorities in the UK, and a lower level of
concern, declining considerably over 15 years, by US participants. EU data protection
laws are more harmonized and offer more direct supervision; for example, Internet
Protocol addresses in the EU are considered personally identifiable information (PII)
and hence merit privacy protection. In contrast, PII protection is localized in the US,
depending for protection on the laws within each jurisdiction. Citizens in both
jurisdictions reveal ignorance about available laws or remedies dealing with
informational disclosure. Once victimized, however, the FRA study participants
articulate a variety of psychological and social repercussions.
They described various personal harms from data disclosure, including
emotional distress, feeling offended, experiencing insecurity or damage to reputation, as
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well as the impact on their relations with other people.540 The overwhelming majority of
interviewees mentioned disturbance of daily life, the pressure of defamation suits,
disappointment due to misplaced confidence, shock, fear, feelings of injustice,
humiliation, and a sense of dispossession or lack of control over their own data.
Financial damages were also mentioned but less frequently. Most interviewees sought
remedies, such as lodging complaints with the national Data Protection Authorities
(DPAs). Very few went through judicial procedures because of the lengthy and time
consuming process, the complexity of procedures, and the high costs involved. Judges
and practising lawyers involved in the study shared that view. Reasons for preferring to
lodge complaints with national DPAs rather than seeking court remedies were again
cost related: the complaint procedure was shorter and less complex, and the procedure
did not demand legal representation. Hopes for outcomes included fixing an unjust
situation, correcting damage to identity or image, clarifying wrong records, rectification
or deletion of personal data, achieving rehabilitation, imposing sanctions against
violators and stopping the abuse of power and excessive unlawful control by employers.
An even greater share of respondents wanted to minimize a possible risk of other
individuals becoming a victim of data protection violations. They most commonly
mentioned prevention of future violations of rights, awareness raising, standing up for
fundamental rights, teaching a lesson to concerned authorities, obtaining an
acknowledgement of the violation from a competent authority, or imposing a sanction
on the perpetrator.541
iii

Data Brokers

Another source of data leakage or non-consensual retention is the activity of
data brokers. Data brokers either collect or buy Big Data containing personal data and
exchange it or sell it to others for purposes of identity verification, marketing of
products, and fraud detection. In a 2014 report of a study into the activities of nine
representative data brokers, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that, while
there are consumer benefits from data broker practices, there are exposure issues as
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well.542 Data brokers conduct consumer profiling to such an extent that they often know
as much, or more, about us than our family and friends, including our online and instore purchases, our political and religious affiliations, our income, and our socioeconomic status.
The primary risk to consumers is that the information held by data brokers is
often outdated, inaccurate, or collected or retained without the consent of the data
subject. The example the study gives deals with ‘Biker Enthusiasts.’543 If the profile
crafted from your PII places you in that category, you can expect to be targeted for road
gear, bike discounts and helmet advertisements. However, insurance companies might
use your interest in motorcycles to make a calculation about your inclination to engage
in ‘risky behavior’ and your premiums would be higher than those of your non-biking
enthusiast neighbour. Data brokers often store the data ‘indefinitely’ and use it for
numerous unidentified purposes, practices that concern the FTC.544
The non-consensual retransmission of personal data still occurs. For example,
within the health care system, doctors working under government funded health
systems make PII details of our visits available, through our health plan numbers, to
third parties or to governments for billing purposes. Within government-funded
healthcare systems, our health information is tied to our health plan number. Those
data might be retained far beyond the limits of our consent, perhaps because, as
Lawrence Lessig has suggested, it is cheaper and administratively simpler to “push the
save, rather than the delete button”.545 Such data might also be shared with other
departments of government or with third parties without our knowledge or consent.
For those privately insured, the network of data receivers might extend to third parties
within and outside the hospital. For example, the hospitals we attend for procedures at
the advice of our family doctor are likely to have provided our contact data to
fundraising personnel within their organization or to business enterprises to whom that
542
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function is outsourced.546 The pharmacy that fills our doctor’s prescription might pass
along our prescription information to pharmaceutical manufacturers, and their
researcher staff, whose products they sell.547 Those data reveal which drugs doctors are
prescribing and from which manufacturers, information of significant marketing value
to competitors. Pharmacies claim no harm is done because the data is anonymous as to
patients’ names. As we know, current data forensic capabilities include de-anonymizing
practices.548 The pharmacy might, in turn, sell our information to data brokers that, in
turn, sell it to a widening network of pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies,
consulting firms, advertising agencies, government bodies, and financial firms.549
One author relates the dilemma over PII control to four idiosyncrasies of the
Internet: its convergence capabilities, scale, volume, and individual empowerment.550
Convergence refers to the process by which media content is increasingly being
unbundled from its traditional distribution platforms so it can find many paths to the
consumers. As a result, it is now possible to disseminate, find, or consume the same
content using many devices or distribution networks, a capability that complicates
efforts to control information flow. The scale of that activity has burgeoned due to the
elimination of geographic, technological, and cultural-language barriers. As discussed,
546
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the lack of a central Internet regulatory agency in the US reduces the effective
monitoring of online data sharing. Regulators would be faced with a monumental task
because, as Internet scholar Adam Thierer observes, “there is just too much stuff for
regulators to police today relative to the past.”551
iv

Cookies

Cookies are used to track web site activity.552 When you visit some sites, the
server leaves a cookie onto your site that acts as your identification card. Upon each
return visit to that site, your browser passes the cookie back to the server. This allows a
web server to gather information about which web pages are used the most, and which
pages are gathering the most repeat traffic. Cookies are also used for online shopping.
Online stores often use cookies that record any personal information you enter, as well
as any items in your electronic shopping cart, so that you don't need to re-enter this
information each time you visit the site.
Webmasters can track access to their sites, but cookies facilitate that function. In
some cases, cookies come from advertising companies that manage the banner or
sidebar ads for a set of sites. That access allows advertising companies to develop
detailed profiles of the people who select ads across their customers' sites. Such access
carries privacy issues. They also have more benign uses, however, such as providing
research data for determining how search queries can be interpreted by a search
company to best respond to your queries. Ron Dolin provides the example of a search
site trying to decipher the best results to return for a ‘GM’ search which, depending on
the language of the person conducting the query, could mean a brand of automobile,
“genetically modified” food, “guerre mondial” or world war in French, and so on.553
Internet companies justify the use of cookies in such functions as ultimately improving
customer service. The autonomously generated notices on some sites that cookies are
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being employed is an indication that authorities are responding to user concerns about
their invasive potential.
v

Lingering Data, Autocorrection & the Power of Internet Companies

There is a divergence in opinion concerning the permanence of collected data
within archival spaces on the Internet. That discrepancy creates uncertainty around the
continuing accessibility of harmful content to third parties, even once a claim in
defamation is successful.554 Within the EU, there is a tradition in many Member States
of expunging court records as of right once the sentence has been completely served. In
most American jurisdictions, however, records are treated as part of the historical court
record and data subjects can apply for a pardon, but criminal records do not
autonomously expire when sentences are completed. That practice runs counter to the
rhetoric in America of second chances and new beginnings. In many jurisdictions, while
records might be removed from immediate public view, they still reside in archival
spaces for future reference.
The US National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) produced
a 2014 report on the erosion of rights and status of convicted persons due to the
persistence in online spaces of their criminal records. The report cites incidents where a
total of 65 million Americans by 2008, or one in four, had lingering criminal records on
file within the states people in America.555 Those “collateral consequences” can create
such significant reputational stigma as voting bans, immigration status issues, parental
rights limitations, unfavourable credit ratings, problems in obtaining or using
passports, as well as diminishment of employment opportunities and benefit
eligibility.556 Interestingly, the NACDL report refers to the ‘stigmatization’ and ‘second
class legal citizenship’ of those with persistent criminal records,557 but does not identify
554
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them as harms to reputation. Among the report’s recommendations is the retention of
criminal records only if criminal conduct is recent and directly related to a particular
benefit or opportunity.
Unless educated in the subject, the individual user is unaware of the nature and
extent of stored data and of how Internet companies can misrepresent the workings of
security features that they promote as privacy features. Several FTC cases involving
Internet companies that have been sanctioned illustrate the myriad ways Internet
companies can mislead individual users. I set out three below.
FTC v. Google Buzz
In the first case, Google created a new social networking service called Google
Buzz in 2010 by linking its Gmail subscribers with each other without their
knowledge. 558 The link was promoted as enabling subscribers to share updates,
comments, photos, videos, and other information through posts or ‘buzzes’. Google
populated the Google Buzz network by gleaning personal data from profiles and other
required information when users first subscribed to Gmail. 559 Without prior notice or
the opportunity to consent, Gmail users were automatically linked with unknown
‘followers’ who had access to personal details of their account. When a user logged on,
she could either choose to check out those users or go straight to her inbox. If she chose
the latter, she could still be followed by all other users of Gmail who had been enrolled
in Buzz, and without her knowledge; as well, a Buzz link would appear in the list of
links on the margins of her Gmail page. If she clicked on that link, she would be taken
to the Buzz welcome screen and automatically enrolled in Buzz, without any disclosure
of that fact and without any further action on her part. In 2012, Google was discovered
to be actively releasing cookies or other architecturally-altering programs into users’
devices in order to extract more user information.
FTC v. Snapchat
The second group of cases involved the nonconsensual transfer and sale of
subscribers’ personal information. Snapchat is an application enabling users to share
558
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photos, record videos, text and drawings. It was found in 2014 to be misrepresenting to
users the extent to which those features compiled their personal data and that of their
recipients.560 Similarly, in 2012 Myspace was found to be passing along users’ personally
identifiable to advertisers with whom they had information exchange contracts.561
Those recipients, in turn, could sell such information to other advertisers unknown to
Myspace or the users. Facebook and Google were prosecuted for similar invasive
practices.
Snapchat was also found to have misrepresented the expiry feature of their
photographs. In United States v. Snapchat562, the defendant company used as a main
marketing feature the ‘ephemeral’ nature of ‘snaps’.563 Snapchat claimed the user could
pre-set the duration of each post, after which content would ‘disappear forever’ from
both the sender’s and recipient’s device. Despite Snapchat’s claims, the FTC complained
of several ways that recipients could archive the content and continue to transmit it to
third parties. Consumers could, for example, use third-party applications to log into the
Snapchat service. Because the service’s deletion feature only functions in the official
Snapchat application, recipients could use these widely available applications to view
and save snaps indefinitely. Indicative of the popularity of such applications is the report
that they have been downloaded millions of times.564 Despite a security researcher
warning the company about this possibility, the complaint alleges, Snapchat continued
to misrepresent expiry times.
In addition, the complaint alleged that any recipient could preserve content
indefinitely by taking a screenshot, and that the company transmitted the user’s
geolocation if an Android system were used, despite its denial of the same in its privacy
policy. The FTC complaint also alleges that Snapchat collected iOS users’ contacts
information from their address books without notice or consent.
560
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FTC v. Google
The third type of case 565 involved Google bypassing Apple users’ privacy
settings by placing cookies on their computers.566 Specifically, Google used computer
code to gain access, through Apple's Safari Web browser, to user data that it then
monitored via cookies.567 Safari, the most widely used browser on mobile devices, is
designed to block such tracking by default. The technique reaches far beyond those
websites, however, because once the coding is activated, it can enable Google tracking
across the vast majority of websites. The findings appear to contradict some of Google's
own instructions to Safari users on how to avoid tracking as contained in their online
privacy policies. Until recently, one Google site told Safari users they could rely on
Safari's privacy settings to prevent tracking by Google. Google defended its actions by
stating that the cookies were only passively collecting personal information. Google
continued to implant cookies even where users explicitly requested that no cookies be
used. The FTC fine for that activity was 22.5 million, the highest monetary penalty
ordered by the regulator against an Internet company.568
Autocorrection
One final feature within the control of the Internet company and its designers,
that of autocorrection (and its correlate autosuggestion) has been introduced to facilitate
browsing and search activities. Some of the search terms it autonomously prompts are
specific to geolocation and its cultural sensitivities that can, in some contexts, provide
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socially inappropriate content and embarrassing innuendo.

569

Under such

circumstances it might suggest racial, sexual, or other discriminatory messages or
search terms. Technically, the autocorrection feature depends on a relatively simple
algorithm. The system can be similar to a word processor's spell checker: as you type,
the software checks each word against a built-in dictionary and suggests alternatives
when it does not find a match.570 Many systems try to predict your intentions and
suggest a word before you have finished typing it. When sent, the lingering damage can
be considerable. Misunderstandings arise when words contained in the built-in
dictionary do not reflect the cultural or legal climate of the user.
Some insults to reputation cross all cultural lines. For example, a Japanese
plaintiff in a defamation suit suffered work loss due to Google algorithms linking his
name to criminal acts he had not committed. 571 European courts seem similarly
intolerant of autocorrection references to illegal activity.572 An Italian court found
liability, for example, in Google Inc.’s autosuggestions that linked a citizen’s name with
truffa (fraud) and truffatore (con man).573 In France, Google faced a similar suit over
search suggestions linking several persons’ names to "Jewish", in violation of a French
law prohibiting the recording of a person’s ethnicity.574 Google argued in its defence
that autocorrection technology is based on most frequently searched terms, but has
more recently modified its practice to exclude references to constitutionally protected
groups. Other lawsuits for defamation involving autocorrection include claimants in
Germany who requested that Google delete the autocomplete results “fraud” or
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“Scientology” associated with their name search;575 and an action by the wife of a former
president of Germany whose name prompted search terms “escort” and ” red light”.576
In that case, Internet companies were not ordered to preemptively vet auto suggestions;
their liability is only triggered if and when they become aware of a violation of third
party rights.577 In practice, Google claims to routinely investigate the defamatory
nature of suggested search terms when faced with a cease and desist request.
Those actions are arising in places other than the US due to the latter’s failure, to
date, to squarely address such potential liability. The major hurdle in enjoining an
American Internet company as defendant in autocorrect or autosuggestion cases is the
near carte-blanche they receive under the Communications Decency Act, s. 230, as pointed
out above. In defence of their invasive practices, Internet companies claim they are
personalizing online services, bringing information and social connections to an extent
the subscriber would never enjoy without such services. As observed in one German
publication, American companies are the great offenders as they dominate the market
and have considerable influence in the effectiveness of FTC regulation:
Internet companies benefit from America's lax privacy and data protection laws,
which are unlikely to change any time soon. It's a stark contrast to Europe,
where the EU wants to toughen its laws -- and apply them to American
companies.578
One disincentive to compliance with privacy rules is that punitive fines, relatively low in
relation to profits, can be rationalized as an everyday cost of doing business. All of the
above examples illustrate the technological and economic power that Internet
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companies have always exercised over our ‘interests, needs, desires, fears, pleasures, and
intentions.’579
3.3

Case Studies
In examining the Mosley and Martin cases, my purpose is to illustrate that the

damage imposed on personal, familial, and societal relationships by persistent Internet
content is profound and not particularly aided by practical legal responses. While each
plaintiff turned for vindication to the traditional adversarial systems in Europe or
America, neither one had their search for justice completely met. Much of that
discontent was due to their awakening to the shortcomings of the litigation process. In
both cases, the privacy invasion they felt at the hands of Internet companies was
compounded by the inability of their respective legal systems to ease the sting of a
damaged reputation.
a

Exposure: The EU Mosley Case

The decision of the British High Court in the Max Mosley exposure case was
favourable in its initial findings but has brought little reputational reprieve in the end. It
illustrates the deep reputational damage incurred by public figures,580 the extent to
which they will go to restore their good name, and the shortcomings of the civil court
process to bring satisfaction after the fact. Mosley is a world figure in auto-racing. On
March 30th 2008, the UK Sunday tabloid News of the World (NoW) published an article
about Mosley under the heading “F1 boss has sick Nazi orgy with five hookers”. The
NoW published photographs and a link to its website that displayed video footage of the
applicant that was secretly recorded by a paid participant to the sexual activities. Public
response was viral: the original publication enjoyed a circulation in excess of 3 million,
the online video received 1.4 million views the first day, and the online article attracted
400,000 views on each of the first two days.
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Mosley sued the NoW and its owners, News Group Newspapers Ltd, for breach
of confidence “by way of conduct inconsistent with a pre-existing relationship”.581 The
nature of that pre-existing relationship was never made clear.582 He also sought,
unsuccessfully, an interim injunction to prevent the NoW showing footage of the
covertly recorded video on their website. In his defence, Mosley admitted to having a
party but denied the Nazi theme and found fault with the press characterization of his
private conduct. 583 Mosley was awarded £60,000 in actual damages.
When Mosley applied to the ECtHR for a reference on the matter of injunctive
relief, the Court cited the ECHR,584 the UK Human Rights Act of 1998,585 and the
successful defamation case of Canadian singer Loreena McKennitt that expanded
confidence actions to circumstances involving public figures where no prior relationship
existed. Mosley petitioned the ECtHR for support of his claim that Article 8 of the
ECHR imposed a positive obligation on the State to require prior notification of
newspaper publications interfering with privacy rights. Only by advanced notice and a
corresponding injunction, Mosley proposed, could he meaningfully preempt publication
of such highly personal material. He argued that the available remedies in English
domestic law inadequately protected his right to respect for private life, as guaranteed
by Article 8 of the ECHR. The ECtHR agreed that privacy breaches were irreversible
581

Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB)(Mosley 1). Although there was
no action for defamation and therefore no ruling on damage to reputation, Justice Eady
pointed out the judicial obligation to apply such legislation as the UK Human Rights Act 1998, c.
42: “[T]he law is concerned to prevent the violation of a citizen’s autonomy, dignity and selfesteem. It is not simply a matter of “unaccountable” judges running amok. Parliament enacted
the 1998 statute which requires these values to be acknowledged and enforced by the courts”.
582
Breach of confidentiality had been successfully argued in the UK case of Canadian singer
Loreena McKennitt in McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73 at [8], per Buxton LJ, a significant
precedent for privacy rights of public figures.
583
The press use of the word ‘nazi’ was intended, according to Mosley, to generate public
discussion of Mosley’s father, Sir Oswald Mosley, well known during the interbellum years as
the founder of the British Union of Fascists. Mosley had previously denounced his father’s
past associations, so saw the press reference as an implication of his duplicity in secretly played
Nazi sex games.
584
ECHR, supra fn 534 at art 8 and 10. Article 8 provides for the right of respect for private
and family life, one’s home and correspondence, with no public interference in that right
except in accordance with law and in the interests of national security, public safety, the
country’s economic wellbeing, the prevention of crime, protection of health or morals, or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 10 addresses the countervailing right of
free speech.
585
UK Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42: Article 8, s. 12(3) serves to buttress the protection afforded
to freedom of speech at the interlocutory stage.

141

under any circumstances, but pointed out that news of defamation awards could serve to
restore some of the plaintiff’s reputation. Citing with approval the distinction made by
Justice Eady in the court of first instance, the court commented:
[L]ibel damages can achieve one objective that is impossible in privacy cases.
Whereas reputation can be vindicated by an award of damages, in the sense that
the claimant can be restored to the esteem in which he was previously held, that
is not possible where embarrassing personal information has been released for
general publication. As the media are well aware, once privacy has been
infringed, the damage is done and the embarrassment is only augmented by
pursuing a court action.586
Mosley’s case does not illustrate that distinction: he is a wealthy587 former
lawyer with worldwide influence in motor sports. While the monetary award assisted in
bringing his case against Internet companies in other European jurisdictions for
retransmitting the offending images, it was of little consequence in removing the stain
to his reputation: he was forced to resign as President of the auto sport governing body
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile. Further, the Queen’s Bench Justice Eady
denied his request to stem further dissemination of the harmful content by granting an
injunction to any further re-publication of the video on the Internet, citing the practical
futility of trying to suppress the highly generative medium once the dams had burst.
Greatly affected by news of his son’s drug-induced death, exacerbated in
Mosley’s view by the devastating effect of the NoW story, he then sued Google Inc. for
its continued listing of his Nazi-themed orgy amongst its search results and Nazithemed photographs in Google Image.588 He pursued takedown orders in the courts of
twenty-two countries and ordered the removal of material from 193 websites in order to
vindicate the false accusations of the NoW press.589 In 2013, Mosley won injunctive and
financial relief from courts in France590 and in Germany. Mosley commented on the
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harm that the exposure of private actions caused him (“enormous and continuous
damage”),591 caused his wife of 48 years (“totally devastating”) and his sons (he could
think of “nothing more undignified or humiliating” for his two sons to experience).592
The Mosley case has been ongoing since 2008 and has exacted a personal toll for
the plaintiff in the lowering of his esteem and that of his family in the public eye, the
embarrassment and humiliation that have resulted, and the formidable cost of pursuing
retribution.593 For the average income earner, litigation on the Mosley scale would be
completely inaccessible.
b

Disclosure: the US Martin Case

The David-and-Goliath case of Lorraine Martin is about a Connecticut nurse
and single mother who sued the Hearst Corporation media giant for persistent online
media accounts of a criminal charge for which she was never convicted. The ongoing
case for erasure that was denied in the US District Court of Connecticut and is now
before the state’s appellate court, and is noteworthy for the additional layer of
complexity added to claims for reputational redress when the Internet is involved.594
Martin’s persistent efforts to assert erasure rights have brought her no remedial relief
to date.
Martin was arrested in 2010 on a warrant, along with her two adult sons, for
possession of a narcotic (traces of cocaine) and drug paraphernalia (scales) and
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), evidence police needed to substantiate
an informant’s contention that the Martin sons had been selling drugs in the
neighbourhood. Ms. Martin was arrested and released on bail. Her charges were
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withdrawn a year later for lack of evidence. 595 Martin argues her case has been
expunged from court records and should similarly be removed from online websites.596
Its persistence in Internet searches serves as a virtual scarlet letter in terms of Martin’s
future chances at employment in the medical field.597
Martin’s arrest was covered by three Hearst publications, both in print and
online.598 Upon the withdrawal of her charges, Martin invoked a clause in a Connecticut
erasure law arguing that while the original accounts of her arrest were true, from the
point of their dismissal they should be considered never to have happened and so should
be removed from both online and offline news archives as a conviction had never been
registered. Most American states have some version of such erasure laws.599 Martin
maintained that any sustained media account of her arrest was therefore defamatory
because it was untrue, brought untold damage to her reputation, robbed her of
opportunities for employment and social acceptability, and did not allow her to move
forward without the stigma of the arrest. She sought expungement of the accounts of
her arrest from all online sources and archives, claiming four tortious causes of action:
libel, publicity placing her in a false light, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
invasion of privacy.
The District Court of Connecticut applied strict statutory interpretation to deny
all four claims and dismissed the case. The court acknowledged that the law mandates
the erasure of the arrest records by law enforcement and court officials but states:
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[T]he expungement statute does not transmute a once-true fact into a
falsehood. It does not require the excision of records from the historical archives
of newspapers or bound volumes of reported decisions or a personal diary. It
cannot banish memories.600
The dismissal is considered a win for the First Amendment, both freedom of speech and
freedom of the press.601 The judge’s decision shields the factual reporting of news
organizations from being erased from the Internet just because its archived version
might seem detrimental to someone’s reputation years later. The case, however, does
not resolve the stickier ethical questions surrounding news organizations’
responsibilities in the digital age, where news stories linger online and can be dredged
up indiscriminately long after most paper copies would have been buried and forgotten.
Martin subsequently brought a class action pleading similar grounds to the state’s
Court of Appeal. An amicus brief filed by the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of
Expression argues in support of the defendant publishers that parties who use erasure
laws to ‘remove factually accurate newspaper stories’ threaten the First Amendment
rights of freedom of expression.602 It stresses that, while erasure is required of court
staff, police, and prosecutors, the Connecticut law would violate individual
constitutional rights if it required journalists who report the truth to rescind it
retroactively once the facts were no longer true.603
c

Significance of Mosley and Martin Cases

The significance of the Martin case lies in the extra layer of complexity brought
to the law of journalism by the Internet. In the class action, Martin could argue that the
ethics around the censorship question are skewed when considering the extent of harm
to her reputation with a medium with permanently cached information, instantaneous
access, and global redistribution capabilities to third parties. The defendant news
publishers rely on standard ethical and constitutional principles espoused by journalists
600
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regarding the inviolable truth of their news at the time it is reported, and the practical
difficulties inherent in ‘unpublishing’ and foreshortening the ‘long tail of the news’.604
The legal issue of who controls news online has been broadened with Google’s
claim that news organizations can block Google from indexing specific content. It is
webmasters who control web content, Google maintains, not Internet companies, and
news publishers control webmaster decisions about what stories have public access,
when, and at what price.605
Meanwhile Mosley continues to sue Google in one country after another, as
domestic laws are the current route to relief in the absence of any pan-European or
international judicial authority over transborder transmission of reputation-destroying
information. Journalist Bill Keller describes the ongoing stigma experiences by Martin:
[She] found that when she applied for jobs that should have been well within
her reach, she got the cold shoulder. She Googled herself and discovered what
any vigilant employer would have seen: stories still sitting in online news
archives with headlines like “Mother and sons charged with drug offenses.”606
While the EUDR might help in bringing some clarity and consensus to an
effective legal response to such damage, for now litigants like Mosley and Martin must
endure the legal uncertainty and the sensational or titillating accounts that publicize
individual efforts at stemming reputational damage.607
In terms of existing legal remedies to protect reputation, the Mosley case
illustrates there are few tools and most are financial. As Mosley’s comments about his
family show, injuries to reputation are not borne exclusively, or even primarily, by the
affected individual. Defamation scholar Ardia explains that, in many ways, reputation is
a quintessential public good in that it is a product of cooperation with others and
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relative to our relationships with them.608 Ardia urges understanding of reputation’s
“important signaling function” in communicating complex information about an
individual and about the individual’s place within society. To malign that reputation, in
his view, is to degrade the value and reliability of that information and of the
community identity as a whole.609
The factor of online permanence is highlighted by the Martin decision. In
Europe, where journalists and citizens do not have the First Amendment protections, a
right to be forgotten allows for those with cleared records to demand every trace of the
record be completely erased.610 That demand extends to print and electronic media
accounts (including European bureaus of US-based media) and includes a demand that
all records of a case be completely erased, not just updated. Toronto Star editor Karen
English reports that misdemeanors and other criminal charges are an increasing source
of requests to “unpublish” news accounts for North American publishers.611 She cites
with approval a ‘sunset’ provision instituted at one news corporation whereby certain
news items autonomously ‘drop off’ the news organization’s website six months after
initial publication.612
Both Mosley and Martin have become victims to what, in the world of US
defamation law, is a commonplace occurrence of time-lapse or “incremental” thinking:
jurists within many legal systems struggle in their own ways with legal culture and
laws that are remnants of simpler times. Another unfortunate and unhelpful influence
on both plaintiffs is what is known as the ‘Streisand Effect’.613 The phenomenon, named
after American entertainer Barbra Streisand, reflects the unsatisfactory results obtained
in an invasion of privacy action she filed in 2003 against a photographer for capturing
images of her Malibu oceanfront home to promote a government coastal erosion project.
Streisand maintained that inclusion of those images in the proposal implied she was
608
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insensitive to coastal erosion, a false impression she judged would cause her great
reputational damage, both personally and as an entertainer. Upon the filing of
Streisand’s legal action for invasion of privacy, public interest in the images on
YouTube soared from six to more than 420,000 downloads within one month.614 The
continued access to the story on YouTube substantiates the fear of every potential
litigant that, far from ameliorating personal suffering, court actions can perpetuate
anyone’s negative reputation.
3.4

Summary
Life in the post-analogue world offers a richness of choice in communications.

The downside is that we become what we behold: we move from being shapers of tools
to being shaped by them.615 We experience opportunities to express, inform, consume,
advance professionally, and entertain ourselves in ways only sketchily drawn by science
fiction authors. With innovation in digital communications comes mobility, plasticity,
speed, ambit, a-spatiality, and ephemeral storage - all creating enhanced risks of
personal privacy invasion. Those invasions damage our reputation or personal identity
within the communities in which we work and interact socially. That result would not
surprise futurist authors such as George Orwell or Michel Foucault or Marshall
McLuhan, but it poses important legal questions that need to be tackled to restore the
balance of key ingredients in post-modern life such as technological convenience,
information management, privacy, free expression, and attribution.
The role of law in remedying damage to reputational privacy within that
complex environment is explored in the next two chapters. Several crucial questions
raised in this chapter prompt that inquiry: is anonymity practically possible or even
desirable in digital transactions; can the power of Internet companies to control our
online presence be shaped to our protection rather than our vulnerability; is digital
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speech sufficiently different than real-time communications to warrant a new legal
regime? As set out in Chapter II, the normative and political differences between US
and EU legislators and jurists regarding those broader questions have produced two
very different regulatory regimes that could lead to a trans-Atlantic clash of values. But
first, an examination of the current legal tools available to those who suffer reputational
injury perpetrated through digital communications.
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CHAPTER 4
4.0

LEGAL RESPONSES TO REPUTATIONAL INJURY

Introduction
Meaning is the essential starting point in any claim for defamation. The same set
of words can legitimately be given quite varied interpretations by different
individuals, but the law of defamation applies a "legal fiction" that a publication
can only be understood to bear one ‘natural and ordinary’ meaning. This is the
meaning as understood by a hypothetical, reasonable reader.616
The Web has augmented and diversified ways to intrude upon our private lives.

It is reasonable as individuals that we look to law to either safeguard our needs for
reputational integrity or to offer a remedy when other mechanisms fail.617 International,
regional, and domestic laws each provide a particular response, either for state-citizen
conflicts (primarily in the area of data protection) or for disputes that arise between
private individuals (such as defamation, privacy, and breach of confidence cases). Since
the end of World War II, the international community has formulated a handful of
significant legal conventions that address reputation, primarily by framing those
concerns broadly within values of privacy, family life, and personal dignity as
entitlements of membership in the human race. As world wars have shrunk to more
regional and asymmetric conflicts in the ensuing decades, the ambit of our interpersonal
communications have expanded – from localized gossip to global, instantaneous
messaging. We might anticipate, therefore, that the wide selection of international
treaties would provide some conceptual reference point and inspiration for collaboration
among jurists. Similarly, with the emergence of the Internet as the dominant
616
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interpersonal messaging tool within the past decade, it would be reasonable to expect
the evolution of Internet-specific laws protecting our virtual selves and that
accommodate speech idiosyncrasies that were not in existence in the analogue era. In
this chapter I begin with international instruments and look for their influence on
regional (EU) and domestic (EU and US) law. Their degree of influence should be
somewhat predictive of how effective and international law of the Internet might be. I
then look to more regional and local causes of action (defamation, privacy, and
confidentiality laws) and case samples to determine how they have incorporated those
international legal norms. I conclude with a discussion about whether digital speech is
ontologically different and hence deserving of a discrete legal or extra-legal response for
our protection. That question is important to an understanding of whether courts are
approaching Internet cases of reputational and privacy violations in a novel way or are
merely applying real time solutions to online content. In summarizing the chapter I
mention alternatives to our traditional legal practices if we are to approach online
speech as an evolving and discrete form of expression.
4.1

International, Transnational & Domestic Response
a

Conventions & Declarations

Two earlier international instruments expressly address reputation as a basic
human right, the first crafted by United Nations members as they emerged from the
destruction and atrocities of the Second World War and the second, somewhat
ironically, created in the midst of the Vietnam War of the mid-1960s.618 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights619 (UNDR) and the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights620 (ICCPR) use almost identical wording to stipulate that “no one shall
618
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be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation” and that “everyone has the right to
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”621 The ICCPR qualifies
“interference” and “attacks” with addition of the word “unlawful”.
The UNDR in article 19 also addresses a human right to free speech “through
any medium and regardless of frontiers.”622 Reputation is treated as a right devolving
from social and political life, and so is significantly more open-ended regarding
interpretation than the protections against violent and arbitrary treatment with which
the Declaration begins. As one source explains, the UNDR leaves larger scope for
variation in different social and political contexts, because “ individuals everywhere have
the right to be free of torture, but different countries may legitimately come to different
conclusions about the conditions under which private property may be taken for public
use,”623 Or, we might add, the import of privacy and reputation as elements of family
and social life. Such differential treatment sets up the conditions for a hierarchy of rights
in actual state practice.
The US and EU Member States have all signed both the UNDR and the ICCPR
and ratified the multilateral UN treaty.624 Both treaties have enforcement bodies: for the
Universal Declaration several oversight bodies are provided. 625 The ICCPR is
monitored by the UN Human Rights Committee that reviews regular reports from
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State parties on how the rights are being implemented.626 In practice enforcement for
both treaties is more nominal than of real weight, with diplomatic pressure and other
‘soft law’ tools being preferred.
The UNDR is not legally binding as such; it carries no formal legal obligations
but might carry moral obligations or attain the force of law as customary international
law. Most of its rights had already received a significant degree of recognition by 1948
in the constitutions of many nations, if not in their practices. Since that time, most of its
rights have been incorporated into the domestic legal systems of most countries.
In contrast, neither the ECHR nor the US Constitution contain direct references
to honour or reputation as a human right, although the ECHR includes a reference to a
respect for privacy and family life, in the spirit of article 12 of the UNDR and refers to
reputation as a legitimate aim that might justify interference with the right of free
speech, not by granting it rights status but by speaking of “protection of the reputation
or rights of others.”627 The use of “reputation” as a qualification of free speech rights
seems deliberate, as appears from the preparatory work on Article 8 of the ECHR.628 It
took the Pfeifer v Austria decision of the ECtHR in 2007 to recognize reputation as a
right equivalent to free speech at European common law.629
In the case of the ICCPR, as with other international treaties, the US and all EU
Member states who are parties to the Convention must comply with and implement the
provisions of the treaty just as it would any other domestic law, subject to reservations,
understandings and declarations (RUDs) requested by other signatories. One RUD of
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considerable weight in foreign relations, as requested by the US, establishes that the US
Constitution shall prevail over any contested free speech use involving the terms of the
ICCPR. Another key RUD attached by the US Senate is a "non self-executing"
Declaration, intended to limit the ability of litigants to sue in a US court for direct
enforcement of the ICCPR. That Declaration effectively challenges any external
enforcement mechanism, although the US continues to file a report every four years
with an ICCPR Human Rights Committee that oversees compliance.630
Cases relating to reputation that expressly reference the UNDR and the ICCPR
are very limited; one reason might be the strength of RUDs requested by the US.
Another could be the comparatively lower significance of reputational harm and privacy
invasions on the scale of human rights violations, ranging from violent physical harms
to intangible ones, that each instrument addresses. Rights to remedies, as discussed in
the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to Remedies, seem restricted to ‘gross’
violations of International Human Rights Law and ‘serious’ violations of International
Humanitarian Law, a bar the indignities and social exclusion caused by reputational
injury might not be able to hurdle.631
In its last report to the ICCPR Human Rights Committee in 2014, the US was
criticized by a committee of the UN for its surveillance activities on foreign as well as
US citizens632 that showed non-compliance with the privacy provisions in Article 17 and
with international law principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.633 Reputation
rights as included in Article 17 were not specifically addressed. The report noted,
however, but cannot enforce, recommendations that any interference with the right to
privacy, family, home or correspondence be authorized by laws that: 1) are publicly
630
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accessible; 2) are tailored to specific legitimate aims; 3) detail the precise circumstances
of data collection and obtaining consent, and 4) provide for effective safeguards against
abuse.634 Also mentioned as excessive invasions of personal privacy are practices that
mandate that third parties (such as ISPs and other Internet companies) retain personal
data for state use; and that the judiciary be involved in “authorizing or monitoring”
surveillance activities.635
With respect to the ICCPR, its Human Rights Committee has assessed its
provisions relating to free speech as describing a much narrower right than that
articulated in US constitutional laws. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR requires prohibition of
any negative statements towards national groups, races or religions that “constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. The US Supreme Court has determined
the First Amendment addresses free speech in three fora: public speech, used in public
spaces such as parks, where all speech is protected unless leading to violence; designated
forum speech, such as meetings held in universities, where speech enjoys the same
protection as public speech but for a designated time; and limited forums where only
certain classes of speech are protected, such as a meeting on a religious subject.636 In
any conflict between a US citizen’s free speech rights and those of a non-US citizen
subject to a non-US free speech law, the US position is likely to prevail due to its wider
ambit. That is particularly the case with hate speech. The US subscribes to an even
wider tolerance: only incitement that is intended to cause imminent violence justifies
restricting fundamental speech right.637 Some EU states, however, such as Finland,
Belgium, Iceland, and Denmark, oppose the term ‘hate speech’ as potentially restricting
democratic debate on religion and minorities. Those protections are broader still than
those in American law.
The International Bill of Human Rights, then, has been extensively elaborated
through numerous conventions and declarations, both at the universal level and at the
regional level. Altogether they comprise a wide range of human rights and that form an
interrelated normative system. More recent additions include the International
634
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Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families that mentions reputation as a qualification in the balance to be struck between
privacy and free speech.638 So even temporary citizens are afforded a basic right to a
good reputation, although its wording suggests it might be subordinate to free speech
rights. Other international instruments and initiatives that are relevant to online
reputation are: the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child;639 (prohibiting arbitrary or
unlawful interference with a child’s privacy, family, or correspondence, and unlawful
attacks on his or her honour and reputation); the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities640(with similar provisions for the disabled, including protection from
unlawful attacks on reputation and privacy rights for correspondence “and other types
of communications”); and the UN Resolution on a Global Agenda for Dialogue among
Civilizations 641 (urging full utilization of communication technologies including the
Internet to further global dialogue and understanding).
With respect to regional initiatives, the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) expressly addresses reputation as one limitation on
the right to free expression. It also suggests reputational protection obliquely through
the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.642 It qualifies
that right for national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the state, the
638

International Convention On The Protection Of The Rights Of All Migrant Workers And
Members Of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45-158, U.N.P.M. 69, Dec. 18, 1990, Article 14.
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No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy,
family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.”
[emphasis added]
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video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue and
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Art. 10. The ECHR does refer to reputation as one of the legitimate aims that might justify
interference with freedom of expression. However, it does not do so by granting rights status
to reputation, but instead speaking of “protection of the reputation or rights of others”.
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prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health and morals, and the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.” 643
The recognition of reputation as a distinct right was slow coming in EU case
law. In the first defamation case brought under article 10 of the ECHR, Lingens v.
Austria 644 in 1986, the ECtHR denied the Government’s argument that the case
concerned a conflict between two equal Convention rights; the court held that a right to
reputation only acted as a qualifier of the right to free expression. With the article 10
case of Chauvy and others v. France645 in 2004 and the article 8 case of Pfeifer v. Austria646
in 2007, however, the right to protection of reputation was established as a full
Convention right under article 8 of the ECHR. The Pfeifer case decided “a person’s right
to protection of his or her reputation is encompassed by Article 8 as being part of the
right to respect for private life”.647 EU law had finally incorporated international legal
norms expressed by the UNDR and ICCPR. That development has its critics: Stijn
Smet of the University of Ghent criticizes the ECtHR for elevating reputation to
convention right status as it will naturally conflict with another, stronger right, that of
freedom of expression which comprises its “strongest enemy”.648 He cites the ECtHR
case of Polanco-Torres (where a judge’s wife fought defamatory claims that she and her
husband engaged in unlawful business transactions) as a judicial attempt to balance the
643
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them of their dignity. It is necessary to reaffirm respect for human dignity as one of the most
important Convention values and one which historical works must also foster.”)
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Pfeifer v. Austria (2007) 48 EHRR 175 regarding an article alleging the Jews attacked
Germany in 1933 and trivializing the actions of the Nazi regime. (stating “A person’s
reputation, even if that person is criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his
or her personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore also falls within the scope of
his or her private life under Article 8.”).
647
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human rights pendulum that had swung too far on the side of reputation. In Smet’s
opinion the court wrongly set a high standard for proof of harm as one that
“compromises personal integrity”.649 Smet is persuasive in arguing that, by creating the
integrity standard, the ECtHR has created a situational right, not balanced an existing
right with a competing right of free speech using the traditional proportionality test. In
the Polanco case “in some situations one enjoys a right to reputation and in others
not.”650
In the Western Hemisphere, the American Convention on Human Rights, promoted
by the Organization of American States (OAS) with state members in North, Central,
and South America, sets out the right to privacy, honour and dignity.651 It prohibits
arbitrary interference with the right to privacy or one’s reputation and stipulates that
everyone has the right to protection of the law against attacks or interferences with that
right.652 It further subjects the right of expression to a “respect for the rights or
reputations of others”.653 The American Convention also provides for a right of reply to
individual complaints of reputational violations through the designation by every
publisher (including online publishers) of a person without immunity to respond to such
complaints.
The American Convention was inspired by the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man (the Declaration of the Americas) that marked the world’s first
general international human rights instrument, predating the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1947 by one year.654 The US and Cuba are the only parties to have
signed but not ratified the American Convention, although a few states have actually
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650

158

attempted to rescinded their ratification.655 In practice, the OAS and the American
Convention are seen as “more Latin American than Inter-American” and there is strong
pressure for the US to become a State Party to the alternative OAS Inter-American
treaties.656
Although not well known outside of the legislative histories of the parties, the
Declaration of the Americas has been referenced in the jurisprudence of both the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and the work of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) that acts as a court of first instance for
the OAS and that works at enforcement of the Declaration in all OAS Member States.
In contrast to the EU system of human rights litigation, individual citizens of the OAS
Member States are not authorized to take cases directly to the IACHR.657
Akin to its position regarding the ICCPR, the US holds that its own laws
provide the same or stronger human rights protections than those of the Declaration of
the Americas and the latter was not referenced in my search of US jurisprudence
dealing with inter-American human rights cases. In fact, there were no cases of US
origin coming before the IACHR. Key objections in the US to OAS rights protections
relate to issues of federalism, sovereignty, and incompatibility with US domestic laws,
most prominently the US Constitution. 658 In political terms, US exceptionalism 659
regarding OAS activities within the Inter-American System is heavily criticized by
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other members who have contemplated the creation of alternatives to the American
Convention and exclusion of US participation.660
With respect to data protection in Europe,661 two international instruments are
crucial to ongoing oversight of transborder data flow: the Council of Europe's 1981
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of
Personal Data (Convention 108),662 and the 1980 Guidelines Governing the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data, drafted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).663 Those rules were devised to deal
specifically with personal information that crosses international borders, targeting the
adequacy of protection afforded in the exporting country. The former, Convention 108,
was devised in 1981 and has been described by the European Data Protection
Supervisor as “the only legally binding international treaty dealing with privacy and
data protection.664 Privacy advocates recognized in the Convention 108 an opportunity
to close a gap in data protections: the ECHR was a ‘closed’ instrument, that is, one not
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open to participation by non-European or non-member states.665 It applies to both
private and public authorities, such as police organizations, but has been heavily
criticized for lack of enforcement mechanisms and for its Euro-centered membership.666
It provided the framework for the 95 Directive in the mid-1990s when data
privacy regulation was viewed as “a niche activity”.667 Today, Internet use is no longer
an exclusive activity: even the purchase of a morning coffee routinely involves
computer-based caching or storage of personally identifying information such as name,
banking data, geo-location, and consumer preferences.
The OEDC guidelines, the 95 Directive, and Convention 108 are crafted using
“technologically neutral” language to avoid the dating of legal instruments by too
specific a reference to the technologies intended. They provide broad principles that
serve as a template for the more specific and practical details that will become law as the
EU Data Regulation.668 The Convention 108 places more emphasis on protection of
human dignity and human rights through individual control of our data but does not
expressly mention “reputation” or the personal cost of data leakage.669
Similarly, the OEDC Guidelines, the first internationally agreed-upon set of
privacy principles, addresses the importance of consumer information to the global
economy and foresees the vulnerability of individuals to automated processing of their
personal information.

While the original guidelines do not express concerns over
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individual reputation, revisions in 2013 mention reputation for the first time within the
context of the “reputational impact” and “loss of trust or confidence” caused to
individuals in organizations that experience a data breach, whether by inadvertence,
negligence, or victimization at the hands of data thieves.670 Reputation as an individual
right, within the context of data protection, is a legal principle that has developed more
in the breach – driven more by punitive than precautionary intentions.
Both the 108 Convention and OEDC Guidelines are under continuous review
and part of a push for global consensus on universal regulation of personal data
collection. Despite those efforts, they have been criticized as ineffectual, as “burdensome
to those whose motives are benign and ineffective towards those more malignly
inclined.” 671
On a more regional basis, the 95 Directive was created to regulate the misuse of
personal data before the popularization of the personal computer. The Directive is the
predecessor to the proposed omnibus EUDR that would update and expand the EU data
collection regime to accommodate the emergence of the Internet, other digital
communications, and data collection technologies that were not in existence when the
95 Directive was implemented. The EUDR’s more novel provisions will grant the right
of access to data by the data subject672 and the right to an effective remedy for leakage
before a complex system of administrative tribunals.673 It will also regulate, on a
mandatory basis, any Internet postings that are no longer true, are outdated, have been
collected or retained without the data subject’s consent, or are embarrassing to the
reputation of the data subject who can request their deletion.674 The proposed EUDR
670
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makes specific mention of the protection of “reputation” eleven times in the draft
document.675
With the accelerated saturation of the communications market with digital
media, transfers across geopolitical borders have become a major concern. The 95
Directive generally restricts the transfer of personal information about identifiable
individuals from the EU to the United States, unless there is "adequate protection" for
such information when it is received in the United States or third party countries. The
resultant Safe Harbor regime has come under review with the EUDR preparations
because its level of protection for data of EU citizens is less rigorous than that
demanded of exporters of such data from one EU country to another.676
Two additional directives relate expressly to online information and aim at
protecting personal reputation. The Electronic Commerce Directive, (e-Commerce
Directive) 677 effective since 2000, provides legal certainty for EU businesses and
consumers alike on issues such as information requirements for online service
providers, 678 the execution of electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of
intermediary service providers (ISPs).679 Under the e-Commerce Directive, ISPs are
subject to the law of the Member State in which the service provider is established. In
turn, the Member State whose residents receive the service cannot arbitrarily restrict
incoming services. In addition, the e-Commerce Directive encourages administrative
cooperation between the Member States and the individual user through a balancing of
self-regulatory actions. Examples of services covered by the e-Commerce Directive
include e-newspapers, the online sale of books and videos and services (financial
advising and travel services) as well as online advertising, professional services from
to, or copy or replication of that data”, where the data are no longer necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they were collected, for which that individual withdraws consent or objects
to the processing of his/her personal data, or where the processing of such data contravenes
other parts of the Regulation.
675
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lawyers, doctors, and estate agents, and entertainment services including basic access to
the Internet.
The second directive influencing online personal data is the Directive on the
Retention of Data (e-Privacy Directive)680 that relates to publicly available electronic
communications or public networks, such as mobile phone and texting data plan
companies. The Directive advises those companies that they have to store citizens’
telecommunications data for a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 24 months, to
allow for official scrutiny by government agents if authorized by law, but is intended to
curb data retention beyond an individual’s original consent. The directive enables the
police and security agencies to request access to details such as the IP address and time
of use of every email, phone call and text message sent or received. A 2014 decision of
the CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v Ireland & Karntner Landesregierng & others, ruled
certain provisions of the e-Privacy Directive are unconstitutional in that they are so
broad as to permit mass surveillance by state authorities that challenge individual and
fundamental human rights.681
Across the pond, there appears no pan-American legal regime for privacy or
reputational protections. The federal Privacy Act of 1974 arose out of concern in the
1960s and 1970s for protecting individuals from the increasing capabilities of computer
systems to compile and store personal data.682 Its aim is to protect records that are
retrievable by the use of personal identifiers such as a name, social security number, or
other identifying data. A data subject can prohibit disclosure of her data: her written
consent is needed before records are disclosed and she can request correction of any
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information she finds is incorrect.683 The Privacy Act addresses only data collection by
federal agencies; states each have their own privacy law regime. It is not referenced
often in the US jurisprudence selected for examination in this chapter. The US system is
developing in a more ad hoc and sectoral fashion than the harmonized and uniformly
applicable system within the EU region. For example, each of the following federal US
laws addresses discrete sectors of online privacy: the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act 684 ; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 685 , and the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984.686
Privacy principles underscoring US legislation reinforce the concept of a “right
to be left alone” and a somewhat more amorphous concept of the “right of personality”
than that recognized by French and German legal traditions, as first articulated in
America by Warren and Brandeis in the 1890s.687 As suggested above, the US system
incorporates legal principles contained in the US Bill of Rights688 as enshrined in the
amendments to the US Constitution. Although neither the US constitution nor its
amendments expressly refer to “privacy” or “reputation”, the US Supreme Court in its
federal jurisdiction has given definition to rights to personal privacy as against the state
through such decisions as the 1973 Roe v Wade689 case (invoking the right to privacy to
protect a woman's choice to have an abortion), Griswold v Connecticut690 (a 1975 decision
protecting the rights of married couples to contraception use), and Lawrence v Texas691
(recognizing in 2003 the right to privacy regarding the sexual practices of same sex
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couples). 692 Constitutional protection usually excludes private activities between
citizens, who must pursue actions in private law, and is less stringent for celebrities,
public officials, or participants in newsworthy events. Individual states also recognize
privacy as a defensible right, as seen in the constitutions of the states of California693
and Montana694.
Data protection in the US has also been uniquely shaped by laissez-faire
economic policies that privilege private industry in the digital age and so present more
complex challenges to individual privacy rights.695 As a result, there is no single data
protection regime comparable to the EU's 95 Directive or EUDR, although
policymakers and academics now urge a move in that direction.696 Regulation has
proceeded on an industry-specific basis, relying more on commercial and individual selfregulation, as can be seen in such federal legislation as the Cable Television Protection and
Competition Act (1992)697 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.698 The latter, designed more
as a credit history protection tool than a privacy law, meets growing concerns over
automated collection and storage of personal data. It allows individuals to check and
correct their credit information and restricts credit reporting to authorized
organizations.
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Another outcome of US concern over data collection was the drafting in 1973 of
the Code of Fair Information Practices. That code of principles had significant input from
the US Department of Health and Human Services that was concerned about individual
privacy amidst the burgeoning collections of personal information within their agencies.
That input also led to the federal Privacy Act of 1974 mentioned above. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agent of the US government devoted to
consumer protection and fair competition practices since 1914, oversees enforcement of
Fair Information Practices, emphasizing principles of Notice, Choice, Access, and
Security. The FTC has powers of sanction over companies that breach those principles,
primarily through hefty fines.699
In conclusion, the European model presents a more comprehensive, uniformly
developed, and administratively centralized legal regime with a more accessible internal
organization than the US system. With data information authorities in place once the
EU Data Regulation is enacted, EU citizens should have a ‘one-stop’,700 streamlined,
and affordable resource to meet their need of protection or redress for both online
exposure of personal reputation and excesses of online data retention. The US sectoral
system, in contrast, relies on self-regulation, in deference to commercial and individual
free speech rights and freedom of information, with the FTC as the oversight
mechanism for any commercial practices that threaten consumer protection. The OAS
forum does not appear to figure prominently in the US regarding human rights issues
around misuses of personal information. A search of cases decided by the OAS
Committee in recent years does not identify any US-related parties. The US has not
made frequent use of its provisions, preferring instead the international OEDC
principles and the domestic Fair Information Practices.
The borderless flow of personal information enabled by the Internet and Big
Data collection, and the different laws it inspires on either side of the Atlantic, results in
two significant legal issues that challenge any individual trying to protect or recover
her reputation from online attack or sabotage: jurisdiction and choice of law. Once a
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victim decides to entrust her reputational recovery to a lawyer and decides on a cause of
action, they must reach consensus on the most favourable forum in which to file suit.
That decision determines the choice of applicable law. In the next section, I examine
how the Brussels I mechanism, in tandem with the Rome II statute, was intended in
principle to provide certainty and flexibility for such procedural decisions facing EU
plaintiffs. We also see how a decision of the CJEU has given such a wide interpretation
to those principles, and others listed above, with the resultant clouding of the very legal
certainty that they had intended.
b

EU/US Jurisdiction & Choice of Law in Internet Decisions

Personality rights have been described as one of the most contentious areas of
private international law. 701 When tortious conduct involving personal data or
defamatory content crosses national borders the issue of a multistate conflict of laws
arises.702 On the personal level, such conduct can create devastating exposure for the
private citizen who needs to know where to bring a lawsuit. It should also be reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant in which court she will be sued. That prospect has been of
concern to Europeans since the initial formation of the EEC in 1958 and throughout its
subsequent formulations to harmonize the laws across Europe.703
Given the unique architecture of Internet communications, such reputational
harm now crosses borders widely and instantaneously and far more frequently. For
example, as we saw in Chapter III, it is increasingly common for the operators of
websites to use cookies in the browser programs of those visiting their sites to
automatically collect their personal data. That activity brings the website operator
based in a non-European country within the four corners of two EU legal instruments:
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the Brussels I Regulation704 (governing the jurisdiction or the location of courts for
hearing transborder civil matters, including torts involving media) and the Rome II
regulation 705

(addressing the choice of laws that will apply to non-contractual

obligations). The third instrument, the E-Commerce Directive is also involved as it
addresses publication of information on the Internet, particularly the issue of “mere
conduit” or the determination of whether an Internet service is involved in content
decisions (as a controller) or is a mere conduit (or transmitter) of such information.706
What becomes important under Brussels I is not the location or domicile of the plaintiff
but that of the defendant and, due to the variety of recognized exemptions, the geolocation where harm is experienced.707
With respect to reputational disputes, the Rome II Regulation has been a most
anticipated mechanism for clarifying “all matters relating to privacy and personality
rights, including defamation”.708 It marks an effort by the EU to coordinate judicial
cooperation regarding civil matters with cross-border impact, such as the import and
export of online information. Such harmonization is intended to reduce or eliminate
forum shopping for plaintiffs not satisfied with the legal parameters within their home
jurisdiction regarding personality or privacy rights. Information flow over the Internet
has been a particular impetus for solidifying such rules709 and there have been decades of
preparation for its introduction.
The 1969 Benelux Uniform law on private international law marked the first
attempt to codify choice of law for torts at a multinational level.710 Although never
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passed into law, its basic principle was to choose the place of tortious conduct as the
venue for a private action, subject to a very broad escape clause. If the consequences of
the conduct were experienced in another jurisdiction with a different system of law, that
system would determine any obligations flowing from the tortious conduct.711 In 1972,
the EEC drafted a Convention on Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations that
also adopted the place of conduct rule (lex loci damni) with an even broader escape
clause.712 With the development of Rome II, those efforts were to be realized.
Rome II has universal application in that it applies to conflicts of torts
committed outside of the EU involving an EU citizen’s reputation or privacy and so will
have effect the very nanosecond that information regarding EU citizens crosses into a
non-EU state. Rome II takes a major step towards the harmonization of EU private law
regarding non-contractual disputes. Unfortunately for legal clarity and predictability,
defamation law is not included in the provisions of Rome II at present, withdrawn at the
eleventh hour due to a flood of protest from the publishing industry as well as a lack of
consensus between the European Commission and the Council of Europe. 713 To
illustrate the diversity of opinions that led to that decision, a meeting of the Council’s
Rome II committee in January 2006 debated thirteen different options for choice of law
applicable to violations of privacy and personality rights.714
In the void left by Rome II’s inapplicability to media issues, a study
commissioned by the EC determined that domestic laws on the right to privacy and to
freedom of expression varied widely between the Member States.715 The jurisprudence
of the Member States’ High Courts showed a “difficult and imprecise balance” between
711
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the two values,716 and that some Member States already had mature rules of law in this
respect, while others did not. The study consulted professionals within the legal,
judiciary, and other professional sectors717 and concluded that the common principles
enunciated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECHR) that codified the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (an unwritten set of principles
on which the ECHR was based), developed within the Council of Europe, were insufficient
to overcome the problems arising from divergences in national law, particularly
involving issues of digital technology.718 In fact, most countries were found to have
made no special provision for conflict rules at all. Regarding the choice of law question,
the vast majority of respondents were in favour of allowing the offended party to
choose, based on the criterion of lex locus damni or the law in the jurisdiction where the
damage occurred. With the borderless and amorphous nature of Internet transmissions,
however, and the re-distribution options available to third parties, such a criterion has
little practical meaning. For example, where does Internet harm occur, where read by
the data subject, where accessed by the majority of public readers, or where the ISP is
headquartered? Nevertheless, press and media associations preferred the law of the
country in which the publisher is established, 719 a position clearly in their favour. The
study recommends some combination of the three.720
The Brussels I Regulation, which provisions include non-contractual conflicts
involving torts and including the media, provides a greater measure of clarity regarding
jurisdiction. It holds that jurisdiction is to be exercised by the EU country in which the
defendant is domiciled, regardless of his/her nationality.721 In the case of legal persons
or firms, domicile is the country where they have their central administration or
principal place of business. For Google Inc., for example, domicile could be Mountain
View, California but if the suit involves an individual plaintiff domiciled in France, the
matter could involve Google France and hence a French court. Brussels I also provides
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that jurisdiction can be determined by the “place where the harmful event occurred”.722
That provision is problematic in that it creates a number of possibilities along the chain
of causation. In the Bier Bv case, the CJEU interpreted that clause to mean either the
place where the harmful conduct occurred (the domicile of the defendant who posted the
defamatory content, for example) or where the harm was experienced (the domicile of
the plaintiff who suffered the resulting publicity, for example).723 That interpretation
was made in pre-Internet days, however, when points along the causal chain were more
easily identified.
The Bier issues were revisited in 1996 CJEU case of Shevill that decided harm
occurs where the defamatory material is accessed or read (offline newspapers in this
case), not where the publisher is headquartered or where the plaintiff is located when
discovering the offending content.724 In that case, a French newspaper published an
article accusing an English student of money laundering while on a three-month job in
France. The newspaper was primarily marketed in France with some circulation in
other countries. The CJEU ruling, therefore, made all locations where the newspaper
was read an acceptable forum for bringing suit. Thus Miss Shevill was able to sue a
French publisher in England in respect of the damage to her reputation caused by the
250 copies of France-Soir distributed throughout the UK.725 Both the Bier BV case and
the Shevill judgment of the CJEU, therefore, have done little to narrow the issue of
jurisdiction, and continue to be applied to Internet cases by European courts despite the
fact that Shevill dealt with newsprint, not new media.
Choice of jurisdiction is also a principal challenge for US cases, often involving
EU litigants as well. One of the first major high profile decisions to highlight US-EU
personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues involving worldwide Internet
transmission was that of LICRA & EUJF v. Yahoo! handed down by the Tribunal de
Grande Instance726 in Paris in 2000.727 The Internet company Yahoo! transmitted its
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auction website throughout many countries of the world advertising Nazi paraphernalia
and providing links to Nazi doctrine sites. Both activities violated criminal laws in
France.728 The relevant issues involved jurisdiction, sovereignty, and enforceability of
court decisions involving the worldwide web. The arguments of the parties, as well as
the interim and appellate judgments, address aspects of Internet and web functioning
that set them apart from traditional communications media cases.
For the Paris suit, Yahoo! argued that the French court lacked jurisdiction
because the goods were offered for sale within the US on the Yahoo site targeted for US
users. In the alternative they invoked US constitutional protections of free (commercial)
speech. The bases on which the Paris court found it had jurisdiction reveal the layer of
complexity added to conflict of laws cases by the Internet context: it found 1) that the
Nazi memorabilia auction was open to bidders from any jurisdiction, including France;
2) the display of such objects on the French website caused a public nuisance in France;
and 3) Yahoo! Inc. was aware that French residents were accessing its site because it
displayed advertisements of the paraphernalia in the French language on the pages
accessed by those users. The Paris court then used an “effects” test to find liability on
the part of Yahoo! Inc. The test is typically used in torts cases and, the Paris court
maintained, was sui to the Internet context. 729 The test measures the effects within the
jurisdiction of the transmission of the impugned website. The court held that citizens of
France who accessed the Yahoo! site suffered the effects of being exposed to “an affront
to the collective memory of a country profoundly traumatised by the[Nazi]
atrocities”.730 It convicted Yahoo! Inc. and, in light of the company’s insistence that
filtering content out of France was technologically beyond its capabilities, ordered a
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consultancy with Internet experts who advised on the installation of geo-location
filtering technology in Yahoo! servers in California.
Yahoo! Inc. appealed the French decision to the US District Court for the
Northern District of California in San Jose seeking a declaration that the French
decision was neither recognizable nor enforceable in the US. Yahoo! Inc. had to argue in
that case that the California court did exercise jurisdiction over the French defendants.
731

The gamut of arguments used by Yahoo! illustrates the lack of clarity within conflict

of laws matters created by online cross-border transmissions, and the resultant
expenditure of financial resources for the two human rights organizations and time to
pursue or defend such actions. The defendants in the California action732 argued lack of
jurisdiction as they did not maintain offices, assets or agents in the United States.
Yahoo! replied that jurisdiction could be established using the "targeting" approach that
emphasized the defendants were 1) sending a cease and desist letter to Yahoo in Santa
Clara demanding removal from the U.S. auction site of items constitutionally protected
in the United States; 2) repeatedly using the U.S. Marshal's Office to serve complaints
and orders on Yahoo! in Santa Clara; and 3) establishing an e-mail account with the US
site and thereby agreeing to Yahoo's Terms of Service that dictated that users would
submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of California.
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The principal conflict of laws issue in the California action was whether another
nation could regulate speech within the United States without violating its
Constitution, on the basis that the speech could be accessed through the Internet in that
nation.733 In addressing that question the California Court distinguished between the
less regulated speech freedoms under US law and those dictated by the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. In the end, the Court found
that the French order called on Yahoo! to make actions that would chill or sensor
protected speech, thereby causing “irreparable injury”, all in the name of comity
between nations as required by international law.734 Yahoo! was issued its declaration
731
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that the First Amendment precludes enforcement within the geopolitical borders of the
US of a French order that in effect regulates speech via Internet of an American
corporate citizen.
A second noteworthy case addressing conflict of laws (between US states)
involving the Internet was decided on a sliding scale of website activity from passive to
active. A district court judge in Zippo Manufacturing case found jurisdiction, and
liability, in a trademark infringement involving Zippo lighters. 735 Within US
jurisprudence, a combination of the Zippo sliding scale and the Calder test (discussed
infra) has been most instrumental in determining jurisdiction and choice of law for
interstate Internet disputes.
On a broader philosophical scale, the Yahoo! France case raised the flag
regarding Internet disputes that have created “endless litigation in disjunctive legal
systems [resulting in] stalemates and unenforceable judgments”.736 Mark Greenberg
points out that France and the US share a long history of support for a free press and
democratic principles in governance and, within the Internet age, the free flow of
information and opinions limited only by a need to preserve domestic and international
peace and to respect cultural values in each country.737 The wider practice question in
cases of personal jurisdiction is whether litigation in multiple fora is the best way to
resolve the international disputes that are arising with increasing frequency over the
clash between web content and local laws. Greenberg argues that the litigation route is
fruitless and endlessly draining of valuable resources, and proposes that the
international community restructure certain principles governing international
jurisdiction in Internet cases and adopt shared guidelines on online content available to
the world market.738 This proposal and others will be considered further in Chapter V.
More recently, the CJEU took the opportunity to address the “Gordian knot”739
that the jurisdiction and choice of law issues have become in defamation and invasion of
privacy cases. In the jointly heard Internet cases eDate Advertising and Oliver
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Martinez,740 the claimants alleged that their personality rights had been infringed as a
result of online publications on websites that were based in different EU Member States
to those in which they lived. In eDate Advertising, the plaintiff was a German national
and resident that had been convicted of murdering a well-known actor in 1993 and
released on parole in 2008.741 He complained that an Austrian website publication, eDate
Advertising, infringed his personality rights by reporting his full name, conviction for
murder, and the fact that he was appealing his conviction.742 The Bundesgerichtshof or
Federal Court of Justice for Germany asked for a preliminary ruling on Brussels I
regarding jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters743 as well as the e-Commerce Directive relating to matters of tort, delict, or
quasi-delict published on the Internet and the place of jurisdiction.744
In the enjoined case of Martinez, the French actor Olivier Martinez, while living
in France, complained of an infringement of his privacy and of the right to his image by
the UK-based Sunday Mirror website in an article entitled “Kylie Minogue back with
Olivier Martinez”. The online coverage used a dated photograph to erroneously suggest
Martinez had reunited with a former girlfriend.745 In both the eDate Advertising and
Martinez actions, domestic courts faced arguments from the commercial defendants that
the court did not possess authority to make orders restricting publication outside their
jurisdictions.
In the eDate Advertising/Martinez decision, the CJEU determined that (1) with
an alleged infringement of personality rights by Internet, the person offended has the
option of bringing an action either in the Member State where the publisher is
established or before the courts of the Member State in which the “centre of his
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interests” is based.746 In the alternative, he may bring his action before the courts of
each Member State in the territory in which content placed online is accessible; (2) the
e-Commerce directive must be interpreted as not requiring specific conflict-of-laws
rules for Internet torts that are stricter on Internet service providers than those
applicable in their own Member State.747
The first issue, then, involved the interpretation of Article 5(3) of Brussels I
when dealing with transborder jurisdiction and recognition/enforcement of foreign civil
judgments.748 As suggested above, that provision had been interpreted in pre-Internet
days (the Shevill case) to mean that the plaintiff could sue for harm to her reputation
either in the place where the newspaper publisher was established or in every Member
State where the newspaper was distributed.
The second issue in eDate Advertising/Martinez dealt with whether the context of
Internet media justified a discrete rule of jurisdiction and choice of law. The judgment
offered such comments as “the Internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion related to
distribution in so far as the scope…is universal”; 749 and “…the placing online of
content…is to be distinguished from printed matter in that it is intended…to ensure the
ubiquity of that content;”750 and further reference to “the impact which material placed
online is liable to have on an individual’s personality rights”. The matter of jurisdiction
for Internet harms to personality are best determined by the courts located where the
plaintiff has his “centre of interests”.751 That place will usually be the location of his
habitual residence; that presumption can be defeated by other indications such as the
pursuit of a professional activity in a specific jurisdiction. According to the CJEU, the
publisher of the harmful content is usually the best source to determine the plaintiff’s
centres of interest, but the whole “centre of interests” concept calls for further judicial
clarification.
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The CJEU decision is not clear regarding the establishment of a discrete law of
Internet defamation or privacy breach. EDate Advertising/Martinez has also been
criticized for exposing online publishers to the jurisdiction of extra-territorial EU
courts outside their core markets and for holding them liable for the totality of damage
suffered across the Internet.752 The opinion of the Advocate General preceding the
CJEU judgment characterizes the digital era as putting an end to the “markedly
national context” of more traditional media and perpetuating the “territorial
fragmentation of the media”. 753 In the end, however, Villalón recommends a
technologically neutral solution, or one that deems irrelevant, for purposes of
establishing jurisdiction, whether the defamatory statement was published online or in
the print media.754 That conclusion is neither helpful nor practical, given the dramatic
changes evinced by the idiosyncrasies of the Internet.
The message for present purposes is that efforts to conduct a mutatis mutandis
application of pre-Internet laws to online tortious conduct, particularly as it moves
across political borders, have not brought the clarity and flexibility that European
practitioners, academics, and policymakers have been seeking since the early Benelux
days. The CJEU in eDate Advertising/Martinez did not opt for revising or replacing the
Shevill standard to accommodate the Internet, but merely tacked on the “centre of
interest” criterion if the offending content were transmitted by digital means.755 The
Court has also been accused of turning a blind eye to the new vulnerability of the
publisher,756 a group whose numbers and professional characteristics have transformed
with online authorship but whose pockets regarding damage awards remain quite
shallow. In addition, the eDate Advertising/Martinez decision does not leave us much
more certain of the particularities of the e-Commerce Directive that could address
specific harms perpetrated online but not addressed by criminal law. On a broader scale,
the CJEU decision appears to favour individual rights to private life over freedom of
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expression, a not-surprising conclusion in light of the EU continental history of
commitment to fundamental rights principles.
c

Domestic Responses

The US has long been considered defendant-friendly terrain for defamation and
privacy suits, in view of the strong constitutional support for free speech and the
entrepreneurial spirit that has fostered ICT and, more recently, digital technologies.757
Although Brandeis and Warren envisioned a privacy regime shaped much like that in
fin de siècle Europe, US commercial interests and the fastidious taxonomy of William
Prosser regarding defamation and privacy took the laws of tort into a very different
direction than for plaintiffs in Europe. The impact of the Sullivan case on US domestic
law related to reputation should not be understated .758 It has put strict limitations on
libel suits and kept the burden of proof with the plaintiff to establish intent and actual
malice in the case of a public figure or celebrity. 759 The US Supreme Court also
eliminated the common law presumption of falsity in defamation cases: henceforth a
plaintiff was required to prove fault in addition to falsity, even if it involved a private
figure.760
Conflict-of-laws principles are relevant to privacy and defamation harms when
content crosses geographical borders that are the rule in the world of the borderless
Internet, transient populations, and off-shore servers. A resultant patchwork of differing
domestic laws from one state to another can be seen in both the EU and the US. Within
the EU, for example, English defamation law has historically held that a reverse onus,
or proof of truth by the defendant, was required, while French law recognizes a broader
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privacy right for which neither good faith nor truth is a defence.761 As well, French
judiciaries over the years have taken a defendant-friendly approach to libel laws,
primarily through very tight procedural requirements.762For example, any suit for
defamation against press or online statements must be filed within three months of the
statement’s first availability to the public, a requirement that necessitates tracking the
first third party access date.763 Meanwhile in the Netherlands and Germany, truth is not
a complete defence to defamation. Regarding procedural rules, in Germany and Italy,
the plaintiff may choose the most favourable law whereas the French and Austrians
prefer the law of the location where the defendant’s conduct occurred.764 The Swiss,
Portuguese, and Polish may apply either rule, as dictated by the facts of a particular
case.765
Those substantive and procedural discrepancies can create considerable expense
and doctrinal confusion for plaintiffs whose efforts to salvage their reputations involve
bringing suit in several foreign jurisdictions. The Mosley case illustrates the legal
complexity, as well as financial and personal burdens, created by those differences in
domestic defamation laws.766 Similarly, the Yahoo! France judgment ordering a blocking
of Nazi paraphernalia commercial websites from France was determined to be
inapplicable in California, the corporate headquarters of Yahoo! due to the refusal of a
California court to recognize the jurisdiction of French courts over California
corporations.
Similarly, defamation cases within the US are governed by myriad sectoral laws
at the federal level and at the state level as well. Courts at both federal and state levels
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Alan Reed, The Anglo-American Revolution in Tort Choice of Law Principles: Paradigm Shift or
Pandora’s Box? 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 867, 878 (2001). The requisite mental element is
one aspect of defamation law that is much changed in the Defamation Act 2013.
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Taylor Wessing, Defamation and Privacy, (2013).
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Niri Shan, & Timothy Pinto (eds), Defamation and privacy law and procedure in England,
Germany & France, Taylor Wessing (Spring 2006)
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has assigned priority to rights of belief and free expression (as inspired by the US First
Amendment), rights against unreasonable search and seizure (Fourth Amendment), the
right against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment regarding personal information), and
the provision that enumerated rights do not abrogate those not expressed in the Bill of
Rights (Ninth Amendment).767
Substantive law issues vary from one US state to another, such as separating
public figures in Texas law into all-purpose and limited-purpose agents of
government. 768 Virginia defamation law recognizes as a per se cause of action
implications that the plaintiff is unfit to perform the duties of an office or employment of
profit, or lack of integrity in the discharge of such duties.769 Pennsylvania maintains a
wire service defence on its books for the republishing of a news item from a “repu news
service”.770 As indicated below, several states maintain criminal defamation laws despite
renewed appeals within state legislatures and in Congress to abolish them.
Reliance in some US states on the jury system for private actions in defamation
and privacy intrusions has resulted in monetary awards of a size unheard of within most
common law countries in Europe. For example, a Florida jury in 2006 awarded $11.3
million in damages to Susan Scheff for Internet defamation. The Broward County,
Florida resident was inundated with caustic messages posted by a Louisiana resident
charging that Scheff was a “con artist” and a “fraud”, allegations that turned out to be
completely false.771 Plaintiff Scheff was aware the defendant would be unable to satisfy
judgment, but even offered to meet her own costs to achieve vindication against the
Dutch courage with which the Internet seems to imbue online defamers.772
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4.2

Private Law Responses
a

What Plaintiffs Seek: Types of Remedy

The law addressing reputational injury is principally framed in Western
democracies as private law claims in defamation, breach of privacy, or breach of
confidentiality. 773 In addition, perpetuating rumour and gossip focusing on public
figures is punishable in some EU Member States and some US states through criminal
defamation laws. Plaintiffs who employ the private law to seek redress from online
reputational injury, whether from posted content or leaking of personal data, are usually
granted remedies that fall short of the scope of personal damage the Internet can incur.
The most sought-after remedy is pecuniary,774 with the implication that lost status does
have financial worth. One US study has found that plaintiffs prefer financial settlements
despite their reported lack of effectiveness in meeting their expectations. 775 Other
remedial options include vindication through retractions (conveying the idea that the
impugned trait or activity was wrongly reported), containment through injunctions (to
stem the damage at source), and restitution through erasure mechanisms (self-censoring
of stories, images, and data that are no longer true or that cause irretrievable damage to
professional, social, and financial opportunities).776
The advent of new communication technologies has increased the availability of
discursive remedies as well, thereby expanding immeasurably the audience for
apologies, corrections, and rights of reply. With the resurrection of the French notion of
le droit a l’oublie, or the right to be forgotten or right of oblivion, as contained in the
proposed EUDR, another remedial variant is introduced: the deletion from the Internet
or other digital sources of personal information or data that was once true within
773

At public law, individual reputation is addressed through crimes of cyber-bullying, identity
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certain defined contexts but that is no longer accurate or whose collection or
publication will bring embarrassment and hence is no longer desirable.777Critics of such
mechanisms are uncomfortable with the self-censorship, revisionism, or filtering
functions they enable.
The right of reply, or le droit de réponse in France, is of particular interest because
it is available in most EU jurisdictions to varying degrees, except in the UK, but is not
recognized as a right of remedy in the US.778 The principle holds that the correction of
the offending statement is offered through a counter declaration prepared by the
plaintiff and published by the disseminator of the original statement.779 The right is
available in some jurisdictions even in non-tortious circumstances if the statement is
incomplete or the result of “non-culpable ignorance” of the falsity.780 In some EU
Member States, the right extends to family members if the subject of the press account
is deceased.781The droit de réponse extends farthest in France, where press reports of
every kind, whether false or mere expressions of opinion, even artistic or scientific
critiques, hold a right of reply.782 The right even applies if the plaintiff is only indirectly
named (designé) or referred to in the statement. 783 The droit de réponse is not a
promising remedy for online defamation or privacy incursions because, at the time of
publication of the reply, a large portion of the reputational damage has been incurred
through retransmissions, retweets, and other methods of third-party dissemination that
forms a convoluted network not reproducible for response.
David Ardia suggests a more conceptually based taxonomy of remedies that
measures the societal harm experienced by the plaintiff: pecuniary loss to the plaintiff;784
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non-pecuniary loss to the plaintiff; 785 non-pecuniary loss to society of its social
connections; the loss to society of its normative standards; and loss of meaningful
discourse within the plaintiff’s society. Ardia does not provide practical application as
the law of remedies currently stands.786
b

Causes of Action
i

Defamation
“There is a great deal of the law of defamation that makes no sense.”787

Defamation law is aimed at protecting reputation against harmful statements,
whether framing the action as libel (written or permanent form),788 calumny, slander
(spoken or ephemeral form), insult, desacato,789 or lèse majesté.790 Defamation has been
defined in American law as an oral or written statement which tends to “injure
reputation in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence
in which the plaintiff is held,” 791 and in English common law as words about a person
that “excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him.”792
English common law has further developed three definitions that focus on the social
harm caused. Defamation is made out 1) if the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the
785

For Ardia those losses can be measured in emotional and physical distress.
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estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”; 793 if a publication “is
calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or
ridicule;794 or if “it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided”.795
Defamation has undergone a very uneven history in terms of its conceptual
development, its location in public or private law, and the requisite elements for a claim
in either civil or criminal law. As William Prosser summed up, the law of defamation is
full of “absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had a kind word”.796
In this section, I survey the general principles of defamation in both the EU and
US jurisdictions, with case examples, and suggest in the footnotes further reading on
more tangential points. An additional layer of complexity has been added with the
emergence of the Internet and social media: primarily the challenge of anonymity,
limitless dissemination, permanence of storage, and difficulties in defining and proving
the requisite mental element. I will discuss each of those challenges in turn.
a

Conceptual Differences

As the above definitions suggest, defamation in the US is conceptually more
aligned with traditional English common law and tends to focus on case law regarding
the loss of social esteem and goodwill, or a loss of social capital in economic terms. By
contrast and as discussed in Chapter II supra, legal principles of continental Europe,
primarily reflected in the ECHR and other statutes, tend to link reputation to one’s
dignity or honour among peers. To defame that dignity is to challenge the positive
public appraisal of the person, and to defame his honour is to mar the self-appraisal of
the person for his own public significance.797 In the Germanic tradition, reputation is
also linked to the concept of personality, a right of autonomy over one’s name that
German courts have determined survives death.798 In contrast, most US law at federal
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and state levels does not tend to recognize the posthumous right to a good reputation or
of third parties to sue for defamation to protect it.799 The key rationale offered is that
posthumous defamation actions would have a chilling effect on both historical
recordkeeping and on journalism. That is a serious consideration given the public
interest in maintaining historical debate and exercising “reasonable speculation” where
records have gone amiss.800 For those states that recognize posthumous reputational
rights, it represents an important social value to have a person’s dignity reinstated by
survivors if its status is questionable his death.
Within the rights discourse, free speech has been viewed as the vehicle for the
advancement of knowledge and the truth, as espoused in England by such theorists as
John Milton and John Stuart Mill. European laws that define free speech rights
traditionally balance those principles with a right to reputational privacy centered
around home and family life. As discussed elsewhere, the right to reputation was first
interpreted by the ECtHR to be subordinate to free speech; in 2004 it gained rights
status of equal value.801 The ECHR as an international convention within the EU has
been particularly influential in gaining that status.802 Any EU legal action involving
defamatory content, then, would trigger a balancing of those two rights. In the US, the
elements of the rights debate are similar, but debates over the relative merits of
reputation and privacy have been dominated by the admonition to Congress contained
in the First Amendment that it must make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of
Mephisto decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court [BVerfG] established a right to
posthumous personality protections).
799
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the press.803 Such an eminent role for free speech is justified for the free flow of
democratic discourse and the development of rational human capacities. Anathema to
such necessary opinion that keeps public officials trustworthy is any paternalistic
interference of the state. Such signature concepts perpetuated the American Horatio
Alger Jr. dream that participation and prosperity were determined by personal
attributes, not social order.
b

Public or Private Law?

We generally think of defamation as a matter for private law. In many
jurisdictions, however, including some states within the US and some member states
within the EU, defamation can involve the criminal law either as an alternative or an
adjunct to private law. This topic is addressed more comprehensively in section 4.3(a)
infra and the EU countries still practising criminal defamation are set out in Appendix
B, Map 2 with penalties listed in Chart 4. I will provide an overview of defamation law
elements and point out regional differences that add complexity to its application. I
focus on US private law and its comparison to that of the UK, and provide a general
overview of criminal defamation laws in the US and EU member states.
The involvement of the criminal law in individual reputation suggests a matter
in which the state holds an important interest. Criminal defamation is much criticized as
a heavy-handed response by the state to affairs of a more personal nature and as
endowing autocratic regimes with physical enforcement mechanisms out of proportion
to the offence. The hybrid nature of legislative response to defamation, addressing it
variously as a tort or contract matter in private law, or as criminal libel, brings further
conceptual confusion to an area of law that has come under historical criticism as replete
with “meaningless and grotesque anomalies”804 and doctrinal inconsistencies.805 The
result for both plaintiff and accused is uncertainty regarding jurisdictional and choice of
law decisions in private law, differing standards of proof, and lack of clarity regarding
remedies meted out by the courts. Discrepancies in criminal defamation laws among EU
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member states is set out in chart form in Appendix B;806 US states holding various
forms of criminal defamation laws are similarly numerous and set out below.807
c

The Requisite Elements

A case for defamation should exhibit the following elements: the publication to
third parties of a harmful statement808 which concerns the plaintiff and causes him
public embarrassment and/or professional and financial suffering, and made without
adequate research into the truthfulness of the statement.809 When those elements are
present, and the plaintiff is reduced in the social estimation of his community as a result,
a private case in defamation is usually made out.
Regarding the form of the complaint, an action can be framed as defamation per
se (a statement is so obviously defamatory according to prevalent social or moral
standards that no proof is required) or as a per quod action (not so obvious, so the mental
element becomes important). Per se actions have historically been made out in the
following circumstances: where false statements relate to charges that a person has
contracted a contagious or venereal disease; charges that a woman is of unchaste
character; other untrue statements that tend to injure a person in his profession, trade,
or business; or accusations of the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. Of
late, per se actions are becoming more restrictive as certain insults to reputation, such as
calling a person a homosexual, are gaining social acceptance and hence no longer
deemed to offend community standards or reduce one’s esteem in society.
The role of truth in identifying a defamatory statement varies with the laws of
particular jurisdictions. This variation can be seen in EU member states: for example in
Sweden truth is an absolute defence; in Latvia, by contrast, truth is not a defence in law,
but defamation can only be committed by the distribution of “fictions”. In Croatia, truth
806
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is not a defence if the defendant acted with actual intent to harm the offended party’s
reputation. In Poland, defendants must prove, apart from truth, that they were acting in
the public interest. 810 Within the UK, the onus of proving truth rested with the
defendant prior to the 2013 UK Defamation Act that shifted that onus to the claimant.811
Again, further comparisons among EU member states are contained in Appendix B,
particularly through the link provided.
In the US, truth is accepted as an absolute defence in some state jurisdictions,
but not in others.812 A plaintiff who is a public official or celebrity must prove both
falsity and malice on the part of the defendant.813 A statement does not need to be
literally true in order for this defense to be effective, just substantially true in the legal
sense. This means that even if the defendant states some facts that are false, if the "gist"
or "sting" of the communication is substantially true, then the defendant can rely on the
defense.
It can be argued that untruthful statements create social harm because they
upset the “relational interest” that an individual has in maintaining personal esteem in
the eyes of others.814 Another social harm would be to put at risk of exposure a
journalist’s sources.815 In a 2015 study of civil defamation laws within the EU for how
helpful they are to journalists, it was concluded that most were unclear and confusing
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and that, currently, “vagueness is the name of the game”.816 Only Ireland, Macedonia
and the UK were named as having passed legislation specific to defamation that
reasonably conforms to international standards and that would assist journalists.817
A consideration of the requisite mental element in civil cases of defamation also
points up complex differences from one jurisdiction to the next. In the US, for example,
prior to the 1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan a plaintiff had to prove the
defendant’s general intention to publish a false statement, or his negligence as to the
truth of the statement.818 With Sullivan, the US Supreme Court refined that mental
element as one of more specific intent with respect to public officials; henceforth the
plaintiff had to prove some malice on the part of the defendant.819 The malice standard
appears, when examining the Sullivan decision, to be less about finding ill will feelings
toward the plaintiff and more about establishing a wider protection for press free speech.
That higher standard has been rationalized as appropriate for public figures because
they voluntarily expose their views to greater public criticism.820
A decade after Sullivan, the US Supreme Court clarified in Gertz v. Robert Welch
Inc. that, unlike public officials or public figures, private individuals could secure a
remedy in defamation simply by proving negligence, as opposed to a higher standard of
intent, on the part of a media defendant.821 So, current US laws have set negligence as
an acceptable level of mental liability when a plaintiff is bringing an action against a
publisher, including digital publishers such as Google, Yahoo! and Tumblr as well as
individual publishers of online blogs and social media content.
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In UK law, the mental element has long been a more onerous standard. In other
words, by shifting the onus of proof onto the defendant, who cannot always raise proof
that the impugned statement is true, the plaintiff under UK law was generally successful
in her claim for damages. As a result of such rigid evidentiary rules, the UK had come to
be described as the most ‘claimant friendly’ jurisdiction in the world822 while America
continues to be known as the most protective of free speech, even to the extent of
protecting some falsehoods in the arena of public discourse.
The UK Defamation Act 2013 (2013 UK Act) set out to rebalance, rather than
rewrite, the common law of defamation. It sets the requisite standard of harm at serious
damage, thereby weeding out more trivial cases, but also doing away with the
presumption in law that defamation causes reputational harm.823 The defendant retains
the defence of truth, but s/he must prove a statement is substantially true. New defences
of honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest are also introduced.
British defamation suits with journalist/publisher defendants have long called on the
qualified privilege defence, as developed in the Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.
decision.824 A journalist could claim privilege if reporting in good faith, on a subject of
interest to her, and made without malice. The defence has been eliminated in the 2013
UK Act, along with the defence of fair comment. The former has been replaced with a
public interest defence 825 and the latter with honest opinion. More precisely,
‘justification’ becomes ‘truth’, and ‘fair comment’ becomes ‘honest opinion’. Malice
remains a requisite element to prove within the journalism context.826 In terms of
procedural changes, the presumption of right to trial by jury is abolished.
In light of the growing use of the Internet, several provisions of the 2013 UK
Act address online defamation. The Act creates a new defence for operators of websites:
822
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they will not be held liable for defamatory comments made on their website if they can
prove that the statement was not posted by them and, upon receipt of a defamation
complaint, they followed a procedure outlined in the Defamation (Operators of
Websites) Regulation accompanying the Act. The defence will fail, however, if the
claimant can prove that it was not possible for her to find the individual responsible for
making the post, she issued a notice of complaint regarding the offending statement to
the defendant and the defendant failed to act according to the regulations. The question
of whether unmediated user generated content will place its author under the Act as a
publisher remains to be developed with future case law.
Finally, the 2013 UK Act creates a limitation period for filing a claim involving
online conduct, and assigning liability for the regeneration of posted content. Known as
the single publication rule, it sets a one-year limit from first publication for making a
claim; that provision should prevent indefinite liability for online publications, including
Internet archives.827 The provision does not apply to third party re-publication. It does
apply, however whenever a publisher provides a new link to a news article or publishes
a new edition of a book or refreshes links to an older obscure article that later becomes
newsworthy. It is also applicable for an article that gets tweeted around the world.828
The legal test is whether the new link, edition, or broadcast is materially different from
the original. The 2013 UK Act came into force January 1, 2014 and so old libel law will
therefore still apply in many 2014–2015 defamation cases where the events complained
of took place before commencement.
In the EU more broadly, there is a broad discrepancy in the application of civil
defamation laws from one Member State to the next, as there is with available defences,
costs to litigants, and damage awards.829 Regarding costs, for example, a 2008 study of
defamation actions for EU Members, conducted by the University of Oxford,
determined that total costs to plaintiffs ranged from approximately 600 euros in Cyprus
and Bulgaria to over 1 million euros in Ireland and England.830 That vast range speaks
to the various perceptions from one jurisdiction to another regarding the relative
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importance of reputation to other civil claims.
Acceptable remedies include monetary damages, retraction, declaratory relief
that the statement is untrue, and injunctive relief against further publication of a
defamatory statement. In America, a defendant who disparages a plaintiff’s professional
reputation is additionally punished upon losing the action by being assessed special
damages without need for the plaintiff’s prove of specific harm.
I have examined the 2013 Act of the UK in some detail above to exemplify the
breadth and complexity of issues at play in instituting a defamation claim. While
discrepancies in laws from one jurisdiction to the next raise the ever-present risk of libel
tourism, major revisions such as the 2013 UK Act are aimed at eliminating that practice,
as well as incorporating references to digital publishing that raises its own roster of
legal challenges.831
d

Internet Defamation

As discussed throughout this dissertation, digital technology has introduced a
breadth of additional challenges to the legal response to reputational harm. Most
problematic in terms of preparing a civil suit involving new media are 1) defining a
victim’s community; 2) identifying and establishing the liability of the content publisher;
3) identifying anonymous defendants; and 4) assessing the probative value of digital
speech. Each of those challenges is discussed elsewhere in this dissertation,832 but those
legal questions ask legislators and judiciaries to think in digital terms rather than in
geospatial, chronological, sequential, and hierarchical ones. Of interest here is how the
jurisprudence of our highest courts can provide guidance for such new media legal
issues. I will make general observations about both the US Supreme Court and the
ECtHR in their roles as high-level adjudicators of cases involving new media. Not all
the cases below use defamation as a cause of action; the need for judicial clarity
regarding new media infuses many areas of law. I then contextualize those observations
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with two recent cases: the ongoing American case before the US Supreme Court of
Anthony Elonis and the 2013 case of Delfi AS v. Estonia before the ECtHR.
The US Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the legal implications of
the Internet’s borderless ambit with three cases involving student online postings of a
defamatory nature. The Court declined to hear three student social media cases in 2012
that would have assisted school authorities in determining whether they held authority
to discipline students for online speech while off-campus.833 The cases focused on the
necessary balance between school authority to provide a harassment-free educational
environment, the reputation of school personnel, and the online free speech rights of
students when not involved in school activities.
In the first of the three cases, from the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the court found no violation of a student’s First Amendment rights when
educational authorities disciplined her for criticizing faculty in vulgar terms, using offcampus web postings.834 A second case, from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, found
there was indeed a violation of free speech rights in 2007 regarding the disciplining of a
student who created a MySpace parody of his principal from his home.835 In a third
case, from West Virginia, a high school student used her home computer to create
S.A.S.H. (Students Against Sluts Herpes) and invited approximately 100 individuals to
join, including students from her high school. Her discipline by school authorities was
upheld as not in violation of First Amendment rights.836 Those conflicting results could
be attributed to the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled on
whether a school official may punish student speech that occurs outside the supervisory
authority of the school. If they had, such discussions could have made valuable
contributions to how to reconcile the limitless reach of online content with the concern
for geographical borders in local administrative laws.
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In none of those recorded appellate decisions was there much helpful
deliberation on the new legal terrain in which we find ourselves when it comes to online
communications. Paul Easton of Boston College Law School, in comparing several
similar decisions, has determined there is a clear need for direction from the Supreme
Court to prevent such results as a conflict between results of the Second Circuit
Appellate Court and the Third Circuit Appellate Court due to use of a different
constitutional standard for student online off-campus speech.837
Court watchers have commented critically that the most up-to-date Supreme
Court precedent available to those appellate courts was a 1969 pre-Internet case
involving the right of students to wear black armbands in class to protest the Vietnam
War.838 So, what the Supreme Court could have provided by hearing the three 2012
cases was much needed clarity on the legal boundaries between private online
communications and school-related online speech that considers new media’s borderless
reach, persistent memory, architectural autonomy, and indeterminate audience. The
Court’s thinking in digital terms, rather than geospatial ones, is much needed.
The silence of the US Supreme Court regarding social messaging has been
assessed by Professor Little of Temple University as attributable to the more general
chill to digital speech created by the Communications Decency Act’s blanket protection of
ISPs from publisher liability.839 I would include in that chilling effect the continuing
influence of the Speech Act of 2010 that sets a very high bar for enforcement of foreign
judgments against US journalists. Without such public discussion by the Supreme
Court, the nature of intermittent questions posed by individual justices that reveal a
lack of technological acumen is troubling, as will be discussed infra regarding the Aereo
case.840
The situation in Europe is much more encouraging. The CJEU and ECtHR have
been relatively active over recent months in their observations regarding the liability of
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Internet companies and web content hosts for allegedly defamatory content they
transmit but do not read or edit. The CJEU decision in Google Spain, for instance, was
landmark in its characterization of ISPs and Internet companies as ‘controllers’ of such
content with attendant liability for third-party retransmissions and hyperlinks. The
court also ventured into novel legal terrain in its consideration of the appellant’s right
to be forgotten and its allocation of responsibility for takedown decisions to Internet
companies.
A 2014 preliminary ruling in a case before the District Court of Amsterdam put
those Google Spain rulings to the practical test in a case involving deletion requests of
an escort agency owner.841 The appellant had been convicted and sentenced to six years’
imprisonment in 2012 for attempted incitement of contract killing. That conviction is
still under appeal. The man wanted to have links removed to online publications that
defamed him by continuing to connect him to the crime. Although Google was willing
to remove part of the search results he complained about, the search engine refused to
comply fully with his request. The Amsterdam decision clarified the Google Spain
position on permissible erasure:
The [Google Spain] judgment does not intend to protect individuals against all
negative communications on the Internet, but only against ‘being pursued’ for a
long time by ‘irrelevant’, ‘excessive’ or ‘unnecessarily defamatory’ expressions.842
The Dutch judge pronounced as relevant the reporting of the conviction and negative
media coverage, but found excessive the online repetition of those factors, not for factual
background but to launch into a “slanging match’ against the plaintiff. The decision also
deals with search company liability for autocomplete suggestions and anonymization of
certain content.
Two cases in courts of final jurisdiction address those issues, one before the US
Supreme Court and the other at the ECtHR. In the first, a pending appeal of a criminal
conviction for US citizen Anthony Elonis will challenge the US Supreme Court to
determine the free speech rights of an ex-husband who used his Facebook page to post
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hostile messages about his community and his estranged wife. 843 Anthony Elonis
claimed his posted content dealt with rap lyrics and was not intended to threaten or
endanger the objects of his posts: he offered the defence that he was, in fact, just
kidding. 844 One such posting stated about his wife:
There’s one way to love you but a thousand ways to kill you. I’m not going to
rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little
cuts.845
Elonis’ lawyer suggests it is difficult with decontextualized online speech to distinguish
humour or high drama from the intent to defame, demean, or frighten:
Increasingly people who speak on the Internet…could be held subject to felony
liability not because they intended to…threaten anybody but because somebody
misinterpreted their comments as a threat…That is a risk on the Internet, where
you're frequently speaking to people…without the context of tone of voice, body
gestures, and frequently talking to people who you don't even know in the
physical world.846
The Supreme Court has been clear that intended threats do not garner free speech
protection if they engender imminent violence.
The court is invited to distinguish threats from protected speech such as
hyperbole or “unpleasantly sharp attacks”, a reference to Justice Brennan’s comment in
the Sullivan case about the outer limits of tolerated speech that attacks government and
public officials.847 Elonis is arguing in his appeal that the requisite intent for online
threats must be specific intent given the looser speech used in the medium. That
determination of intent in the absence of offline corroborating evidence is difficult when
the mode of communication is Facebook postings that can employ two-dimensional,
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hasty, and impulsive venting and more spontaneous and emotionally charged rants that
can be easily misinterpreted by readers. Also problematic is the determination of the
intended community or audience given Elonis’ claim the contents are rap lyrics.848 The
case is urging the Supreme Court to weigh in on the novel challenge of special intent
involved in threatening social messaging.
The ECtHR has been recently active in providing precedent in the EU for some
of those issues. In the 2013 case of Delfi AS v. Estonia the Court upheld an Estonian
court ruling that an online news service was liable for defamatory comments, including
anonymous postings, submitted by its users regarding news stories.849 Delfi is an
Internet news portal that publishes up to 330 news articles a day, operating out of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The articles received about 10,000 readers’ comments
daily, the majority posted under pseudonyms. The comments in question were online
responses to one article suggesting a majority shareholder in a local ferry company was
endangering public safety. The contents were profane and explicit in their threats of
physical harm and other criminal acts.
Delfi had taken wide precautionary measures regarding offending content. There
was a system of notice-and-take-down in place: any reader could mark a comment as
leim (an Estonian word for an insulting or mocking message or a message inciting
hatred on the Internet) and the comment would be removed “expeditiously”.
Furthermore, there was a system of automatic deletion of comments that fielded certain
stems of obscene words. In addition, a victim of a defamatory comment could directly
notify the applicant company, in which case the comment was removed immediately, as
was done in the instant case, with removal accomplished the same day. Delphi also
published conditions of postings on it site, advising users that the comments were not
its opinion and that the authors of comments were responsible for their own content.
In finding Delphi liable as publisher and controller of content, the ECtHR relied
on a proportioned balancing of free speech and privacy protections under the ECHR.
The minimal fine, 5000 kroons or approximately $427 US, provided little deterrent
effect, however. The Court reasoned that Delfi benefited financially from comments
posted on its server by individual users, and assigned Delfi a positive duty to monitor
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comments on predictably controversial articles it transmits. Long ranging implications
of the decision could be that anonymous commentary might be vetoed by Internet
portals and servers850 and that industry reliance on automatic word filtering capabilities
or posted notice-and-take-down notifications would be insufficient to avoid liability.851
It has also been suggested, more controversially, that the decision affords more
protection to the right to reputation, as contained in the ECHR article 8 right to
privacy, than in previous ECtHR cases.852
Meanwhile across the Atlantic, until the US Supreme Court provides more
jurisprudential direction for the above issues, uncertainty regarding the law of
defamation’s “shifting sands of assumptions and policymaking”853 will persist in that
country.
Other uncertainties remain: with regard to the particular society in whose hands
our reputation resides, whom do jurists include in our online communities when they
attempt to measure the extent of our shame and embarrassment? Where do we measure
losses to social, financial and professional chances, within that online community or
within the broader community? Are we, as social media users and victims, a composite
of our communities both online and off? Current jurisprudence has not delivered clear
legal thinking on those puzzling issues.
Another uncertainty is the question of how a monetary award, besides conveying
exoneration, works to retrieve our good name or future opportunities. As has been seen
in the Mosley case in Chapter III, the distributive capabilities of the Internet and offline
texting perpetuate defamatory content and necessitate a serial protocol of court
challenges in various jurisdictions. To date, Mosley has initiated actions in 22 countries
within the EU based on Google links to News of the World publications. That iterative
process is expensive in both real costs and emotional wear. The UK 2013 Act limits
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actions against such retransmission as well with its single publication rule. As well, the
lack of deep pockets with online publishers means that, unlike institutional media that
maintains a keen interest in safeguarding professional standards in reportage, freelance
authors of blogs, tweets, and e-magazines comprise a new crop of defendant with little
ability to pay and hence a reduced fear of large damage awards.854
There is also a noticeable surge of injunctive relief awarded in Internet
defamation cases, notwithstanding the timeworn equitable principle that “equity will
not enjoin a libel”.855 That remedial development goes against years of judicial concern
over prior restraint to free speech rights.856 In a review by David Ardia of fifty-six
decisions involving injunctive relief in US defamation cases, well over half were found to
have been delivered since 2000 and over half by separate calculation, involved Internet
speech. 857 As well, the nature of injunctive relief awarded has been either
disproportionate to the harm threatened or technologically unfeasible. For example,
judges have ordered defendants to cease mentioning a plaintiff’s name online858 or to
take down a complete website for a single defamatory remark,859 both remedies that
ignore the Internet’s capability for third party regeneration of the offending message
and the resilient memory of Internet archiving. In addition, injunctions afford scant
procedural protection for the defendant who is compelled to obey under threat of severe
punitive sanctions, usually a hefty fine or period of incarceration. Interestingly, plaintiffs
have confirmed in hindsight that apologies, corrections, or a retraction from the
defendant would have sufficed.
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The differing views on whether new media journalism merits legal protection
equal to that of traditional media can be seen in two final cases I discuss at this juncture:
the California Courtney Love case and the Oregon Obsidian Finance decision. In the first,
the plaintiff was arguing that her tweets were not bona fide journalistic statements
while in the second the defendant maintained her blogs were journalism to the Sullivan
standard and hence deserving of constitutional protection.
Celebrity Courtney Love was turned down when she asked her former lawyer
Rhonda Holmes to administer the estate of her deceased husband, singer Kurt
Cobain.860 Love subsequently published tweets suggesting Holmes had “been bought
off” and therefore had acted against her client’s best interests.861 Holmes sued in 2013 in
the California Supreme Court for defamation on the grounds that Love’s tweets implied
Holmes had an association with organized crime, accusations that impugned her good
name and professional reputation. In an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment,
Love’s lawyers proposed in oral argument that it is the nature of tweets to use
“hyperbole and sensational language” characteristic of communications by social media
that are not to be scrutinized too carefully or taken as carrying deeper meaning. They
asked that claims made via Twitter not be held to the same legal standards as speech
used by offline (or online) news organizations.862 Love’s counsel were asking that the
law of defamation shift to create a lesser category of speech that not be held to
professional publishing standards, particularly given its unmediated status.863
The judgment on preliminary motion determined that, when both the language
and context of the offending tweets were considered, they were sufficiently akin to real
time communications to proceed to trial.864 In the context of defamation law, the rights
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of social media publishers were held to no greater or lesser standard than those enjoyed
by institutional counterparts.
There was, in other words, an opportunity missed to address the potential for
discrete treatment in law for digital messaging. A jury returned a verdict favouring
Love on other grounds, due to the inability of the plaintiff to prove Love’s knowledge
that her statements were false. That is not surprising, given the cryptic messaging
within the 140-character limitation that lacks any cues often available in more
traditional media as to how Love received her information or her level of credulity when
tweeting. The case does recognize, on a more basic level, that First Amendment
protections for defendants can extend to tweets.865
In the 2011 case of Obsidian Finance Group v Cox, 866 the District Court of
Oregon required Crystal Cox to prove that her blogging met the standard of a bona fide
publisher in order to merit the Sullivan malice standard of speech protection. 867 The
plaintiff Obsidian was a bankruptcy consultant business engaged in the reorganization
of Summit, a company that had misappropriated client funds in the past. The defendant
Cox was a blogger with a history of making allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange
for retractions. 868 She considered herself an investigative journalist and posted
accusations that the plaintiff company was involved in fraud, corruption, money
laundering, and other illegal activities in connection with the Summit bankruptcy. She
claimed that Oregon’s shield law protected her from revealing her sources. The Court
found the hyperbolic and figurative language of the postings to be personal opinion, not
editorial opinion or journalism. It found the statement that Obsidian had failed to pay
$174,000 in taxes sufficiently specific, however, to create a cause of action for
defamation.
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Cox argued for the higher malice standard of intent as a journalist but the Court
disagreed. 869 Cox was held not to be a media defendant for the purposes of shield law or
libel protection. That decision, based largely on Cox’s use of the Internet as a medium
and her lack of professional credentials, has potential to threaten legal protections of
online citizen reporting and publishing. It also underscores the narrow construction of
US state legislation related to journalism shield laws, a major block to wider legal
protections for online citizen journalism in what we can agree is a formative time in its
development.870
Cox appealed her loss, claiming that Obsidian and its partners were public
figures, an assertion the Ninth Circuit rejected, holding that her posts involved private
figures even while covering a topic of public concern.871 It found that, “in the context of
defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than
those enjoyed by other individuals engaged in the same activities.”872 In light of the
Internet-induced decline of the unique hold on information by traditional media, the
court found “the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political
and social issues becomes far more blurred.”873
The Obsidian appellate decision advances the law of intent by meshing the 1964
Sullivan decision (that public figures can only seek claims for defamation if false
information is published with actual malice,874) and the 1974 Gertz decision of the same
court (holding that the First Amendment required only a negligence standard for false
information about private individuals to constitute defamation).875 The import of the
two decisions is, as one analysis states, that
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[t]aken together, the two cases establish a meshing precedent: To count as
defamation, false information about public figures must be published. False
information about private figures, meanwhile, must merely be published
negligently.876
A weighing in on these issues by the US Supreme Court is much needed for clarifying
the requisite elements of Internet defamation.
ii

Privacy Torts

European discussions on privacy enjoy a long history of framing it within family
life and, in some countries, around the concept of individual personality rights.877 The
European statutory model has historically incorporated fundamental rights of privacy,
personhood, and personality.878 Across the Atlantic, any comprehensive consideration of
privacy law in America begins with the seminal suggestions of Warren and Brandeis
that privacy laws keep pace with "numerous mechanical devices [that] threaten to make
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops’.” 879 The technological framework of Brandeis and Warren was yellow
journalism and the Kodak camera. As judge in the Olmstead wiretapping case, Brandeis
later makes mention of not only “what has but what may be,” anticipating a future
technology whereby Government, “without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court,” to reveal some of the most intimate occurrences of the
home.880 The advice of Warren and Brandeis regarding crafting a federal US privacy
law was not followed immediately and, according to research by Neil Richards and
Daniel Solove, the law of privacy in America veered away from the European model,
including the law of confidentiality in the UK, to create a new conception of privacy
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based on the individual’s ‘inviolate personality’.881 The principles promoted in that
article of 1890, however, have shaped the development of statutory, constitutional, and
other privacy protections from that point on.882
Privacy common law in America has developed in a particular direction due to
the considerable efforts of William Prosser. His extensive taxonomy of privacy torts
was meticulously catalogued. Prosser reviewed hundreds of US cases in the 1960s and
relegated them to one of four torts: intrusion upon seclusion (invading a plaintiffs’
physical solitude or seclusion), appropriation (commercial exploitation of the property
value of one’s name), public disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public
eye.883 His texts still form the backbone of US law school torts courses.
While Prosser’s organization has been instrumental in producing a uniform
reference for the tort law of privacy in the absence of a robust federal privacy law, his
work has been criticized as too regimental in its categorization of tort law: it contains
such arbitrary inclusions as the ‘right of publicity’ (that protects a celebrity’s intellectual
property from misappropriation and hence financial deprivation) within the
‘appropriation’ category (that protects the private person from the emotional harm of
unwanted publicity). To some, such results produce contrivances that do not work well
in practice.884
Most controversial are the uneven results played out in court. For example, false
light claims are recognized in only about two-thirds of US states due to their doctrinal
overlap with defamation actions. There are differences, however, that justify Prosser’s
inclusion of both torts. For example, false light actions avoid hurdles set by limitation
and retraction statutes to which defamation actions are subject. In terms of substantive
differences, false light claims have no access to defences available to the press in
defamation actions.885 Truth is a complete defence to defamation, while true statements
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are actionable under false light law. Journalists must therefore be particularly wary of
attracting false light claims because defendants can be successful even if the story is
truthful in its entirety.886 As well, false light requires the dissemination of offending
content to a wide audience, whereas defamation claims can rest on the perceptions of a
smaller number of recipients. The principal doctrinal difference rests in the interest the
law seeks to protect: defamation protects the objective interest of reputation while false
light protects the subjective interest of emotional injury causing personal
embarrassment, helplessness or mere hurt feelings.887 The conceptual vagueness of
those terms, as well as of the reasonable person standard of proof, has prompted
journalists to complain of the tort’s chilling effect on their First Amendment
protection.888
Daniel Solove’s work builds on Prosser’s taxonomy, emphasizing the variety of
possible legal protection models beyond tort law that need addressing. 889 He observes
that many jurists too readily rely on Prosser and avoid tackling the conceptual “muddle”
that the law of privacy has become more recently. 890 Beyond Prosser’s tort law,
American privacy law extends to the jurisprudential right to privacy,” Fourth
Amendment law, evidentiary privileges, dozens of federal privacy statutes, and
hundreds of state privacy statutes.891 With the “panoply of different privacy problems”
arising with new technologies that do not fit readily into Prosser’s categories, Solove
calls for a new legal framework that more accurately recognizes potential risks of privacy
harm: information collection, information processing, information dissemination, and
886
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invasion. 892 That organizational framework accommodates nicely the concept of
reputational privacy (with its inclusion of data privacy) addressed throughout this
paper.
Solove notes particular conceptual problems posed for personal privacy by the
Internet, primarily consent893 and increased accessibility.894 Recognizing that there is
no pan-American law of information privacy, unlike the uniformity achieved by the panEuropean 95 Directive,895 Solove argues for more nuanced categorization of harm, from
methods of intrusion from gazes (surveillance) to official questioning (interrogation) to
the imposition of one’s presence into another’s physical space as revealed in celebrity
cases.
Regarding the latter, some US celebrities have taken the prying of the yellow
press into their own hands: they have joined forces to argue for laws that prohibit
paparazzi from photographing their children.896 For celebrity targets of unwanted
publicity, virtual intrusions magnify the ambit, speed, and constancy of exposure.
YouTube videos and mobile phone photo capabilities provide a particular kind of
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intrusive dissemination that tort and privacy laws fail to address.897 By undertaking
their own anti-paparazzi campaign, American celebrities are exhibiting the
independence and autonomy of the self-regulatory model that US privacy policymakers
prefer.
For EU Member States, two main legal instruments direct privacy legislation in
the digital information society: the 95 Directive regarding data privacy of individuals898
and the e-Privacy Directive regarding privacy rights of individuals and other legal
persons for electronic communications, including oversight of the free movement of
data, communications equipment, and services.899 Both directives are persuasive, not
mandatory, but portions of the 95 Directive will instantly become domestic law upon
passage of the EUDR. Domestic criminal laws and the EU Convention on Cybercrime
continue to address such violations as identity theft, the transmission of pornography,
and cyberbullying.
The unsolicited commercial use of email addresses for marketing purposes is
prohibited by the e-Privacy Directive900 within the EU, unless consenting individuals
choose to opt-in to such activities. That model contrasts with the traditional tenet of US
Internet company terms of service where participation of consumers is accompanied
with provisions for opt out choices. Those differences reflect US political support for the
behavioral advertising regime that, as a consequence, makes the sale and transfer of
personal data a flourishing industry in America. The emergence of post facto data breach
notification laws in several US states marks a slight shift from the older US policy
mindset of placing all data protection in the hands of the consumer.901 The fact that
breach notification was contained as early as 2002 in its e-Privacy Directive within the
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EU indicates there is some cross-Atlantic influence of Europe’s more paternalistic
approach.902
A significant conceptual challenge posed by our participation in new media is
whether we can claim any expectation of privacy when the very appeal of digital
communications resides in the features that reduce our privacy. For example, we know
that the personal cost of free entry and the convenience of the Web is the privacy
invasion involved in commercial tracking of our online activities and consumer
preferences.903 While socialization has taken on a whole new visual appeal through the
portability and immediate distribution of selfies and group photos, we have come to
expect that our party antics are frequently tagged, posted, and widely disseminated
through Facebook or Instagram, often without our knowledge. Potential employers,
clients, and business prospects have access to legal, and illegal, spyware to learn more
about such indiscretions.904 On a broader scale, with each web search auto-correction
suggestions are algorithmically determined from the most frequently entered search
terms, a compendium to which we contribute with each entry online. We are coming to
know, click by click, the privacy costs of our engagement.
iii

Breach of Confidentiality

This subcategory of tort law has historical roots in Anglo-America to protect
information conveyed within a confidential relationship. 905 It has maintained its
usefulness within the UK to recognize expectations of trust within certain transactions,
but has less currency in US legal practices due, primarily, to the other path taken by
legislators responding to Warren and Brandeis, that of individual rights to privacy.906
902
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Communications within the confidential relationship are protected in a court of law
through evidentiary privilege.907 At earlier periods of history, communications through
letters and literary expression were also respected as confidential, as were post office or
telegraph office services.
Having existed in the shadow of tort law, the US breach of confidentiality action
remains obscure and rarely invoked. In England, however, actions have been expanded
to include cases where no prior relationship of confidence or trust existed but where an
equivalent breach of privacy would be found in America.908 An example is provided by
the UK case of Loreena McKennitt v. Ash.909 Canadian singer McKennitt sued in a breach
of confidentiality action for a handful of references in a book by Ash, her former friend
and confidante with whom no prior, legally-recognizable relationship of confidence
existed.910 Justice Buxton of the UK Court of Appeal found McKennitt’s personal trust
had been breached with the revelation of personal details. The cause of action has been
similarly expanded over the past decade to include disclosure of personal information in
such fields of practice as insurance, accountancy, social work, and education.911
Doctrinally the two causes of action are quite distinct. First, breach of
confidentiality deals more with the context within which information is revealed, that of
a relationship of trust and an understanding that certain information is of such a private
nature as to be kept between those who originally shared it. With breach of privacy, the
content is more the focus: the information must be sufficiently personal that its revelation
causes humiliation and shame to the subject of the information. As one judgment
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determined, breach of confidence in the UK is more about the source of leaked
information while the US privacy torts address the nature of the information itself.912
US and UK doctrine differ as well regarding the impact of the offending or
leaked information. It is sufficient to make out a case of breach of confidentiality with
few recipients of the news. With privacy invasion, however, an element of publicity
must cause the plaintiff embarrassment and humiliation. The impact on reputation is
much more profound. In addition, the information itself must be “highly offensive to a
reasonable person”913 whereas the confidence that is shared in a UK action need only be
one that is preferred to be kept between the speaker and the confidante.
iv

Data Disclosure

The genesis of modern legislation in this area can be traced to the first data
protection law in the western world, enacted in the area of Hesse, Germany in 1970.914
Such legislative development was reportedly prompted by an increased interest in
rights to privacy with the advent of information technology in the 1960s and 1970s.915
Similar data protection provisions followed in Sweden (1973),916 the United States
(1974)917, Germany (1977)918 and France (1978).919 The Hesse data privacy legislation
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was prompted by the power struggle that was developing between legislative and
executive authorities.920 The legislature sought to monitor the control the executive
branches of local government would have over knowledge collection and retention.921
As well, citizens began to worry about what would happen to their data and, more
broadly, to their jobs as data collection became more widespread.922
The Hesse prototype contained basic themes that would influence most privacy
and data protection legislation in Europe up to the present day: 1) the negative default
rule (viewing the processing of personal data as interference per se that needed
legitimization); 2) the idea that data subjects had a right of access to information
relating to them without the need to show cause; 3) the omnibus approach (the Hesse Act
could not cover the private sector and so it set out to regulate all of the state public
sector within its competence); and 4) the establishing of a privacy protection institution
(with the primarily European idea that you cannot regulate behavior through litigation
but through highly structured organizations).923Today within the EU, the e-Privacy
directive has been instrumental in introducing breach notification measures that can be
taken within EU Member States once the damage of disclosure has occurred.924
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Such principles differed widely from those that led to a much less centralized
data protection regime in the US where the right to be left alone involved a freedom
from state intrusion into one’s private spaces. One German principle has influenced
privacy policymaking in both Europe and US, however: the right to free development of
the personality as the "highest constitutional value," existing within the "untouchable
sphere of private life withdrawn from the influence of state power."925 That goes back to
that expressed by Justice Brandeis: the right to be let alone as against the
government."926
Both EU and US jurisdictions have enacted legislation for the protection of
personal data,927 the central doctrinal concept that defines the scope and boundaries of
many privacy statutes and regulations around the world.928 As indicated above, in the
1990s the Clinton administration determined that the private sector should take the
lead in global electronic development through self-regulation. As a result no single data
protection law emerged in the US.929 Consequently, electronic and digital innovation
has produced such various pieces of federal legislation as the Credit Reporting Act of
1970, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, and the Cable
Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992. 930 In addition, individual states
frequently pass their own versions of such legislation when local jurisprudence
determines that portions of the federal acts are unconstitutional. An example can be
found in the creation of the federal Children’s Internet Protection Act of 2000 upon the
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striking down by the US Supreme Court of certain provisions of the Communications
Decency Act of 1995 dealing with Internet pornography.931
Cases of inadvertent data leakage by a public repository (such as a bank) or more
deliberate or negligent disclosures at the hands of commercial entities (such as Internet
companies and retail outlets) are an increasingly familiar occurrence worldwide. (click
on Pictogram 2 in Appendix B). The case of Google’s Street View mapping service
demonstrates the litigious response such privacy invasions can ignite in concerned
citizens on both sides of the Atlantic. From 2006 to 2010, Google Street View camera
cars navigated city streets in more than thirty countries collecting over 600 gigabytes
of personal data from citizens using unencrypted or public Wi-Fi services.

No

notifications went out to those residents or to the Wi-Fi stations involved.932 The
collection of video, audio, and other information bits only came to the attention of
Google executives through queries by German regulators. The equipment used to
photograph neighbourhoods around the world also picked up personal details of the WiFi networks and coding from Wi-Fi routers, including usernames and passwords.933
Google claimed its camera cars only picked up fragments of data due to their rapid
movement through city streets. Several lawsuits ensued, including a class action heard
in San Francisco that was decided for the plaintiffs and affirmed on appeal.934The case
established that Wi-Fi operations do not come within the definition of “radio
communication” under the federal Wiretap Act, an interpretation argued by Google Inc.
to render all Wi-Fi data publicly accessible and hence to relieve them of charges of illicit
interception of private data or communications.935
The 2013 Google Spain decision of the CJEU marked an expansion of individual
rights over personal data collected by Internet companies for the retention and
dissemination of inaccurate or irrelevant personal data. The decision’s findings, while
931
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focused on the 95 Directive, set the stage for acceptance of the provisions of its
successor, the EUDR. The facts of the case are straightforward: A newspaper published
a notice of auction in respect of the property of Mario Costeja González for unpaid debts
in Spain. He subsequently paid the debts and the property was not auctioned. Ten years
later Google searches on his name still brought up the newspaper advertisement. The
Spanish courts did not agree that the newspaper archive should be amended and so
González brought an action to require Google to suppress those results. Google
appealed the lower court finding for the plaintiff to the National High Court that, in
turn, sought a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on ISP liability (among other issues)
as set out in the 95 Directive.
Google’s principal argument was that search engines do not distinguish between
data it carries that are protected by the 95 Directive (personal data) and other data, and
that it has no control over the data or the selection of the data. It therefore argued that
its role was not to “determine […] the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data” as required by the terms of the 95 Directive, and hence it was not a
controller for purposes of the Directive. The CJEU rejected those arguments. Firstly it
was not contested that the data included personal data that was processed: the fact that
there was non-personal data in the search engine operations was deemed irrelevant. It
was decided that:
a search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘records’
and ‘organises’ within the framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its
servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes available’ to its users in
the form of lists of search results’.936
The CJEU emphasized that a broad definition must be given to ‘controller’ to
ensure complete protection for data subjects. In assessing this, the CJEU looked not
only to what Google does in terms of the organization of the search engine but also its
role in linking individuals to results.937
The decision establishes a system for data processing in the EU that gives the
data subject certain rights to correct data and to object to its ongoing retention. The
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data subject thereby moves a step closer to garnering control over its online data
presence. The case also raises important questions about the scope of the 95 Directive in
its impact on non-EU resident processors who might be a ‘controller’. It has
repercussions for non-EU-based companies using data of EU citizens and exporting
them across national borders. It also has implications beyond a first publisher of
material to search engines and other entities that republish personal content and that
might have more audience than first publishers of a webpage. Under all those scenarios,
a search engine operator might be required to remove information at the request of the
data subject.
With respect to the particular data rights of M. Gonzales that concern the right
to be forgotten,938 the CJEU held that:
having regard to the sensitivity for the data subject’s private life of the
information … and to the fact that its initial publication had taken place 16 years
earlier, the data subject establishes a right that that information should no longer
be linked to his name by means of such a list. 939 [emphasis added]
It is critical to remember in the ensuing discussions on the right to be forgotten
that follow in Chapter IV that the Google Spain decision recognizes a right to request
erasure of architecturally embedded links to one’s non-consensual information, not a
right to have the original information itself removed. Such a finding is always subject to
the public interest in having access to the information.
c

ISP Liability

There appears to be different judicial treatment emerging on each side of the
Atlantic regarding the activities for which ISPs should be held legally accountable. US
judges are less likely than their European counterparts to find Internet companies or
Internet service providers (ISPs) liable for the hosting and distribution of defamatory
content due to First Amendment protections and the sweeping immunity afforded by
the Communications Decency Act.940 Section 230 of that law states:

938

As set out in Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the Directive.
Google Spain, supra fn 401 at para. 98.
940
The Communications Decency Act of 1996, (47 U.S.C.) is a common name for Title V of the
Telecommunications Act of the same year.
939
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No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”941
Such wording suggests liability is restricted to active publishers or intermediaries, as
the Matthew Drudge case illustrates.
The Internet gossip columnist Drudge,942 most noted for breaking the President
Clinton-Monica Lewinski story, was contracted to America On-Line (AOL) for a series
of columns he posted on an AOL enabled website that were distributed by email to
subscribers. The Drudge Report promoted itself as a particular species of new media: a
US-based “news aggregator”.943 The AOL, as ISP for those columns, had the right to
remove content under its standard terms of service, and arguably could be considered
an editor or controller of content for its active involvement in the selection of posted
material. Drudge physically posted the gossipy content, which provided links to other
articles and sources of news. In one such column Drudge reported domestic abuse by
Sidney Blumenthal, a prominent member of President Clinton’s administration. 944
Blumenthal sued both Drudge and AOL for defamation. By invoking section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act and disavowing any activities as publisher, AOL was
successfully removed as a defendant, despite its input to content and the editorial
oversight it provided.
In its deliberations over whether it held the judicial authority to impose a
judgment in Blumenthal’s suit for $30 million, however, the District Court of Columbia
questioned the carte blanche extended to ISPs under the Communications Decency Act. It
specifically addressed ISPs’ freedom to “flaunt a rumormonger’s ability to make rumors
instantly accessible to its subscribers and then claim immunity” for any defamation
claims that follow. The court upheld ISP immunity all the same,945 and revealed in its
judgment a misunderstanding of the technology of the Internet. The court suggested
941

Section 230(c)(1).
The Drudge Report provided links to upcoming political and entertainment stories and
“predicted” the Monica Lewinsky scandal in 1996.
943
Kaley Leetaru, New media vs. Old media: A portrait of the Drudge Report 2002-2008, 14 FIRST
MONDAY (6 July 2009), http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2500/2235
(arguing that the Drudge Report relied heavily on wire services and obscure news outlets to find
small stories that would break large in future days, making it highly dependent on mainstream
“old media” sites.)
944
Blumenthal v Drudge and America On-Line Inc., 992 F. Supp. 44 (1998) (D.D.C.).
945
Id., at 51.
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Drudge maintained a mailing list of email subscribers. Online authors like Drudge do
not maintain email subscription lists that they service; they have no idea where, or from
whom, their postings are transmitted from day to day. That service is provided
autonomously in response to anonymous prompts from subscribers.
The ISP immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act have been
applied consistently by US jurists to defeat defamation or privacy claims provided three
criteria are present: 1) the defendant must be an “interactive computer service”;946 2) the
plaintiff must allege the defendant I s a publisher or author of the material; and 3) the
communication must have been provided by a third party “information content
provider”.947 There has been a certain judicial willingness in recent decisions to use a
more nuanced interpretation of the section 230 provisions.
EU case law has generally taken a stricter view of liability for ISPs than that of
the US. Under EU law, a “service provider" is any person or entity providing an
"information society service” which means any services provided for remuneration at a
distance by electronic means.948 The eCommerce Directive949 affords an ISP immunity from
liability only when it serves as a "mere conduit"950 or provides "temporary caching"951
for the sole purpose of making the transmission of content more efficient. The Directive
is used in cases of copyright infringement, defamation, and invasion of privacy.
Immunity is also provided if the ISP service is of a mere technical, automatic and

946

In § 230(c)(1) the Act states: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” In § 230(f)(2) “interactive computer service” is defined as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server. . . .”
947
In ” § 230(f)(3) “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”
948
Article 1.2 of EU Directive 98/34/EC.
949
Directive 2000/31/EC (8 June 2000) On Certain Legal Aspects Of Information Society
Services, In Particular Electronic Commerce, In The Internal Market (eCommerce Directive).
That approach is termed "horizontal" because it addresses liability regardless of the grounds of
claim by a rights holder or injured party.
950
Article 12.
951
Article 13.
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passive nature, and where the ISP has neither knowledge nor control over the content
being transmitted or stored.952
Personal data retained by telecom service providers are regulated under a
separate Telecom Directive. 953 Such laws requiring the retention for government
purposes of location and traffic data of individual users were found to violate the ECHR
according to the CJEU Digital Rights Ireland case in 2014.954 Such service providers are
thereby granted valid grounds to refuse to comply with national data retention
obligations, although the decision is unclear as to which remedies are available to
individual users whose personal data is disclosed. It is difficult to imagine such
restriction on government surveillance practices in America.
Takedown requests by ISPs are of particular interest to courts in Europe. An
oft-cited example involves the conviction for invasion of privacy and defamation of three
Google executives at the hands of Italian courts in 2010. Residents of a small Italian
town complained that a video of schoolmates taunting an autistic student lingered
online for a couple of weeks before Google administration removed it.955 The Milan
court found that period of time sufficient for extensive access by countless online
viewers. Google argued a guilty verdict might require it to filter content on YouTube
before it was posted, which it claimed would be incompatible with the open spirit of the
Internet, as well as the tenor of several European directives and guidelines. The
executives were given a suspended sentence and fine.956 The case is currently making
its way through appellate levels of court, with the Google executives arguing the “mere
conduit” defence.
The cases against Google’s Street View mapping services in Europe, as
952

Article 42. As affirmed in the CJEU decision of Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM (Societe belge
des auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs, C-70/10 (24 Nov. 2011).
953
EU Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC (eTelecom Directive). The Directive covers fixed
telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet email and Internet telephony. All EU
Member States have incorporated the Directive’s provisions into their domestic laws except
Belgium and Germany.
954
Digital Rights Ireland, supra fn 681 .
955
Loek Essers, Google Video trial to continue to Italian supreme court, PCWORLD (17 Apr. 2013),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2035387/google-video-trial-to-continue-to-italian-supremecourt.html. Three Google executives were handed 6-month suspended sentences in Milan in
2010, a decision that was reversed on appeal. The prosecutor has appealed that reversal in the
highest Italian court, the Court of Cassation, arguing the executives deserve criminal sanctions
for having knowledge of the continued posting.
956
Privacy actions are addressed through the criminal law in Italy.
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mentioned above, show how far some courts are willing to go to find ISP liability.
Several EU countries have taken exception to the privacy invasion of Google’s Street
View cars and several German towns and cities have moved to block Google from
taking pictures of storefronts and homes. In Switzerland, data protection authorities
sued Google to press it to increase privacy protections.957 The Swiss Data Protection
laws extend privacy rights to images of a person’s home and street view without
express permission of the owner.958 This is also the case for vehicle number plates and
pictures of residences, gardens and other private spaces, all considered personal data
because in such cases a personal connection can be established without difficulty. Public
institutions housing individuals in need of privacy protection, such as hospitals and
schools, are also protected. The rationale is that it takes little effort to identify specific
persons and it must be assumed that third parties will take an interest in the data.959
The German decisions further rejected the claim of Google that the fact vehicles
are clearly equipped with a rooftop camera meets its duty to provide information on
what it is doing. People are simply not aware that the object of the exercise is to travel
the roads, systematically photographing them to publish the images on the Internet
without their consent. In Switzerland, advance notice in both the local and regional
media and in particular in the print media must be given of Google Street View
recording trips and of the activation of new images on the Internet. Clear notice must
also be given of the right to object.960
There is increasing concern in the US over the lack of precision in defining the
functions of ISPs for the purpose of determining legal liability. Such intermediaries as
AOL, Prodigy, and Yahoo! have reportedly struggled with the issue of how much
957

FDPIC v. Google Inc., BGE 138 II 346 (31 May 2012). Note: Switzerland is not an EU
member state so its relations with the EU Union membership is regulated through a series of
bilateral agreements. Although it does not have a concrete legal framework dealing with rights
and obligations of ISPs, legal doctrine and practice apply similar principles to those stated in
the eCommerce Directive and the provisions of the 95 Directive concerning data protection
more generally. See further Rolph H. Weber Internet Service Provider Liability: The Swiss Perspective
(2010), https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-3-2010/2793/Weber_ISP_Ch.pdf.
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Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP; SR 235.1).
959
Google Inc. und Google Switzerland, BGE 138 II 346 E. 6. The only exception is when data is
processed exclusively for personal use by a private individual who does not disclose the data to
third parties.
960
See further Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court on Google Street View: Decisions on the processing
of personal data, Confederation Suisse,
http://www.edoeb.admin.ch/datenschutz/00683/00690/00694/01109/index.html?lang=en.
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control to exercise over their members and subscribers. By gearing its content to
particular sectors, such as the family, Prodigy became known as a content-rich or
content-specific site, thereby attracting liability for damages in the case of Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.961 Post-Stratton, ISPs have attempted to rely on safe
harbour protections to avoid liability for content. 962 They argue they are passive
intermediaries, although their provision of services and their insistence on subscriber
compliance with terms of service indicates some de facto control over content. The
posting of warnings by ISPs about compliance with certain laws, on auction sites for
example, provide further indicia of control.
The more clear-cut intercontinental differences between European and American
legal treatment of ISPs are beginning to shift as we experience the democratizing effects
of online speech, become more aware of the existence of cached data, and ponder the
implications of the Google Spain decision.963 The issue of takedown requests is becoming
the battleground for those shifting issues. Under the Google Spain ruling, individual
users’ takedown requests must be considered by Internet companies using a set list of
criteria and, if denied, brought as of right before a “competent authority” for a decision.
Within the EU that authority would be a Data Protection Authority once the EUDR is
in effect. Within the US, that authority would be a court of competent jurisdiction.964
In a comment from France regarding take down requests discussed in the Mosley
decision by the Court of First Instance in Paris (detailed below), we can see resistance
based on privacy rights that involve cached or linked content that get transmitted to
third parties and hence is claimed to be outside of Google’s control.965 The author

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995).
962
For an extended discussion of various methods of ISP control, see further Greenberg, supra
fn 736 at 1195ff.
963
Google Spain, supra fn 401.
964
As stated in the Google Spain decision: ‘…if, following a search made on the basis of a
person’s name, the list of results displays a link to a web page which contains information on
the person in question, that data subject may approach the operator directly and, where the
operator does not grant his request, bring the matter before the competent authorities in order
to obtain, under certain conditions, the removal of that link from the list of results.”
965
Mosley v. Google France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris file # 11/07970 (Nov. 2011)
http://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/mosley-v-google-france.pdf;
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MartinBariteau, The Mosley/Google Case: Why Privacy Can Not be Argued, Droitdu.Net (17 Nov. 2013)
961

221

comments that Google has responded to each of Mosley’s takedown requests, but the
offending images are still accessible via video using a different search URL:
Mosley asked Google to figure a way to automatically and permanently take
them down. Google refused, arguing the company wasn’t the Internet Police,
and has no duty to watch the web content. 966
Google’s resistance to taking down any links to lingering images from Mosley’s
private party, particularly YouTube video footage that continues to be available
through Google searches, has the Hamburg District Court characterizing the Internet
company an “accomplice” to the News of the World whose story provoked Mosley’s initial
claim filed in the UK. As one commentator notes,
The case strikes another blow at Google’s continued resistance to the idea that it
should play its part in preventing unlawful images from being published by way
of image search results.967
The fact that Internet companies, as corporations, are not restrained by First or
Fourth Amendment provisions, has resulted in executives for companies like Google
wielding considerable autonomy regarding what content is posted, retained, or removed
from their sites.
Facebook executives wield similar power: although its policy statements
promote the democratic concept of its subscribers having a duty to invigilate offensive
content, it is the upper management tier that makes final decisions.968 Its current
protocol is to ask its one billion subscribers to flag content that they believe violates
Facebook’s community standards as posted on its site. Such factors as “nudity, hate

http://droitdu.net/2013/11/the-mosley-case-paris-why-privacy-can-not-be-argued-for-noticeand-stay-down/.
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Mosley v Google France, Inforrm’s Blog (Nov. 2013)
http://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/mosley-v-google-france.pdf (reporting that ‘The
publication of the images was held to be unlawful by Mr Justice Eady [2008] EWHC 1777
(QB) but video footage continues to be accessible via Google searches’.)
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Dominic Crossley, Case Law: Hamburg District Court: Max Mosley v Google Inc., Google go down
(again, this time) in Hamburg Inforrm’s Blog (5 Feb. 2014),
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/02/05/case-law-hamburg-district-court-max-mosley-vgoogle-inc-google-go-down-again-this-time-in-hamburg-dominic-crossley/.
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speech, bullying and pornography” are particularly targeted.969 Facebook algorithms
then sort the offending content into digital piles and Facebook employees around the
world do a more detailed sorting and decide which content stays and which is deleted.
Their word is the final arbiter.970 There is an exception to such standards if content is
group-posted on community pages, or involves humour.
Law professor Jeffrey Rosen objects to such “delete squads” or “deciders”
wielding the power to determine community norms and to weed out comments that
might be controversial and offensive, but still within legal limits.971 Delete squads will
be explored in section 5.3c(1) infra.
4.3

Outliers: Criminal Defamation, Insult Laws, Opinion, & Creepiness
a

Criminal Defamation

While the focus of this paper is primarily on private law, defamation as a crime is
still invoked in many countries in Europe and in some states of America. It is designed
as either an alternative to, or in addition to, private law actions in defamation. More
specifically still, the penal laws of several civil and common law states makes defamation
of public officials, the nation, or government a discrete offense from laws addressing
defamation of a private person. In the civil law jurisdiction of France, for example, the
choice of law is left to the discretion of the prosecutor who bases such decisions on the
degree of public interest that the facts attract.972 Although framed as an offence related
to the selling of prohibited goods rather than as defamation, the LICRA v Yahoo!
decision of the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance is an example of a high profile case
where the court applied the French penal code to the streaming into France of Yahoo!
969
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Stephen Henn, Facebook’s Online Speech Rules Keep Users on a Tight Leash, NPR (3 Apr. 2013)
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/04/03/176147408/facebooks-online-speechrules-keep-users-on-a-tight-leash.
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Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, and Facebook and the new global battle over the
future of free speech NEW REPUBLIC (29 Apr. 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules
(Delete Squad). See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of
Privacy and Free Speech, in JEFFREY ROSEN & BENJAMIN WITTE, EDS, CONSTITUTION
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auction websites advertising Nazi paraphernalia and links to holocaust denial
literature.973 The case was deemed of considerable public interest in that over 70% of
French citizens were identified as Internet users that accessed the unlawful content, as
determined by their digital tracks. The court had several criminal sanctions from which
to choose: stiff fines, confiscation of offending materials, and the court appointment of
technological experts to advise on the permanent removal of offending advertising from
such websites.974 The court chose the first and third options and issued an injunction to
facilitate such removal within three months, failing which the defendant Yahoo!
Corporation would be subject to a fine of 100,000 francs per day (about 16,500US).
In general, criminal defamation laws differ from those of civil defamation in their
higher probative standards, penal sanctions, and more pervasive social stigma. Their
chilling effect on dissidents, journalists, and political activists at the hands of state
authorities and monarchs has led to repeated calls for repeal of such laws.975 The power
of criminal sanction has proven irresistible to leaders across time, even within
democratic states, as an instrument to quell public criticism.
The first citizen to be convicted under the 1881 French Press Law had called the
French President a ‘voyou profanateur’ or profane thug and a ‘goujat iconoclaste’ or
iconoclastic boor.976 The last to be convicted was fined thirty euros977 for holding up a
cardboard sign at a 2008 rally telling then-President Nicolas Sarkozy to “Casse-toi
pov’con,” or get lost.978 Critics of French Presidents, if convicted under insult laws, have
973

Contrary to Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code that prohibits the wearing or
exhibiting of public uniforms, insignias and emblems which recall those used by any
organization declared illegal by the Nuremberg Charter or by a person convicted of crimes
against humanity under French law № 64-1326 of 1964-12-26.
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LICRA I supra fn 727.
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United States Helsinki Commission On Security And Cooperation In Europe,
Memorandum On Defamation And Insult Laws, http://www.csce.gov (14 Dec. 2001).
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WASH POST (26 July 2013),
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been sentenced to a year in jail; between 1881 and 1958, the law against presidential
insults was used only nine times, but employed thereafter by President De Gaulle to
convict 350 critics of his tactics in the war in Algeria.
It is a legal curiosity that such laws remain in force. A 2014 study of extant
criminal defamation laws in Member States of the EU determined that only five of the
28 states have repealed general criminal defamation and insult laws, despite broad
international consensus among legal experts and press freedom advocates that criminal
punishments for defamation represent a disproportionate restriction on free
expression.979 The study has further determined that the laws of 20 EU Member States
suggest imprisonment as a punishment for either defamation or insult, in contradiction
of ECtHR rulings that imprisonment is, as a general rule, never an appropriate
punishment for defamation. Fifteen states set maximum incarceration at two years, with
eight years in one state.

980

Although international standards recommend against

providing public officials with any special protection under defamation law, the laws of
six EU states elevate criminal punishments for defamation when the offended party is a
public official or public figure. In Appendix B, Chart 1, the distribution of criminal
defamation laws within the EU is shown, indicating the ample provisions within EU
states that have resisted pressure for repeal.
While the basic elements of defamation include a false statement about the
person made to a third party that results in the lowering of his reputation in the esteem
of his community, criminal defamation law additionally requires proof of intent to cause
harm at a much higher probative standard than for civil actions. 981 In more autocratic
regimes, the criminal law of defamation has become a weapon to rout out public
discourse on controversial policies of the state.982 Journalists and writers are specific
979

Scott Griffin et al., Out Of Balance: Defamation Law In The European Union And Its Effect On Press
Freedom, Report for International Press Institute, (July 2014)
http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/uploads/pics/Out_of_Balance_OnDefamation_IPIJuly201
4.pdf
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defamation.
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penal standard of the particular state.
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The United Nations Commission on Human Rights determined in 2012 that the
criminalization of libel violates freedom of expression and, in particular, Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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targets of such laws and press councils and associations tirelessly promote the repeal of
such laws.983
At times defamation laws, often in the form of “insult” provisions, are invoked
simply to compensate for hurt feelings or indignation, without appreciation for the fact
that in an open society, a person’s sensibilities must be weighed against the right of
others to freely express themselves.
In America, penal consequences can be quite harsh: in Colorado, for example,
criminal libel was a felony carrying up to 18 months in prison and a $100,00 fine for a
first offence. The libel law was quite broad: it was a crime to “knowingly publish or
disseminate, either by written instrument, sign, pictures, or the like, any statement or
object tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty,
integrity, virtue, or reputation or expose the natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule”. 984
Nearly all EU Member States retain criminal sanctions for defamation – with
only Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK having repealed such laws.985 The
European Commission continues to call for a harmonization of libel laws across the
EU,986 and the Council of Europe called on states to repeal criminal sanctions for libel in
2007, as did both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)987
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http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_e
n.pdf
987
Ending the Chilling Effect: Working to Repeal Criminal Libel and Insult Laws, OSCE (Nov. 25,
2004), http://www.osce.org/fom/13573 (detailing the censorship experienced by journalists for

226

and UN special rapporteurs on freedom of expression.

988

Non-governmental

organizations that oppose their use include Amnesty International, Article 19, the
Committee to Protect Journalists, the Helsinki Committees of Bulgaria, Croatian,
Greece, Romania, and Slovakia, the International Helsinki Federation, the World Press
Freedom Committee, the Norwegian Forum for Freedom of Expression; national
chapters of PEN; and Reporters Sans Frontières. For many EU Member States, politicians
and journalists receive tougher sanctions for criminal libel than ordinary citizens, even
though the ECtHR ruled in 2006 that the limits of acceptable criticism (of the state and
other citizens) are wider for a politician than a private citizen.”989
In the US, criminal defamation remains on the books in seventeen states despite
repeated calls for its repeal for the restrictions it places on First Amendment rights.990
Journalism professor David Pritchard suggests that criminal libel can be a legitimate
and hefty legal tool in the hands of state agents for ‘expressive deviance’ causing harm
to private citizens, particularly victims with few resources for private lawyers, lengthy
delays, and the unpredictability of private law outcomes.991
The reformation of criminal defamation (desacato) laws of OAS Member States
has been a focus of the IACHR and, despite reports in 1998 and 2000 of its Special
Rapporteur for Free Speech recommending their abolition across the OAS
membership,992 there is still wide usage of desacato laws to silence opinions against state
authorities.993 The basic constitutional argument of the IACHR is that desacato laws
criticisms of a ruling regime, but dealing very little with the experiences of non-journalistic
critics of the state).
988
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(2002), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=87&lID=1(stating in
its preamble that the authors are “Mindful of the ongoing abuse of criminal defamation laws,
including by politicians and other public figures”.
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afford a higher level of protection to public officials than to private citizens. This is in
direct contravention of the “fundamental principle in a democratic system that holds the
government subject to controls in order to preclude abuse of its coercive powers.”994 It
also offends the principle of US constitutional law that the state serves with the consent
of the governed.
b

Insult Laws

Insult laws differ from criminal defamation in that insults might be true but
undesirable to public figures and heads of state; criminal defamation, in contrast, relates
to false allegations involving either public or private citizens. Particularly disconcerting
is the fact that insult laws remain in place in twelve EU Member States even though
convictions have been consistently overturned by the ECtHR.995 Even insult to national
symbols, such as the flag, is criminalized in Austria, Germany and Poland.
Most European countries have domestic laws that accommodate actions in
insult, a term so broad that it frequently covers expression that would be considered an
opinion or value judgment.996 Even countries regarded as having relatively strong
media freedoms have statutes outlawing the insult of elected officials. For instance, the
ECtHR has described Belgium’s insult law as covering “gratuitously offensive terms or
exaggerated expressions.”997
Insult laws can cast a wide net and punishments can range from token to severe.
For instance, until its repeal in 2013, France's 1881 Press Law prescribed punishments
for insult to the president, public officials and foreign dignitaries. At one time
punishment included prison terms, but more recently “an insult to the president of
France could see you smacked with a €45 000 fine.”998 Insult laws are frequently
confused with criminal defamation laws, possibly because the procedural result is the
same: hefty fines or incarceration, and the chill of expressive freedoms. For example,
Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88, doc. 9 rev., 17 February 1995, 197-212.
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ARTICLE 19 as an organization of free speech activists complains that a number of
countries across the world use defamation laws for the “ill-defined and stifling
protection of ‘feelings’”999 where the plaintiffs’ requisite standard of proof appears to be
“that they feel offended.”1000 In some countries the term ‘honour’ is used instead of, or in
addition to, reputation and humour and satire come within its prohibited actions.
c

Opinion

Finally, much online invective that offends individuals has been determined by
jurists in defamation cases to be opinion, not fact, and hence not actionable. Such speech
can be “uninhibited, casual and ill thought-out” and it is often apparent to casual readers
“that people are just saying the first thing that comes into their heads and reacting in
the heat of the moment."1001
Internet scholar Yochai Benkler has emphasized that new methods of knowledge
production on the Internet fundamentally alter the capacity of individuals to be active
participants in the public sphere, from disparate corners of the world.1002 Within that
indeterminate community, the Internet confers
entitlement to opinions and attitudes about me on persons who have never met
me, likely do not speak my language, and who have the potential to do
incalculable reputational damage through their online commentary.1003
While such opinions can cause loss of esteem and financial disaster, they escape legal
remedy due to their unverifiable nature. Prosser took care to distinguish the defamatory
facts that prompted legal defamation actions from the provocation of harmful opinions in
a community of third parties.1004
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Online commentary, even if expressed in biting and devastatingly wounding
terms, is not often legally actionable because it is not probative - it cannot be proven to
be true or false. Courts have allowed that deciphering opinion is not always a clear-cut
exercise, although a few have pronounced that statements posted on an Internet bulletin
board or chat room are highly likely to be opinions or hyperbolic speech. Each remark
must be examined in context. To criticize the Toronto Blue Jays as a defensively weak
baseball team is more clearly a personal opinion than to couch that opinion in an
assertion of fact, such as alleging that the Blue Jays’ management is using deceptive
trade practices in their recruitment from the minor leagues. The latter is still arguably
an opinion, albeit dressed as fact that is unverifiable by the average individual.1005
US Courts’ interpretation of what comprises opinion has not always been
predictable; much is based on cultural context. For example, the following comments
have been judged to constitute opinion: statements on a radio talk show that the
plaintiff was a “chicken butt,” “local loser” and “big skank”, because they were too vague
to be capable of being proven true or false and had “no generally accepted meaning”;1006
and email comments by a newspaper employee that a former publisher had displayed
“abusive behavior” and “bizarre management style” and had damaged the paper’s
finances.1007 Other examples of opinion include calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar”;
calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch"; and changing a product code name from
“Carl Sagan” to "Butt Head Astronomer".1008 Examples found to be defamatory are:
charging someone with being a communist in America in 1959; calling a lawyer a
"crook"; accusing a minister of unethical conduct; or accusing a father of violating the
confidence of his son.1009 In Ireland, a former garda commissioner was awarded £30,000
in damages for the use of a graphic representation of his ears in a television program on
corruption, and a senior barrister settled a High Court action against Irish television for
an undisclosed amount for using an image of her car in a story about drunk drivers.1010
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Online comments found to be defamatory, even though not verifiable as fact,
include those referring to a chief executive officer as “insane” with conduct similar “to
that of Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.”1011 Linking a person’s name to
the website www.Satan.com however, was determined by a California court not to
constitute defamation because "merely linking a plaintiff's name to the word "satan"
conveys nothing more than the author's opinion that there is something devilish or evil
about the plaintiff."1012 Such examples illustrate courts are not always consistent and in
many cases arbitrary.
More formalized opinions, such as those contained on professional performance
rating sites like ratemyprof.com have become the target of teachers’ unions due to their
cyber-bullying potential. In 2007, delegates at a UK annual convention of the
Professional Association of Teachers cited as defamatory such online activities as
posting a doctored photograph of a headless teacher with the caption “You are dead”.
The organization approached the Internet company with a take-down request.1013 In
France matters have gone even further. When French entrepreneurs created the
Note2be.com site, they encouraged students to grade teachers and discuss their teaching
abilities. The SNES, a secondary school teachers' union backed by the Ministry of
Education, immediately took the website to court, claiming the personal comments
represented a breach of privacy and an incitement to public disorder. The judges agreed,
ruling the website could no longer identify any teachers by name or risk a 1,000 euro
fine for every infraction.1014
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Such responses to individual commentary exist in a grey area between
defamation, cyber-bullying, and opinion that, for the moment, look to the courts for a
clear determination of individual privacy rights.
d

Creepiness

Certain objectionable online behavior straddles the line between unethical or
menacing behavior and overtly illegal acts. It might inflict alarm, discomfort, dread, or
even apprehension of harm, but such creepiness lacks the proof of reasonableness that
meets the legal test for reputational injury.1015 It does, however, push the public-private
boundaries of social interaction. Imagine, for example, standing at the bar for a
professional social event and using your smart phone to access the name, musical tastes,
and political convictions of an attractive individual you see standing across the room.
You can equip yourself with immensely helpful background information before
undergoing the risk of rejection involved in the more direct approach. That kind of
social snooping does not incur legal liability; specific applications are even available to
encourage the behavior. One such application, Girls Around Me, provided a profile of
women within the user’s geographic vicinity whenever they checked into their social
networks on their mobile devices. While a definite social advantage at a nightclub, the
passive collection of another’s private actions is creepy and clandestine.
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Unsurprisingly, the application was withdrawn from the public market within hours of
its launch in response to online critical reference to the “stalker app”.1017 A less sinister
example, in that consent of subscribers is required, is the application Highlight that
produces a profile (photos, name, likes and dislikes) on your mobile phone of someone
standing near you whose phone also contains the application.1018 This digital version of
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speed dating is permissible under rules of privacy, but disturbing for the harassment
potential it makes technologically possible.
Those devices illustrate that innovative technology does not guarantee ethical
correctness.1019 With social messaging comes ambiguity about the bounds of permissible
online behavior. For example, is it acceptable to befriend your children, and their
friends, on Facebook and to tag their photographs? What are the social rules for
posting, or tagging, a friend’s image on Instagram? How about a photograph of her
infant children? As dana boyd warns, privacy in an age of social media is complicated. It
is about “managing visibility, negotiating networks, and facing an ever-increasing flow
of information.”1020
4.4

Reputation Online: is digital speech different?
Given the democratization of online communications (free, spontaneous, and

culturally open) there is some argument for allocating less weight and meaning to
digital speech.1021 Karniel maintains that a rumour does not have elevated status just
because it is online: its reliability is still “restrained and incomplete”.1022 The credibility
of sources, so critical to acceptance of traditional media accounts, is part of that status
but often suppressed or absent in online accounts. Cues about authority and status of
either the writer or sources can be hidden and footnotes and direct quotations
suppressed. In online speech they seem to take second place to know-how and good
ideas, as one psychological study of Internet behavior points out:
Although one’s identity in the outside world ultimately may shape power in
cyberspace, what mostly determines the influence on others is one’s skill in
communicating (including writing skills), persistence, the quality of one’s ideas,
and technical know-how.1023
Commentary on the Internet is perceived as different than in more scrutinized
traditional media in that “[h]yperbole and exaggeration are common and ‘venting’ is at
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least as common as careful and considered argumentation.”1024 It is the side-by-side
combination of both styles of speech, unmediated by editorial oversight, that creates
discomfort about the verifiability of much online ‘reporting’.
Online statements can be gossipy, grammatically creative, expletive, insulting,
racist, politically incorrect, and contain only loosely connected thoughts. In the absence
of editorial second thought for bloggers and tweeters, it becomes practically
burdensome to authenticate and hence legally prove the reputational harm caused by
such communications. It is because Internet content is “located in another time and
zone”, more anecdotal and immediate, that it is not subjected to the investigative
rigours of traditional journalism.1025 In the Obsidian decision, discussed above,1026 the
lower court found the language of blog posts contained “somewhat run-on” and “stream
of consciousness-like sentences”, reading more like a journal entry than assertions of
fact.1027 For example, Cox used such hyperbolic terms as “immoral,” “thugs,” and “evil
doers.”1028 On the matter of proof of the truth of blog posts, Cox’s assertions that
“Padrick hired a ‘hit man’ to kill her” or “that the entire bankruptcy court system is
corrupt” were found “not sufficiently factual to be proved true or false.”1029 The US
appellate court of the 9th Circuit found that the very tenor of language used by the
defendant Cox in her blog posts “negates the impression that she was asserting
objective facts.”1030 The statements were posted on obsidianfinancesucks.com, a URL
indicating that any reader would be
predisposed to view them with a certain amount of scepticism and with an
understanding that they will likely present one-sided viewpoints rather than
assertions of provable facts.1031
Karniel takes the position that most digital speech cannot constitute a cause of
action for defamation. 1032 He views the role of blogs, tweets, and other informal
journalism as the preliminary flagging of issues that the mainstream offline press can
1024
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then decide is worthy of further investigation, sober thought, and possible publication.
Regarding the role of law to address defamatory remarks online, Karniel makes two
proposals: either create a sub-category of law for virtual speech, with more lenient levels
of proof, or remove online speech altogether from judicial scrutiny.1033 We shall explore
those options in Chapter V.
Yale University constitutional scholar Jack Balkin agrees that, while digital
technologies have altered the social conditions of speech, the key transformation has
been around the question of control.1034 Online participation both widens our access to
speech and diminishes our control over it. When we speak of freedom of speech,
therefore, we must identify whose speech we are contemplating, the commercial speech
of industry, the regulatory speech of government, individual speech, and so on. Balkin
accepts that social networking speech is collaborative, interactive, and involves
gossiping and shaming as much as supporting and praising. 1035 Internet speech
intensifies all of those dynamics due to its unique architecture.
Law has a changed role in all of this, as Balkin promotes. Rather than the
traditional US model, that is, the “judicial creation and protection of individual rights of
free expression enforceable against state actors”, he suggests we support individual
privacy rights with various government programs and entitlements including, perhaps,
requirements for technological design.1036 The digital age makes the court model as
important as ever, but aligned with technological and regulatory infrastructure.
4.5

Is the Bench Ready for Digital Speech?
A recent indication from the bench that jurists do not always understand digital

science was provided by the Aereo case before the US Supreme Court. Technological
confusion was indicated when Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked a lawyer to compare the
services of his corporate client to "iDrop in the cloud”, a non-existent data storage
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system.1037 She also asked a question about the video streaming service “Netflick”.1038
Another example of technological confusion on the bench is provided by a class action
against Google, brought in 2011, regarding its Street View geo-location service.
Plaintiffs claimed privacy invasion under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. The
information collected, however, was from open Wi-Fi networks, requiring no special
equipment. It was unencrypted information people were transmitting in the open, that
is, data that was being broadcast. As one technology writer suggested,
If you understand basic technology, you can understand what they were doing,
and how it was almost certainly not to capture data from the network, but just to
determine location info…This was data that was being broadcast.1039
Although not luddites, some judges ask questions in oral argument to more
accurately understanding communications technology. In the 2010 case City of Ontario v.
Quon, involving the issue of constitutional protection of California police
communications sent by a paging system, US Supreme Court Chief Justice John G.
Roberts asked “What’s the difference between email and a pager?”1040 Justice Anthony
Kennedy asked how a text message could be sent to an officer at the same time he was
sending one, showing a lack of knowledge of the existing technology. Justice Scalia
asked, “Could Quon print these spicy little conversations and send them to his
buddies?”
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trouble."1042 US Justice Scalia has publicly admitted to being “Mr. Clueless” when it
comes to technology.1043
Similar concerns are expressed within the EU. As one Council of Europe report
notes, “Experience suggests that in most cases, judges and prosecutors encounter
difficulties in coping with the new realities of the cyber world.”1044 One country, Japan,
took the initiative of creating an Intellectual Property High Court in 2005 to hear cases
of technological complexity. Justice Richard Posner doubts such a move would be well
received in the US: “[T]he Supreme Court justices are unlikely to agree to any system
which puts a focus on the technology, and likely will seek the safe harbor of focusing
their decisions based on prior legal rulings and principles.”1045
Part of that apprehension might be related to the fishbowl in which judges
function today. Many judges display an acute awareness of “negative, even noxious
gossip” that can erode their reputations and those of other officers of the court as
proceedings are increasingly transcribed for online media.1046 For example, judicial
competence in online research that informs a judge’s ruling can now be tracked, and
results might in future be argued by counsel as leading to the judge’s faulty decision
making.1047 The more technologically intrepid among judges are free to use the Internet
and social media to monitor the past and current behavior of lawyers and defendants
1042

See further, Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties At The Supreme Court Causing A
‘Disregard Of Duty?’ 3 J. L. TECH. & INTERNET, 1 (2011).
1043
Jordan Fabian, Chairman to Justices: “Have Either of Y’all Ever Considered Tweeting or Twitting?”
Hillicon Valley: The Hill’s Tech. Blog (May 21, 2010),
http://itk.thehill.com/policy/technology/99209-chairman-to-justices-have-either-of-yall-everconsidering-tweeting-or-twitting (quoting Justice Scalia’s testimony at a House judiciary
subcommittee hearing).
1044
Cybercrime training for judges and prosecutor: a concept, Council Of Europe Project On
Cybercrime And The Lisbon Network, (8 Oct. 2009),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Documents/Training/2079_t
rain_concept_4_provisional_8oct09.pdf
1045
Keith Kirkpatrick, Technology Confounds the Judges, 57 Communications Of The ACM, 27
(May
2014),
http://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2014/5/174343-technology-confounds-thecourts/fulltext.
1046
See further James G. Carr, A Judge's Guide to Protecting Your Reputation, 36, Truth Or
Consequences, 26-30 (2014) American Bar Association,
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/29760783?uid=3739448&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid
=3737720&uid=4&sid=21104468347941 (recommending that “vigilant and constant probity
and competence remain the best – and perhaps the only- defenses against the corrosive
consequences of innuendo”, 26.
1047
See further Karen Eltis, Does Avoiding Judicial Isolation Outweigh the Risks Related to ‘Professional
Death by Facebook?, 3 LAWS (2014) 636, 639, www.mdpi.com/journal/laws/.

237

who appear before them, as well as judicial colleagues.1048 As well, American judges use
the Internet to promote and manage their election campaigns, an activity that has
ethical implications for the appearance of impartiality.1049 Both American and European
judicial oversight bodies have expressed a need for judges to stay socially connected
with their communities in order to gauge community standards, but within limits.1050
For example, an ethics opinion from South Carolina found that judges could befriend on
Facebook court employees and law enforcement personnel, so long as they avoided
making reference to court matters.1051 In a project on media relations for judges, the
European Network of Councils for the Judiciary crafted guidelines in 2011 for use of
social media and smart phones by the judiciary that would not compromise the
appearance of judicial distance from the press.1052
The National Academy of Science as early as 2004 noted a lack of technological
literacy amongst the general population in both America and European states.1053 As
juries for defamation and privacy litigation, as well as prosecutors and candidates for the
bench, are selected from those populations, those findings are important indicators of
how well (or poorly) scientific evidence is understood.1054 More broadly, jurists offer

1048

Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal Field: Just
“Face” it, 41 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 355, 399ff (2010).
1049
Gena Slaughter and John G. Browning, Social Networking Dos and Don’ts for Lawyers and
Judges, 73 TEX. B.J., 192 (2010) (reporting that the use of social networks by adults
quadrupled between 2005-2008).
1050
That policy has been supported in America by Bland v. Roberts, 57 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D.
Va. 2012), rev’d in part, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (extending First Amendment protection
to Facebook “liking”).
1051
Supreme Court Judicial Department Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial
Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009) as cited in John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’
Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 447 (2014).
1052
The Judiciary And The Media, European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary
http://www.encj.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=21&Ite
mid=241&lang=en.
1053
Public Knowledge About S&T, Ch. 7, Science And Technology: Public Attitudes And
Understanding, NSF (2004), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c7/c7s2.htm - note29
(highlighting research that challenges, in light of digital technologies, the gatekeeper role of
judges in admitting scientific evidence using the criteria of falsifiability, error rate, peer review,
and general acceptance as set by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). A study of 400 state trial court judges in 50 US states
found that a majority clearly understood peer review but only a fraction clearly understood
falsifiability and error rate.
1054
A 2001 study concluded that "many judges may not be fully prepared to deal with the
amount, diversity and complexity of the science presented in their courtrooms" and that "many

238

candid admissions that those who shape the law cannot always grasp its immediate or
future applications. As cyberlaw scholar Michael Geist commented when Internet cases
were beginning to appear on court dockets:
[T]he technology involved in Internet publication is not a matter of judicial
notice of knowledge. Many of the words used to describe what appears to be
happening on the screen . . . are quite obviously metaphors and the Court cannot
assume that they accurately describe what is actually taking place. 1055
Hence they struggle to use technologically neutral language to avoid dating or
over-particularizing their conclusions.1056
Judges are often tasked with using their imaginations to fashion new legal
answers to problems arising from the functioning of new technology, all without
overstepping their constitutionally designated functions. The judiciary must rework the
materials of the common law to meet changed circumstances. Legal and institutional
legitimacy in the face of such renewal depends, in large measure, on judges expanding
the contours of law while “proclaiming fidelity to the past”. 1057 Unlike Internet
technology itself, developments in the law must be seen as continuous, not
disruptive.1058 Judges are also cautious when speaking of technology in order to prevent
the need to revisit their prior decisions and preexisting doctrinal framework and often
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choose to issue more narrow decisions to avoid the difficult jurisprudential questions
new technology can present."1059
4.6

Summary

As citizens of mature western democracies, we entrust our governments through
our laws to balance our needs for liberty and security. However, false ideas or false facts
by themselves are not illegal, and the dominant principle of the First Amendment is to
treat falsehoods with “benign neglect”.1060 The US constitution does not offer a defence
to defamation and American courts vary in opinion as to whether factual falsity is
protected speech.1061 For the most part the First Amendment shields people who make
false statements, even intentionally, in the public sphere.1062 Corporations like Google
and Facebook take the position that, whether designated as carriers, controllers,
accomplices or publishers in court decisions, they are engaged as innovators in the free
market. Therefore, any government constraints on those activities must be authorized
through the consent of the governed.1063
The constitutional framework of the EU, as embodied in the ECHR, similarly
offers protection for freedom of speech but does not pronounce as illegal statements that
are false or harmful per se.1064
The wider question addressed by this dissertation is whether the First
Amendment or EU law can protect false statements in a public forum such as a new
media site. One writer observes there exists very little public space online:
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17.12.2011.
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Because the vast majority of websites and social media sites are in private hands,
public space online, the equivalent of sidewalks and parks, which receive the
highest level of First Amendment protection, is next to nonexistent.1065
We shall address that question in Chapter V. With respect to ISP liability
discussed herein, those committed to reputational privacy are calling for a
reconceptualising of free speech values to remedy the fact that “unregulated ISPs, free
to engage in content discrimination or to steer user attention toward consumption,
oversee nearly all online expression.”1066
In summary, this chapter has shown that all levels of law are infused with
challenges as raised by the presence of the Internet. The following broader conclusions
relate those challenges to individual reputation: 1) the context of any impugned
publication is critical to outcome; 2) the importance in pre-Internet law of the
written/spoken distinction has become nuanced into a durability/ evanescence
distinction; 3) at the heart of EU and US differences over rights to reputational privacy
is the perception of individuals as either rights holders or as consumers; 4) increasingly,
the binary discrepancies between offline/online and public/private activities are losing
relevance when contemplating free speech or individual privacy;1067 5) Internet users
have little control over third party damage to their reputations, but they have
considerable power en masse when discrediting the reputation of others;1068 6) the legal
infrastructure varies from one jurisdiction to the next, creating a legal balkanization of
the Internet and frustrating attempts to formulate an international law of the Internet
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or even to enforce foreign judgments;1069 7) those discrepancies create expense, delay,
uncertainty of outcome, and little vindication when using traditional defamation law;
and 8) much of digital speech is so different in kind from offline expression that it is
time to consider either a discrete legal process or extra-legal solutions.
Three broader observations relate to the cases chosen for analysis in this
chapter: 1) private corporate action appears relatively immune from legal sanction as
Internet companies view monetary sanctions as just another cost of doing business; 2)
judiciaries on both sides of the Atlantic are struggling with the capabilities of new
media and how to fashion judgments that do more than shoehorning digital speech into
the timeworn legal categories created for an age of letters; and 3) despite a handful of
international conventions that address reputation within the context of privacy and
family life, those legal norms are not seeping down to regional or domestic judiciaries.
More specifically, in the sample cases considered, we have seen that 1) judges at
the trial and first appellate levels tend not to invoke broader legal principles as
contained in international legal instruments; 2) many older causes of action persist (such
as criminal defamation and insult laws) that prevent development of a uniform or
updated approach to reputational harm; 3) issues of jurisdiction and choice of law
require up-front resources as well as emotional investment for the plaintiff even before
the main contested principles can be heard; they also result in an uneven application of
the law across geopolitical borders; and 4) judges and legislators are often under
escalating pressure in both US and EU jurisdictions to recognize that digital speech is
different that offline communications and hence it calls for more innovative or separate
legal and extra-legal treatment.
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CHAPTER 5
5.0

“NEW LEGALITIES” AND OTHER SOLUTIONS

Introduction
There are calls to reconceptualize free speech values to remedy the fact that
unregulated Internet service providers (ISPs), free to engage in content
discrimination or to steer user attention toward consumption, oversee nearly all
online expression. It may well be time for such sweeping changes.1070

We have seen that legal responses offered by western democracies like the US
and EU have limited value in lowering our reputational risk. Like privacy, reputation is
of profound personal concern but, unlike privacy, law cannot seem to close a door to the
world and bring it back. Living online only complicates its vulnerability.

While

reputation forms our social currency without which our future is limited, legal minds
cannot arrive at a remedy to guarantee its recapture. As Goffman suggests, once
stigmatized, our social acceptance is permanently tarnished.1071 In light of its complex
nature (socially constructed but involving the private self, proprietary without
meaningful control, reliant on trust from the very people who judge) perhaps the best
law can do is to garner for us as much autonomy over its fate as society will allow, to
provide a little vindication as we reorder our diminished opportunities.
We have also seen that, in Europe, the Web 2.0 is viewed as a highly regulable
space; in America, it presents a mostly self-regulating marketplace for user-generated
content and consumerism. Due to the spillover of online information from one
geopolitical state to the next, those viewpoints must come to terms with one another
and often clash. Efforts to resolve those differences are increasingly pressured by
relentless technological innovation that keeps content control in the hands of Internet
companies.
In this chapter I examine two such efforts, one originating in the US and the
other within the EU, for the promise they hold for individuals to achieve meaningful
1070
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participation in that debate. I then move to other legal and extra legal suggestions for
addressing reputational stigma and conclude with a consideration of a solution
introduced in Chapter IV supra: whether digital speech might best be perceived as its
own language, subject to its own rules.1072
5.1

User-Focused Legal Initiatives
Two new instruments, one remedial and one preventative, mark efforts by

legislators in the EU and US to address another unique feature of Internet architecture,
its persistent memory. Both models offer a user-centric tool for individual Internet users
to control their online reputations. In the EU, the EUDR proposes erasure mechanisms
whereby data subjects can order the take-down by Internet companies of content the
data subject finds offensive or embarrassing, or the cessation of data collection and
retention that no longer has their consent.1073 In America, DNT legislation proposed in
some US legislatures exhibits the more ad hoc and sectoral approach of US lawmakers
and offers the Internet user (including children) the opportunity to proactively opt out
of certain data mining and commercial access to their digital tracks by commercial
agents. Those mechanisms will be compared for their effectiveness in addressing novel
retention and tracking issues posed by Internet and web architecture.
a

Erasure Laws: The European Harmonized Approach

i

A Brief Legislative History

The most significant precursor to the EUDR is the 95 Directive, so called
because of its introduction into the European Union in 1995, a time when both the
political stability of the EU and individual use of the Internet were in much earlier
states of their development. The total state membership of the EU was 15 that year,
with Austria, Finland and Sweden having just acceded to the union.1074 In 1995 “the
Net” was an emerging technology, desktop computers were suitcase-sized and
Compuserve was used to sign into USENET to get the daily news on the world wide
1072
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web: that dial-up process took about a minute.1075 The principal social medium was
email.
The 95 Directive was an important component of European privacy law and
human rights law, but it dealt very little with the Internet. Its objective was to provide
standardization of rules for all members of the EU regarding data collection by
governmental, commercial and other interests that could identify individual citizens of
the EU. That protection became particularly critical in the late 1990s as authorities
sought to harmonize practices across all Member States in order to protect personal
data as it was transmitted to any corner of the EU. To do so, the Directive set strict
limits on the collection and use of personal data and demanded that each Member State
set up an independent national body responsible for the protection of those data.1076
The 95 Directive, like all EU directives, was not a compulsory legal tool, but a
guideline for crafting domestic legislation. Its provisions were sufficiently languageneutral to accommodate ICT evolution. As membership in the EU grew into the new
millennium, and as collection and retransmission of personal data became more
autonomous and more technologically sophisticated, EU authorities looked for a more
effective regulatory tool that would reflect the two growing concerns of EU politicians:
a strong digital economy for all commercial interests, and enhanced privacy protection
for all EU citizens.
In January 2010, the European Commission proposed a reform of the EU's data
protection rules to make them “fit for the 21st century” by addressing the vastly
networked communications enabled by the Web, the Internet, and various applications
such as social media.1077 The EUDR sets out a general EU framework to meet that
objective. It aims at data protection for purposes of prevention, detection, investigation
or prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities.
To become law, the proposed EUDR must meet the approval of four
institutional authorities: the European Parliament, the European Commission, the
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European Council, and the Council of the EU.1078 The European Parliament gave the
regulation first reading on 14 March 2014 with 207 amendments to the original draft.
Still outstanding at this writing is final ratification by the European Parliament and
passage by the Council of the EU. The EUDR will crystalize into state law of the 28
EU Member States once approved, without need for further voting or ratification by
the domestic parliaments. Although over 3,000 changes to the current Directive are
under current review, the European Commission anticipates that it will be finalized and
passed by the end of 2015. It is then expected to take two years from that date for the
law to come into force.
In the interim, EU Member States are reviewing their data protection and
privacy laws to ensure they do not conflict in principle with the proposed EUDR. All
foreign countries and commercial interests that deal in any way with personal data of
EU citizens are now challenged to review their data collection laws and policies to aim
for compliance with the EUDR. The scope of the proposed legislation is very wide: it
will affect public and private sector businesses, large and small, all of whom must have
compliant in-house privacy and data protection regimes. Internet services are
particularly involved, as online collection and storage is the dominant method to deal
with personally identifying data.
ii

Scope and Significance

The EUDR is promoted by the European Commission as the most
comprehensive data protection tool in the world for meeting both individual and
corporate needs.1079 It deals with personal data that it defines as “any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person” or “data subject “.1080 More
specifically, an “identifiable person” is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
1078
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by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity” such as a name, a
photo, an email address, bank details, posts on social networking websites, medical
information, or a computer’s IP address.” 1081 The regulation applies if the data
controller or processor or the data subject is resident in the EU. Furthermore, and
unlike the current 95 Directive, the Regulation applies to organizations based outside
the EU if they process personal data of EU residents.
The EUDR states three policy objectives for businesses involved in the digital
economy: 1) a single pan-European regime for data protection;1082 2) application to all
foreign companies without preference; 1083 and 3) strong enforcement powers for
European regulators. 1084 Compliance is the responsibility of the “controller” of a
business, that is, the authority that determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data.1085 Small and medium sized businesses are predicted to
draw particular benefit from cost savings available when dealing with one law and one
data authority. Commercial interests will henceforth have a clear regulatory regime that
should contribute to the health of the online global market.
Individual users, as data subjects, stand to benefit in significant ways as well.
They include extended control of their own personal information once it is posted (or
data collected) online, thereby resolving the issue of who owns content once it appears
online. As well, in keeping with the principle of transparency, individuals’ data can only
be processed1086 with their consent, to protect their vital interests as the data subject,
for tasks carried out in the public interest, or in the exercise of official authority vested
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in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed.1087 A controller is
defined as the people or body, “which determines the purposes and the means of the
processing” both in the public and in the private sector. A medical practitioner, for
example, would routinely be the controller of the data processed on her clients that is
stored within her own firm’s medical record system; a company would be the controller
of the data regarding its clients and employees. The Google Spain CJEU decision
extends that responsibility to the Internet company that provides online access to such
data or general information.
Very stringent rules apply to processing sensitive data, that is, data relating to
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs trade union
membership, data concerning health or sexual preference. In principle, such data cannot
be processed. Exemptions include historical and scientific research, health and other
necessary institutional records, and journalistic coverage that serve the public interest.
Individual users are offered expanded rights of free erasure, 1088 rights of
notification of when and how their personal data will be used including its transfer to
third parties, 1089 rights to block contested data, 1090 restriction of the collection or
lengthy retention of sensitive data in relation to fundamental rights of privacy,1091
restriction of profiling,1092 general access to their own data,1093 its easy transfer between
service providers,1094 its general portability,1095 and the right to be notified of any
corporate data breaches in time to take appropriate action1096 (ie, to cancel credit cards
1087
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or order new government licenses).1097 A breach should be considered as adversely
affecting a data subject “where it could result in, for example, identity theft or fraud,
physical harm, significant humiliation or damage to reputation”.1098
Children merit particular attention when it comes to personal data, because
“they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation to
the processing of personal data.1099 A parent or legal guardian is required to authorize
such use where the child is under the age of 13. Exceptions are made for matters of
public interest, such as processing in the context of “preventative or counseling services
offered directly to the child.”1100
The enumerated rights of the data subjects are not absolute,1101 but can only be
suspended for the following purposes: to safeguard public security, including the
protection of human life including response to natural or man made disasters, the
prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, for breaches of ethics for
regulated professions, other specific and well-defined public interests of the EU or of a
Member State such as its important economic or financial interest, or the protection of
the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. The EUDR notes that all such
rights or restrictions should be in compliance with the ECHR. The EUDR would place
a reverse onus on the data controller to establish why data cannot be erased.
Erasure rights extend the most direct control of users over their data and have
created a great deal of media and academic interest.1102 Known historically (and in
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earlier drafts of the EUDR) as the “right to be forgotten” or, more historically still, le
droit a l’oubli, they are based on the data minimization principle that data controllers
must keep compilations of personal data to a minimum and remove any data when it is
not longer needed for the original purpose of its collection.1103 The Google Spain
decision particularizes that requirement to data that is inaccurate, inadequate,
irrelevant, or excessive for the purpose of the data processing.1104The controller must
respond to requests of the data subject within a reasonable deadline and give reasons if
the request is denied. 1105 Permissible reasons include for the fulfillment of contract
terms or other legal obligations.1106
The EUDR does not expressly define a right of erasure with respect to social
media, including user generated content, false and anonymous social networking posts,
or third party re-contextualized postings, that provoke reputational damage.1107 Any
mention of that aspect of forgetfulness is confined to explanatory notes in the many
public speeches promoting the EUDR,1108 in online news commentary,1109 and through
a growing interest on the part of academics.
In terms of the practical mechanics of asserting individual rights, erasure or
rectification requests can be made directly to Internet companies. Those agencies must
provide transparent and easily accessible and understandable information, including
procedures for submitting deletion requests and reasons should those requests be
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refused.1110 Data subjects hold a right of rectification of mistaken or otherwise faulty
personal data or information1111 either when (a) the data are no longer necessary in
relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; or (b) the
data subject withdraws consent for its collection or storage or the consent period has
expired. 1112 Data transfers and processing by law enforcement and judicial authorities
will have particularly strict guidelines, 1113 most notably in view of allegations by
Edward Snowden in 2013 of spying activities of US intelligence agencies on EU high
profile figures,1114 and of other NSA activities.1115
There is promise of a significant impact on user rights made by the combined
force of the 95 Directive, the clarification of its current scope in the Google Spain case,
and the user-directed provisions of the EUDR. Their combination should aid in shaping
an omnibus EU law with broad scope both inside and outside the EU that defines a
European model of data protection and Internet company liability. The broad strokes of
the EUDR are mostly backed up by domestic laws in each of the 28 Member States
already in place as inspired by the 95 Directive.
iii

Responses to EUDR with Respect to Reputation

Through the EUDR, the European Commission promotes three legal principles
that underlie the legitimacy and stability of the EU: transparency, proportionality, and
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legitimate purpose.1116 Within the context of data protection, the European Commission
explains transparency as the right of every European citizen to know how the European
institutions are collecting their data, who participates in that collection, and what
documents are held or produced. The right extends to accessing those documents and
making one’s views known, either directly, or indirectly, through intermediaries.1117
Proportionality generally involves regulating the exercise of powers by the EU. It seeks
to set within specified boundaries the actions taken by the institutions of the EU. Under
this principle, the involvement of the institutions must be limited to what is necessary
to achieve the objectives of the Treaty on European Union.1118 In other words, the
content and form of the action must be in keeping with the aim pursued.1119 Legitimate
purpose assumes that personal data will only be processed in accord with the provisions
of Article 7 of the 95 Directive.
Within the EU there is, predictably, resistance to the legislation as it is currently
drafted. Jan Philipp Albrecht, as vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s civil
liberties committee, has identified Germany’s concern with how the EUDR might erode
the sovereignty of the country’s powerful regions (Lander) in relation to the federal
government.1120 He notes both France and Germany are also sensitive to the idea that
data issues could be decided in the smaller member states with less established data
1116
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protection traditions. The United Kingdom is opposed to the entire EUDR document,
preferring that the EU adopt a new directive with members states who will bring it into
force in their own way similar to pending directives on nuisance callers and
spammers.1121
For American businesses involved in the use of personal data of EU citizens,
however, the EUDR provisions provide a considerable barrier to business as usual.
Provisions that most affect US businesses include 1) specified fines for noncompliance;1122 2) inclusion of data processing of personal data regardless of whether
the data belongs to persons EU citizens or residents and regardless of whether the
controller is resident in the EU;1123 3) the need to report to EU data supervisory
authorities any mass surveillance activities of the US government (as reported by
Edward Snowden) to receive supervisory permission in order to transfer such data;1124
and 4) the requirement that successful erasure requests are forwarded to third parties
that might control replications of the data.1125 The most controversial provision is (3)
above regarding government surveillance.
US litigants are already engaged in disputes over court orders by US judges
compelling the transfer of data out of the EU because one side argues that US law
requires the provision of certain evidence, and the other argues that doing so would
make its EU subsidiary or parent violate the applicable EU law. Such discrepancies are
expensive and time consuming for litigants. EUDR provisions will need to be
scrutinized to assure litigants that such procedural discrepancies are addressed. In this
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and a variety of other ways, American sources are the most vocal critics of the EUDR;
then again, the US has the largest stake in the digital economy with respect to its
Internet companies and collateral industries.
Regarding the practical details of individual take-down requests, an Internet
company’s procedure up to this point is to direct users with deletion requests to site
operators. For example, educators concerned with the defamatory details of a posting on
the Rate My Professors site would go to the “help” function on the
<http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/help.jsp> site and follow the instructions under
“Can I flag a comment or professor note that I think should be removed from your site?”
They will be asked to report any postings that contain, 1) profanity, name-calling,
derogatory remarks about

religion, ethnicity or race, physical appearance, mental

and/or physical disabilities; 2) references to a professor's sex life, including sexual
innuendos; 3) claims that a professor shows bias for or against a student or specific
group of students; 4) claims about a professor's employment status, including previous
employment; 5) claims that a professor engages or has engaged in illegal activities; and
6) accusations that the professor is rating him/herself or his/her colleagues; 1126
The website creators address liability for defamation to third parties with the
statement that all postings are opinion, not fact.1127 More recently, as the enactment of
the EUDR with its right of erasure seems more certain, Google and its video arm
YouTube are dedicating teams of administrators and paralegals to vet requests. Take
down requests from government agencies are not processed automatically unless
accompanied by court order.1128 Google raises in defence of its decision to deny a takedown request that the applications lack important detail, or that complete erasure of
content is technologically impossible or infeasible due to costs of tracking third party
use.1129 In general, Google staff review and categorize requests as defamation, copyright
1126
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infringement, or violence, and appear prepared to reveal the number of successful
requests but not the reasons.1130
As indicated earlier, the major concern over the EUDR provisions for erasure is
the quasi-judicial role bestowed on the few largest Internet companies.1131 Their staff
function as the first layer of authority to vet erasure requests from individual users. The
principle objection is that the key players in the Internet industry thereby become the
first line arbiters of online content, a distribution of power in opposition to that
anticipated by the promoters of the EUDR.1132 The only guidance provided by the
CJEU, through the Google Spain decision, is that the data subject’s rights should
override the interest of Internet users as a general rule, and that the balance of interests
should be determined on a case-specific basis.
Academic response to the passage of the EUDR has been generally
favourable, 1133 urging compliance by US Internet companies. 1134 Paul Schwartz
criticizes the EUDR initiative for, among other things, heightening individual rights of
privacy beyond those accepted in the US. Schwartz advocates diminishing the role of
the European Commission as the final arbiter of information privacy disputes under the
EUDR, primarily because of the US preference for self-regulation regarding
transborder data transmission.1135
down requests for 24,179 pieces of content by government around the world between July and
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1131
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In preparation for the EUDR, the current US-EU agreements concerning data
export involving EU residents are under review. The Safe Harbor provisions; Model
Contractual Clauses; 1136 and Binding Corporate Rules 1137 only require proof of
‘adequate’ data protection, a standard much lower than for other exporting countries.1138
For its part, the US has maintained that a combination of policy responses do provide
adequate data protection by combining to provide a type of collaborative ‘lawmaking’,
with compliance overseen by the FTC.1139
b

Do Not Track Laws: The US Sectoral Approach

The Do Not Track (DNT) policies in the US represent a different approach to
individual control over one’s online content: injecting FTC oversight into unauthorized
commercial access to a person’s digital tracks. Interestingly, the original guidelines
drafted for US government agencies in the 1970s were very similar to the current
EUDR provisions.
i

A Brief Legislative History

DNT policies were created to provide an easy mechanism for consumers to opt
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out of online tracking that led to targeted or behavioral advertising.1140 As indicated in
Chapter 3, tracking of our online activity involves targeters or advertising companies
contracting with online publishers to place a piece of tracking code on its site that, when
you visit the site, will inject cookies into your computer that enables digital tracking of
all the sites you visit or browse online.1141
In 2010, the FTC endorsed the concept of a universal browser-based DNT
signal that could be inserted into online services and programs. Much earlier, in the
1970s, the DNT concept was raised on a formal governmental basis by the US
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. At that time a voluntary Code of Fair
Information Practices was devised to form the backbone of a US privacy law model that
included data collection and use. The key policy points of the code were openness (no
secret personal data record keeping systems); disclosure to data subjects; no secondary
use of data without full disclosure to the data subject; ability of the data subjects to
correct false or outdated data; and assurance by collectors of the security of the stored
data against third party unconsented use. Many of those policies reflect provisions of
the draft EUDR.
While those principles were influential in formation of some state laws, no
overarching federal privacy law was ever developed covering public and private sector
data collection. Neither was there created a federal privacy commission unlike in the EU
and may commonwealth jurisdictions. The result has been a patchwork of laws with
many gaps.1142 For example, the federal Do Not Track Me Online Act,1143 introduced into
Congress in February of 2011 but never passed, was specifically targeting the blocking
of all collection of personal data for behavioral advertising purposes, with an exception
for fraud prevention and inventory control. The bill also authorized the FTC to create
nationwide regulations that required DNT technologies to be implanted into devices,
and to use random audits of web publishers as an enforcement mechanism. Five
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additional attempts have been made in the US to introduce similar legislation, most
invoking the FTC to set an ‘opt out’ regime for online tracking as well as other userdirected mechanisms to discourage third party tracking.1144
ii

Scope and Significance

Unlike the uniform approach to data protection and user control envisioned by
the EUDR, American DNT policy and legislative tools regarding information privacy
have proceeded in a much more ad hoc fashion. For example, there is one set of statutes
for the public sector and another for the private one. Further, US private sector
legislation distinguishes between types of data. The variety of US legislation governing
the regulation of data collection and transfer just at the federal level is wide: it could
involve the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021145 for the financial sector; 1146 the Financial
Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) 1147 to protect the privacy of
consumer information held by financial institutions; or the Economic Espionage Act of
1996.1148
On the state level, the passage of the California DNT legislation, The California
Online Privacy Protection Act, marks the first successful codification of DNT policies in
any US jurisdiction.1149 It requires any operator of a website, online service, or mobile
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application that collects personally identifiable information about California residents to
include DNT disclosures in its privacy policy. That disclosure would reveal any third
party tracking activities on the operator’s website and explain how the operator
responds to web browser DNT signals or other mechanisms used by individuals to stop
such tracking.1150 The Act does not require website operators to incorporate DNT
technologies into their sites or services nor does it require operators to respond to DNT
signals used by data subjects in a certain manner. If an operator does not respond to
such signals, it will suffice merely to indicate this fact in its privacy policy. The
legislation limits operator responsibility to setting forth its privacy policy in a separate
online location accessible by hyperlink. Once again, any active opting in or out is left to
the individual user. Should the operator violate any terms, it has 30 days from the time
of notice of the violation to comply or be subject to fines of up to $2500 per violation.1151
That fine is often justified by operators as the cost of doing business, so the California
Attorney General has clarified that each download of a non-compliant mobile
application constitutes a single violation.1152
A similar first step has been taken through the California The Student Online
Personal Information Protection Act 1153 regarding children’s rights of online erasure,
dubbed by the press as a youth “erasure button”.1154 The draft law stipulates that
websites and applications directed at children under 18 must allow registered users to
remove publicly posted content and make certain disclosures to those users. 1155 A
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a51c3fe0-98b8-4c2d-9035-01e32f2576e2. The
act is in the form of an amendment to the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003
(CaIOPPA).
1150
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users.
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website or application is directed to a minor (under 18) when it is “created for the
purpose of reaching an audience that is predominately comprised of minors, and is not
intended for a more general audience comprised of adults.”1156 A complete expunging is
not required: deleting the requested content from viewer accessible websites will suffice,
even though it remains on the operator’s servers in some form.1157
iii

Responses to DNT with Respect to Reputation

Internet researcher Adam Thierer characterizes the DNT mechanism as “a
browser-based tool that tells advertisers and other third parties not to follow us around
the Internet”.1158 In policy terms, he suggests the anti-tracking device transports the
EU data minimization principle to the US. Thierer warns, however, that such
technology proposed for California minors opens a back door for hackers or “others with
malicious intentions”. The uneven history of data protection in the US might be
attributed in some regards to the lack of uniform definition of online “tracking” as well
as government policy concerns about undermining commercial entities that rely on
behavioral tracking and subsequent advertising for economic survival.1159
As most online activities are free to the consumer, commercial interests argue
that behavioral advertising is carrying the weight of the digital economy. That pull
between individual privacy expectations and the economic wisdom of the market
overshadows transnational efforts to reach agreement on the legal efficacy of antitracking. A prominent example is the lack of direction in the wake of the 2012 meeting
in Amsterdam between the European Commission’s top privacy panel, the Article 29
Working Group, and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) a global standards
group that promotes good governance of the Internet.1160 The talks foundered on what
types of user data advertisers should be allowed to collect while respecting the right of
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consumers to “simply and effectively declare their ‘do not track’ preferences on Web
sites.”1161
Advertisers express concern that EU regulation could diminish the amount of
free information that users access on the Internet and could “create incentives for online
companies to erect pay walls and lead to more shotgun forms of advertising.”1162 As US
data collection regulator, the FTC has contributed to the conflict by exempting Internet
companies, including Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Apple, from tracking oversight
in 2011, arguing consumers gave implicit consent to data collection by signing up for
their services. In the EU, regulators perceive that tracking is illicit in any form without
the data subject’s consent. Such discrepancies could lead to a “two-track do-not-track
system” which makes cross-Atlantic compliance costly and perpetuates choice of
jurisdiction issues – none of which helps either side.1163
A critical impediment to the success of DNT policies is public confusion or
ignorance regarding tracking policies. Two studies have found that individual users are
not aware of such data protection measures in the US. The Hoofnagle study found that
almost 66% of American Internet users have never heard of DNT.1164 The 2012 study
additionally determined that a significant number believed their activities online were
protected by strong privacy laws, but could not provide details when asked, a failing
that raises doubt about the viability of the notice-and-choice process and the ability (or
willingness) of individual users to make informed opt out choices.
An earlier US study by McDonald and Peha similarly reported that a wide gap
existed between the capabilities of DNT technology and the expectations of users.1165
While users currently have a choice of total blocking of all advertising data collection
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(opt out) or only those selected by the user (HTTP cookies), most participants of the
McDonald study were unaware of the difference, and believed if they chose a DNT
option all of their personally identifying information was deleted all of the time.
McDonald found participants to be naïve about more aggressive data mining
technologies as well, such as flash cookies1166 (that evade the opt-out settings) and cache
cookies (that store webpage history for fast retrieval). 1167 As users become more
knowledgeable about DNT technologies, advertisers become more creative in their
innovations for data collection, igniting the semblance of a virtual “arms race”.1168
The key concern for researchers was the users’ imbalance of technological savvy.
For example, when users delete cookies believing they are erasing data collection
capabilities of advertisers, the McDonald study determined that they are often deleting
the opt-out function instead.1169 The study concluded that users do not have a nuanced
understanding of DNT technology; about 25% expected they would be exempt from all
commercial tracking by merely clicking a DNT option and a further 50% believed they
were completely exempt from any tracking (commercial or government or private)
simply by choosing one of the options available. When informed such expectations were
not valid, those users displayed a general distrust so eroded in the opinion of the
researchers that “there may not be many options for engagement left.”1170
Public ignorance of DNT capabilities is troubling, particularly to the FTC. In
2010 it promoted three priorities its staff determined would move users closer to
informed choices for protection: greater industry transparency, privacy by design at
every stage of product development, and implementation of greater consumer choice
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and hence control through such mechanisms as DNT tools.1171 In a follow-up report in
2012, the FTC reported have brought enforcement actions against 1) Google and
Facebook for failing to gain express consent of users before changing their data
practices;1172 2) online advertising networks that failed to honor opt outs; 3) mobile
applications that violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act; 4) applications that
set privacy settings in a way to cause consumers to unwittingly share their personal
data; and 5) companies that sold consumer lists to advertisers in violation of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.1173 The FTC further announced it would increase vigilance against
de-anonymizing activities of companies, and against information brokers who buy,
compile, and sell highly personal information about consumers but never interact with
them. 1174 The 2012 Report sets the following future goals: intensified DNT
implementation; increased privacy initiatives by mobile service companies; increased
access by consumers to information about them held by data brokers; and the creation of
sector-specific privacy codes of conduct.1175
Not all major browsers and web servers are on board, however, foretelling a
possible regulator-industry clash. Yahoo! announced in May 2014 its intention not to
honour DNT customer requests, and to disable web browser DNT settings, primarily
due a lack of a single, easy-to-use standard that has been adopted “by the broader tech
industry.”1176 Google has “opted out” of DNT policies as well.1177 Facebook similarly
announced its decision to dishonour DNT browser settings in June of 2014, except for
iOS (Apple) and Android devices, and to employ its ‘like’ function for subscriber
tracking- all because of a lack of industry consensus.1178 AOL followed in August of
1171
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2014.1179 Other industry leaders are more compliant: one source reports that 12 percent
of Firefox users around the world have opted into Mozilla’s DNT program, that
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Apple’s Safari now block many cookies by default,
and that most mobile devices, including the iPhone, don’t allow use of cookies in its
applications.1180 The initiative taken by Microsoft and Apple raises the stakes in the
debate, accelerating protests from advertising industry associations. Those actions
nevertheless fall far below the expectations of the FTC for a nationwide program to
gain some control over behavioral tracking.
The principal advantage for industry (and challenge for the FTC) is that, in the
legislative vacuum created by the inability of Congress to agree on a uniform DNT law,
major Web companies and intrepid start-ups are offering “personalized services” that
streamline web searches and allow portability between personal devices,1181 generally
through cookie alternatives that are getting smarter and more difficult to spot or
disable.1182 Start-up companies add new meaning to the word “interoperability” by
selling tracking devices that can link smartphones, tablets, personal computers and even
Internet-connect televisions to an autonomous entity that uses algorithms to sift
through their programs for IP addresses, browsing patterns, and buying preferences.1183
The resultant cross-device advertising illustrates the relentless surge of innovation
when regulation falters or becomes entrenched in only one game plan.
c.

Can the EU and US Agree on Data Protection Mechanisms?

Unlike the influence US policies confer in the areas of copyright, net neutrality,
and cybercrime, information privacy policies are being set by a combination of US and
EU initiatives. The good news about both the EU and US mechanisms is in its message
to legal, political, and civic sectors that governments are proactive in their response to
1179
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digital invasive practices. Policy setters have erected privacy infrastructures that, in
principle, provide a backdrop against which Internet users can react. Until recent
successes with movement towards some consensus over passage of the EUDR, the gap
in cooperation between EU and US authorities did not look likely. Industry leaders have
begun to comply with the implementation of the EU model, however, due in large
measure to their impatience with the lack of progress with the federal US model,
coupled with the forceful Google Spain characterization of Internet companies as
“controllers” with direct liability.
One potential outcome of the EU-US differences in data protection policies is for
each jurisdiction to go its own way. That do-nothing option appears practically
unworkable for a few reasons. One of the practical impediments to perpetuating the
status quo involves the expense and frustration of the simple act of getting disclosure for
litigation. In cases involving the cross border transmission of personal data, US
requirements are much wider, calling on litigants to produce any requested information
under their control without regard to whether the information originated in the US or
elsewhere or to whose private information they are disclosing.1184 EU regulations,
meanwhile, prohibit the transfer to the US of data on its citizens that originates within
its borders because it has determined that the US lacks adequate data protection
standards. 1185 The resulting EU-US safe harbor arrangement, 1186 by which US
companies may voluntarily increase their level of data protection in order to conduct
data exports involving EU citizens, creates problems for a smooth and predictable
sharing of disclosure. Legal compliance in one jurisdiction means noncompliance in the
other.
Another impediment is the difference in evidence gathering for private law cases.
Under the common law (US), evidence is gathered by both parties and presented to the
opponents during pre-trial discovery. In civil law jurisdictions, including many EU
Member States, the judge determines which evidence is necessary and collects that
evidence, including taking witness statements. While those differences are not
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insurmountable, they give fundamental messages about who conducts the release of
personal information in each legal system and call on special procedures that are not
automatic and hence that create uncertainty, additional costs, and frustration for the
parties.
US adoption of the EU model would clearly provide the least expensive answer
to the compliance issue. The EUDR is in the final preparatory stages: it has been
approved by the European Parliament and awaits final amendments. One proposed
change by the Italian EU Presidency that is being given serious consideration adds
further enticement for US authorities to consider adopting more EU-like practices. It
involves the granting of binding decision-making to a centralized EU data protection
Board with arbitration powers if data protection measures cannot be worked out at the
local level by Member State authorities.1187 US Internet industries look upon this as
streamlining their information flow activities into “one stop shopping”. That means
businesses operating across the 28-nation EU would have to deal only with the data
protection authority in the country where they are headquartered, even if alleged
mishandling of data affects citizens in another country. That new feature makes the
EUDR more palatable to US companies in terms of cost in data mobility, a factor that
could be quite persuasive as the US DNT model founders.1188.
In introducing its Privacy Bill of Rights in 2012 that urged a comprehensive
nationwide DNT program, the White House indicated America’s intention of pursuing
its own course in regulating the flow of personal data.1189 Less than two years later, the
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program is perceived as seriously log-jammed.1190 The formal mechanisms are in place:
the Commerce Department has been tasked with creating enforceable policies, the FTC
has queued up as nationwide enforcer, and the advertising industry has agreed to
support DNT.1191 The inherent flaw in moving DNT forward is that, even with DNT
technology as part of online systems, users might still need to initiate them, a
requirement that calls for user understanding of the basic mechanics of opting out and
privacy settings. In some ways we are back to the notice and choice model whose
uneven application led to the formation of DNT policies in the first place. In the vacuum
created by the slow development of a federal DNT regime, state legislators are devising
their own privacy laws in many sectors, a development that localizes the law on data
privacy in the US, just as national laws in EU Member States have threatened to
‘balkanize’ Internet regulation across the EU.1192
As Thierer observes more broadly, “information control has always been
complex and costly”, 1193 increasingly so as expanding ways to steal, invade, and
manipulate stores of personal data or posted content challenge government efforts to
maintain free access and minimum regulation of online spaces.
5.2

New Legal Responses
a

Internet Companies as Controllers: Google Spain

With the long-awaited Google Spain decision, the CJEU achieved two things that
had a major impact on individual control of online personal information. It judged
Internet companies to be “controllers” of such information with respect to data
1190
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-on-privacylaw.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
1191
Id.
1192
State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, National Conference Of State Legislatures (NCSL) (23
Jan. 2014) http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/state-laws-related-to-internet-privacy.aspx (outlining how schools can collect
student data, how websites post privacy policies, how to protect readers’ online purchasing
choices, how to get personal information held by ISPs, how to require employers to give notice
before monitoring employee email, and tightening up warrantless police searches of cellphone
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involving EU citizens or for Internet companies offering services in EU Member States.
Being identified as a controller meant liability for data misuse that threatened individual
user’s reputational privacy. It also granted unprecedented autonomy to individuals
regarding the collection, processing, leakage, and mobility of that information.
Prior to the CJEU decision, take-down requests were limited. The head of
Google in the United Kingdom admits they were only successful if they referred to
information deemed illegal by a court (such as defamation), pirated content (once
Google was notified by the right's holder), malware, child sexual abuse imagery and
other things prohibited by local law (such as material that glorifies Nazism in
Germany).1194 The large number of US victims of data mishandling had no recourse;
FTC sanctions against major offenders did not have any impact on individual cases of
exposure and litigation would have been far too expensive unless class actions were
pursued, a long and costly undertaking with uncertain outcomes.
Control of the individual over her personal information was limited in other
ways. People did not know what data identifying them was being collected, profiled, or
shared with other institutional third parties. For example, medical information from
laboratory tests or clinical trials is frequently sold to pharmaceutical companies in
formats that can be de-anonymized. That practice has received legal recognition by the
US Supreme Court in its 2014 Sorrell decision.1195 People also were unaware of all the
agencies and businesses that were collecting their data or when their stored data was
subjected to hacking, loss, negligent handling, or other activities that jeopardized their
privacy. If leaks, exposure or loss occurred, there was little recourse that compensated
the data subject. If a victim of negligent or ruthless data use became aware of such
exposure, there were no intermediaries she could appeal to for information, damage
control, or compensation.
This lack of transparency hid the extent and acceleration of the exposure
problem: an IBM study in 2013 revealed that American companies are attacked an
average of 16,856 times a year, and that many of those attacks result in a quantifiable
1194
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data breach.1196 A pictograph of the world’s biggest breaches and hacks (see APPENDIX
B, pictogram 2) indicates the size of such breaches in 2014 alone: Adobe (152 billion
accounts); JP Morgan Chase (76 billion); Ebay (145 billion); Target (70 billion); Gmail
(5 billion); and AOL (2.4 million). 1197 With today's data moving freely between
corporate networks, mobile devices, and the cloud, data breach statistics show this
disturbing trend is rapidly accelerating. Affixing ISP and Internet company liability,
along with a more structured and international data collection regulatory regime, is one
answer being pursued on the international level.
b

Reputational Injury as a Tort

The creation of a new tort of reputational injury has definite appeal. It might
more adequately provide remedies for personal exposures.1198 A new reputation law
might serve several needs: 1) it could force courts to clarify reputation as a societal
value and a legal concept; 2) it would sharpen distinctions between various types of
reputational harm (exposure versus disclosure) so that suitable remedies might be more
adequately fashioned; 3) it would allow courts to more closely monitor the means-end
relationship between harm and liability; 4) it might clarify the distinction, if any,
between defamation and the false light privacy cause of action. The latter would
particularly reduce the amount of claims pleaded in the alternative and hence reduce
court costs and delays. Such a proposal could also increase the seriousness with which
reputational suits are perceived and call for clearer thinking on the discrete nature of
online reputational damage. A new law of reputational injury could also expand legal
analysis on how the First Amendment might be modified in its application for new
media cases in view of a lack of institutional mediation and other indications that digital
speech might be a unique species of communication.
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c

A Discrete Law for Digital Speech
i

A Critical Need

Creating a separate legal space for digital speech is another response that
addresses the unique ability of online messaging to put another person’s reputation at
risk. Such a proposal recalls the contrary opinions of Justice Frank Easterbrook of the
US Court of Appeals1199 upon the emergence of the law of the Internet: that it made
about as much sense as creating a law of the horse.1200 He found such a proposal
frivolous because the need would be based on technology, not on norms or industry.1201
Easterbrook’s objection was the unattainability of legal principles for a subject that is so
rapidly evolving:
[W]hat I do know will be outdated in five years (if not five months!); and my
predictions about the direction of change are worthless, making any effort to
tailor the law to the subject futile.1202
He also objected on the grounds that the law of the computer smacked of dilettantism:
it was without serious subject matter and was an attempt to use clairvoyance to
decipher the future: 1203
Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make about new
technology, are highly likely to be false. This should make us hesitate to
prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The blind are not good
trailblazers.1204
Lawrence Lessig rebutted Easterbrook’s objections stating that, essentially, cyberspace
was a discrete entity and the need for cyberlaw an example of legal exceptionalism as
1199
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determined by the intricacies of computer code and the digital market.1205 Andrew
Murray of the London School of Economics believes we have not met Easterbrook’s
objections head on because we continue to use “the language and rhetoric of social
policy, sociology and political philosophy,” such as the literature of communications
theorists like Manuel Castells and the philosophical thinking of Michel Foucault. In
other words, “[w]e become social scientists not lawyers.” 1206
Despite those objections, the Internet has several idiosyncrasies that recommend
separate legal treatment for the language used in digital spaces, most of which reference
technological capacity but all of which shape human behavior online. New media
communications can be, for example, immediate and spontaneous; truncated and filled
with digital semaphore,

1207

unmediated; internationally accessible; consensually

anonymous and interactive;1208 archived in perpetuity and with no entry costs.1209 Of
those qualities, three particularly raise issues of free speech – the spontaneity of
messaging that results in fragmented speech; the anonymity of messages that
encourages incivility; and the ability for permanent archiving with indeterminate third
party access. All three factors can exacerbate our reputational risks that warrant direct
legal protection. For example, posted or texted content can inform, alert, persuade, or
convert. Those are positive attributes that advertisers and reputational management
firms count on. On the other hand, content can confound the recipient or judge in that
translation is needed to decode the cryptic terms of regular users. It is its own language.
The very complexity of determining whether offending content is defamatory, a
breach of confidentiality, or a privacy offence within traditional categories of law
illustrates the non-traditional nature of online communications. For example, is a
YouTube video that harms your good name actionable as libel or slander? What about
the reader commentary displayed below the video? If you did not post the video but are
the subject of its contents, can you claim a proprietary interest in the video? Is texting
an abbreviated form of writing or speaking?
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Linguist John McWhorter of Columbia University suggests texting and other
digital messaging is more speaking than writing. “Texting isn’t written language,” he
claims, “[i]t much more closely resembles the kind of language we’ve had for so many
more years: spoken language.”1210 Why not write like we speak, McWhorter proposes,
— looser, more casual, telegraphic, and less reflective? Primarily, he answers, because
we haven’t had the right tools. Pencils, typewriters, even computers were too slow to
keep up with the pace of human speech. The speed and convenience of the mobile phone
or tablets could achieve it. “Fingered speech” is developing its own form and vocabulary;
it does not measure a decline in written speech but an evolution of a new means of
communication. McWhorter gives as example the changing nuances of the acronym
“lol”. Its original literal translation was “laughing out loud,” but with use it has adopted
a subtler meaning as demonstrated in a texting exchange McWhorter observed between
two 20-something college students:
Susan: lol thanks gmail is being slow right now
Julie: lol, i know
Susan: i just sent you an email
Julie: lol, i see it 1211
McWhorter sees “lol” becoming something far subtler than laughing out loud or
“loving you lots”. “It’s a marker of empathy of accommodation,” he notes, what linguists
call a “pragmatic particle,” like the word “yo.” Another practicality is the recently
minted acronym “TLDR” which is a disclaimer-type reference to a text that is “too long,
didn’t read” or the use of a forward slash (/) to indicate the author is changing topic. In
some ways, texting resembles Pitman shorthand, an American transcribing system from
the 1950s that few would argue should be taken for a written code, not a standard form
of communication. It was semaphoric in style and economic in its abbreviation of words
through symbols. For judges or jurors to be tasked with finding criminal intent or the
civil standard of liability in such fragments would seem akin to deciphering a unique
code or language.
As well as exhibiting a different form and more nuanced messaging, digital
speech contains its own cultural coding. Words or images that might not offend in one
1210
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culture or religion could vilify in another. That provides another challenge for anyone
who attempts a legal response to impulsive, emotionally charged digital speech. Takedown requests of Internet companies track that standard setting most frequently. For
example, the Turkish government demanded YouTube remove videos posted by Greek
soccer fans who claimed Turkish player Kemal Ataturk was gay; YouTube agreed to its
removal from Turkish access but allowed its dissemination in other countries where
wider tolerance of sexual practices is the norm. France and Germany outlaw any speech
that even hints at holocaust denial or that promotes Nazism; America seems more
tolerant of hate speech as long as it is not dangerous or incites violent behavior. As
Jeffrey Rosen summarizes,
the American First Amendment tradition…allows speech to be banned only
when it is intended—and likely—to incite imminent violence or lawless action.
By contrast…European law draws a tighter line, prohibiting so-called group
libel, or speech that offends the dignity of members of a protected class and
lowers their standing in society.1212
Rosen characterizes decisions regarding protected online speech differently from one
side of the Atlantic to the other: Americans, he observes, are guided by democracy,
Europeans by civility.
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the provision in the EUDR that places
erasure decisions in the hands of Internet company staffers effectively bestows judiciallike power. Such “delete squads” 1213 are tasked with vetting takedown requests
primarily by studying the language used in all its nuances and interpretations.1214
Jeffrey Rosen has studied the basis for such takedown decisions and has determined they
are based on arbitrary criteria that are not necessarily conveyed to the individual
applicant. He reveals that delete squads have settled on accepting content that targets
institutions, such as churches and governments, but not groups or their members. To
1212
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state “I hate the Pope” is acceptable under those guidelines; to say “I hate Muslims or
Jehovah’s Witnesses” is not.1215 In essence and practice, then, those new delete squads
are a law unto themselves.1216 Further, they need not give reasons for their decisions,
other than to ensure that they align with internal policies and data retention laws.
Devising a law of digital speech would mean expanding on all of the above
possibilities of language, a feat that could call on linguists and other language
specialists. It would find resources in a variety of experiences, from UN debates to
cryptography practices, from those who analyze hate speech to interpreters of signing
or online flaming. All participants in such a legal system would need to keep an open
mind regarding the cultural histories that certain words carry. As the ECtHR advised in
the 1976 British obscenity case, Handyside v. United Kingdom,
Freedom of expression...is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but
also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the
population.1217
A law of digital speech might be as obscure as a law of the horse. In the spirit of
innovation that spawned the cyberworld, however, we could engage those in the
emerging field of social media studies with constitutional experts, linguists, systems
languages, and others with a professional interest in decoding social media speech. An
auspicious starting place would be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for its
pronouncement that,
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” (emphasis
added)1218
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ii

Aim, Scope, and Form of Digital Law

If we were to design a law to deal with digital speech vis a vis the protection of
reputation, what features would it have? We would have to ensure, firstly, that such a
law acknowledges that individual reputation has social capital, that is, worth in the eyes
of one’s entire community and that its misuse would have has implications both societal
and personal. In terms of the scope of the law, the model would focus on human activity,
not technological possibilities. Unlike the myriad EU regulations and directives, as well
as the various national and state laws in the US that focus on digital technologies, a
critical feature of a Digital Speech Law would be its regard for individual rights (to
Internet access, to free speech online, to speech format) while setting out responsibilities
(to self-educate regarding the legal limits of self speech, to consider digital spaces in the
spirit of community stewardship, etc). It would address conduct beyond what ethical
guidelines would do but would stop short of regulating the particularities of speech
defined by culture or geography. Available defences or excuses would arise from those
limits. Such a law could incorporate national, regional, and international laws
addressing those rights and responsibilities.
In terms of the particular aim and scope of the law, the mandate of judges,
mediators or other directing figures would be to seek a deeper understanding of what
constitutes a welcoming and respectful online communicative environment, to place that
determination as much as possible in the hands of the individual participants, and to
create a tone of edification and leniency, not one of exacting retribution so prevalent in
today’s private law solutions. They could achieve this objective by pursuing clarity of
meaning over certainty of word choice.1219 Context would be critical. In order to avoid
dictating that context, lawmakers would need to take a page from their policymaking
colleagues who strive for technologically neutral language when drafting technology-
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focused law: they would use “linguistically neutral” or “culturally neutral” language as
much as possible. This law would foster a certain expertise in digital speech for judges,
mediators, or other facilitators who direct the process. There is precedent in arbitrators
of labour disputes or jurists involved in drug courts or mental health courts who accrue
special knowledge. This law, and those professionals, would not address immoral or
treasonous acts already captured through criminal laws or insult laws. They would not
concern themselves with reputational risks posed by government institutions that are
already addressed by government oversight bodies. They would deal with offending
behavior between individuals, not between individuals and commercial entities as is the
object of data protection and anti-tracking laws. In furtherance of that aim, the law
would be silent on the role of Internet or Web companies regarding their respective
liability for the content they transmit.1220 That would avoid a judge or mediator having
to deal with duties to disclose anonymous contributions and sources.
In terms of procedure, the model would require cheap and quick entry into the
legal process so that reputational damage could be speedily suppressed to stem
unending or unquantifiable third party regeneration online. We would frame the
problem within the private law system, distinct from so-called cybercrimes against the
state that are already addressed by national laws in western states. Determination of
choice of law and jurisdiction issues up front would be important in reducing
uncertainty and expense. A hierarchy of non-acceptable online behavior might be
devised, correlated with the risk or loss to which the plaintiff has been subjected.
Alternatively, the judge or mediator could work in each case to have the parties
determine their own hierarchy within their particular normative circumstances.
Remedies would incorporate the reasonable wishes of the plaintiff, modified by
input from community sources or other expertise. While aiming for a speedy resolution
to diminish cost and the further publicity affecting reputation, the law would canvass a
variety of remedies that do not commodify reputation by placing a dollar on one’s good
name. There would be the recognition of aggravating circumstances for a defendant
trying the plaintiff in the court of public opinion prior to legal process. One innovative
remedy would be to have the defendant pay for reputational management services of the
1220
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plaintiff if the online damages so warranted. Another would be to order the defendant to
produce an online posting that not only recanted his offending accusations but that
extolled the particular virtues or successes of the maligned plaintiff, all subject to the
plaintiff’s consent and review. Such remedy would meet the concern of privacy scholar
Helen Nissenbaum that personal information ought to be distributed and protected
according to norms governing distinct social contexts, whether it be workplace, health
care, schools, or among family and friends.1221
With respect to the function of the law in relation to other laws involving
cyberspace, the lawmakers might consider Karniel’s more liberalist position that the
Internet is a new playing field for freedom of expression and such spontaneous,
anonymous expression has very little significance or reliability in proving harm to one’s
reputation in the absence of a consideration of the “totality of circumstances”.1222
5.3

Extra-legal Responses
a

Online Civic Monitoring

Ideally, Internet content hosts could serve a function similar to real time social
conveners or impresarios of information. University of Cornell communications
professor Tarleton Gillespie is advancing a similar idea when he speaks of Google and
MySpace as “curators of public discourse” in that their technologies mediate between
various sectors of online community. Those sectors include individual users, advertisers,
major media producers it hopes to have as partners, and policymakers.1223 “Community”
is used here in its broadest sense to indicate an interacting population of various kinds
of individuals considered collectively, especially in the context of social values and
responsibilities. 1224 Content hosts serve as intermediaries in assembling those
communities, by intervening in the delivery of content, cultivating relationships,
1221
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serving advertisers, and distinguishing between user generated content and advertising
content - all the while striving to remain neutral.1225 Its services must be simultaneously
specific and flexible, “anticipatory but not causal”,1226 and must appeal to all users as
egalitarian and democratizing in order to garner wide participation. 1227 It is that
neutral, anticipatory role that web hosts can fulfill by monitoring what serves civic
interests without defaming them or exposing their most personal data.
Alternatively, web hosts can provide a platform for such communities to
comingle amongst those of like interest without host intervention. Ardia points out
that, even in the absence of legal liability, many online communities are “experimenting
with various forms of dispute resolution procedures and reputation management
systems”.1228 No longer confined to a shared space or time, but acting in a decentralized
and independent manner to safeguard a shared value, such community members need
not know one another, subscribe to larger ideologies, share a language, or identify
themselves to each other in order to effectively monitor online space to protect
reputations. Communities can also be fluid, coming together once, over one issue, and
then dissolving.
A prominent example of such ad hoc communities is a large group of Facebook
subscribers who united online to protest changes to privacy terms of service by both
Facebook and the photo sharing website Instagram.1229 Those two companies had
introduced into their privacy policies their intention to connect users with each other, or
with advertisers, in order to promote wider advertising potential.1230 In 2009, without
forewarning subscribers, Facebook executives decided to advance that scheme by
claiming ownership of personal content posted on its site that had been provided by
subscribers when they first created a personal profile.1231 Facebook justified its move as
1225
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an attempt to intensify subscribers’ social networking by linking users who shared
interests, birthplaces, consumer tastes, and other indicators of community. The ad hoc
community of protesters held Facebook to account for invasion of privacy and
manipulation of its informational property. 1232 Facebook retreated under that
community’s pressure.
Instagram, now owned by Facebook, tried a more far-reaching strategy in 2012
when it sold images posted by its subscribers to advertisers without users’ consent.
Many photographs contained images of children. Users objected to the loss of privacy
and disclosure of personal information.1233 In response, Instagram initiated an opt-out
privacy setting that relied on user initiative to set privacy boundaries. Instagram CEO
Kevin Systrom explained the company’s strategy through an example: Instagram might
promote a brand X and show Facebook visitors which of their friends already follow
Brand X, blurbs that could include their user name and avatar. Systrom reassured
Instagram subscribers that they still “own their content and Instagram does not claim
any ownership rights over your photos.” 1234 Instagram followed that gaffe with a
verification scheme in 2014: subscribers were notified that, unless their posted
photographs were to be accompanied by an arrow, they would be deleted. The arrow of
“verification” was obtained by clicking on an icon that, when clicked to reveal a drop
down page, displayed accounts similar to theirs. That scheme appeared to have little to
do with deletion prevention and much to do with trying to generate a list of users with
shared interests, presumably to sell to advertisers.1235
Both examples illustrate the potential of communities to change industry
practices where their privacy is concerned. Such communities of power might be
2009 virtual assembly of interest groups like “Students Against Facebook News Feeds” that
totaled 700,000 Internet users to protest Facebook’s launch of News Feeds. That feature
presented a start page listing of every act undertaken by a Facebook subscriber’s friends each
time the subscriber logged on to the system.)
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limited in their influence, however, due to economies of scale. As an analyst with a
private research group advising on disruptive technologies comments, “There’s not a lot
of portability. Where would you go?”1236 To its credit, Facebook is presenting the
incident as a learning moment, and has committed to a set of Principles it created and
submitted to subscribers for comment. The company pledges to let its community of
members vote on contentious practices that affect them.1237
Former Microsoft social media researcher dana boyd sees these movements as
far more complex and involving several communities of interest. In the following
excerpt, for example, she identifies five such communities that have been affected by
Facebook’s 2009 gaffe:
The disconnect between average users [community #1] and the elite [community
#2] is what makes this situation different, what makes this issue messier.
Because the issue comes down to corporate transparency, informed consent, and
choice…I think that it’s important that the techno-elite and the bloggers
[community #3] and the journalists [community #4] keep covering this
topic…[W]e also have to contend with the fact that most people being screwed
don’t speak English [community #5] and have no idea this conversation is even
happening. Especially when privacy features are only explained in English.
[content in brackets added]1238
Boyd makes a call to arms to each of the above communities to “challenge Facebook to
live up to a higher standard, regardless of what we as individuals may gain or lose from
their choices.”1239 She also takes it upon herself as an elite user “to make sure that
everyone is informed and actively engaged in a discussion about the future of
privacy.”1240
The community David Ardia envisions has no need of a formal legal apparatus to
protect online reputation. Community players assume a central role in community
governance because they are often in a position to recognize and respond to reputational
harms, a more engaged and influential force than individual subscribers acting alone.
Ardia suggests that we enlist their help, through social incentives, to mitigate
1236

Rebecca Lieb as cited in Wortham, supra fn 1232.
Tom Spring, Dawn of a Facebook Democracy? Users Invited to Shape Site’s Policies, PCWORLD,
(26 Feb. 2009) http://www.pcworld.com/article/160314/facebook.html.
1238
Dana boyd, Quitting Facebook is pointless: challenging them to do better is not, Apophenia Blog
(23 May 2010) http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/23/quitting-facebook-ispointless-challenging-them-to-do-better-is-not.html/comment-page-1.
1239
Id.
1240
Id.
1237

280

reputational harm while maintaining an environment “conducive to public engagement
and vigorous debate.”1241
b

Online Reputation Ranking Systems

Another community-based approach to safeguarding reputation is to ensure the
reliability of reputational information we read online rather than trying to impose legal
liability. There exists a community of websites devoted to that task: large-scale wordof-mouth networks.1242 EBay, for example, was designed with a built-in review system
so that its buyers and sellers could review or assess each other and hence build trust in
certain participants and in various products. 1243 Within that system, by adding
commentary as either buyer or seller, we designate select websites as our online
communities for that particular purpose. Amazon, another reputational rating system,
goes one step further by permitting buyers to rate the choices of others. Netflix
provides similar rating opportunities, for either one’s own movie choices or for those of
other users within the same household. Xbox Live, a gaming site, rates gamers against
the performance of other gamers using scoreboards in order to reward them and help
them find opponents with similar skill levels. Until the summer of 2014, the website
Technorati served as a rating system for blogs in various subject areas.1244 Rating
systems have been democratized in the sense that many online activities in which we
participate call for user ratings: examples include rating requests (Rate and Review your
shopping experience, service experience, viewing experience, etc.) sent to purchasers of
e-books through Google and Amazon, recipients of online technical help at Apple, and
online conferences, podcasts, or courses we experience.
Chrisanthos Dellarocas of Boston University’s School of Management suggests
such reputation management systems fulfill four primary roles: 1) they build trust in the
reputation of another person by encouraging positive behaviors and discouraging
1241
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negative ones within a site; 2) they filter high quality content from lesser content; 3)
they attempt to neutralize or even out a wide array of subjective contributions or
products; and 4) they “lock in” users who have established a reputation and loyalty
through their contributions to a particular site.1245 A reputation system must decide
which behaviors it wishes to feature; that will determine the information it will collect
to promote that message. For a professor, for example, those behaviors relate to the
three components considered for promotion and tenure: teaching, research, and service.
Institutions such as universities employ websites to build both institutional and
individual reputations. They participate in a reputation system that evaluates their
ranking and value system among professors. The choice and placement of information
on faculty websites signal what factors are of most value to the university or faculty.
For example, a professor’s degrees are usually listed prominently on her homepage, as
are areas of research and courses taught. Should the professor hold a particular research
chair or have been granted a major funding allocation, additional esteem is signaled
within the professional community by announcements on the website. Individual faculty
webpages list a professor’s publications; research areas are also listed. Both build the
professor’s scholarly reputation while building institutional reputation. Similar benefits
accrue from lists of industry and professional awards, scholarship funds, and
endowments. Faculties frequently post the rankings of their school in comparison to
others if favourable (QS World University Rankings, for example). Teaching awards
bestow additional prestige, indicating an elevated trust component amongst students.
By posting such achievements on the institutional website, school and faculty receive
reciprocal benefit.
The home page of the law faculty at Stanford University is exemplary of those
features. 1246 It presents, at center page, a column of most recent publishing
contributions from the entire pool of faculty. While building institutional reputation,
that listing also elevates a particular professor above her peers and serves to urge others
to follow suit that, in turn, will build the institutional reputation even higher. Faculty
are also encouraged to tweet about publications authored by themselves and their
colleagues and include a link for a more interactive experience.
1245
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Customer or peer ratings, another online reputational measurement, can work
either for or against an individual or institution and so calls for serious deliberation
before choices are made. Review of a professor’s work for example, by publishers or
colleagues or students, can bolster her reputation; it can also carry bias or inaccuracies
that will persist and be globally available.

One way to reduce those risks is to

implement a rate-the-rater mechanism into the system, as is used in restaurant or book
reviews where readers of reviews comment on their usefulness or credibility. One can
usually “game the system” as was revealed at an American university where a professor
was found to have negatively rated a colleague on the <ratemyprofessor.com> website
whom he found particularly threatening due to his comparatively greater
achievements.1247
A prominent reputation system for the academic world is offered by the Social
Science Research Network (SSRN), an online publishing and rating service.

All

submissions are made available to anonymous readers despite the article’s publication
history. A reputation service is provided through the compilation of statistics that track
the number of times the abstract has been accessed, the number of downloads of the full
article, and how that statistic ranks with other downloads. The number of footnotes is
provided, as well as the number of citations from those sources. Similar works of other
authors are promoted in a sidebar. A feedback function allows users to make
suggestions regarding their selections. The contact information of each author is
provided, as well as the institution where she teaches. A “top paper” and “top author”
ranking is also provided, as is a listing of “top organizations” that rates universities and
law schools by country and on an international scale. Authors, in turn, are encouraged
to email or tweet announcements of upcoming publications, an endeavor that can boost
both individual and institutional reputation. The concept of rating systems for law
practitioners is receiving academic interest; one such article points out the additional
layer of complexity brought to the reputational issue when considering the professional
obligation of confidentiality.1248
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The above discussion establishes that design choices for a reputational system
can profoundly affect a community’s culture, with potential to make either a
collaborative and cordial community or “a competitive and even combative space.”1249 If
used with careful deliberation, however, it can also generate user loyalty, mutual
respect, institutional pride, and lasting impressions for the reader.
c)

Expiry Dates

In 2009, Victor Mayer-Schönberger offered expiry dates as an extra-legal
solution for users’ data protection online. 1250 This technical default system would
trigger the dissolution of personal information at a user’s pre-set date. Such external
mechanisms would remind us of the “finiteness of information”,1251 hone our skills at
data conservation, and instill an appreciation for the data minimization thinking akin to
that promoted by the EU agenda for harmonization. Mayer-Schonberger maintains
such a technological solution would compel us to decide how long our information
remains relevant and valuable. He urges that data cleaning, just like fridge cleaning of
foods past their expiry dates, reinforces the importance of forgetting: it “shifts the
default back from pervasive remembering to human-controlled forgetting.”1252
The debate over the technological realities of the persistence of data is not
resolved and provides a complication to Mayer-Schonberger’s practical suggestion.1253
Jeffrey Rosen warned in 2010: “[T]he Internet records everything and forgets nothing
… every online photo, status update, Twitter post and blog entry by and about us can
be stored forever.”1254 As discussed earlier, several Internet scholars point out that, if
only through a plethora of technological glitches and errors, online content does have a
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life span. The permanence argument might just have met its match in the data
ephemerality discourse.1255
d

A Bifurcated Space for Online Speech

One high-risk feature of the Internet is its ability to take gossip that is scattered,
forgettable, and localized and transform it into a form that is permanent and infinitely
searchable.1256 The defining attributes of gossip are that it is conversational, often
unattributed, casual or unconstrained, and about other members of our community. Due
to its details that cannot be confirmed as true or false, gossip cannot become the subject
of a legal action such as defamation or breach of confidence.1257 Nor does it rank as
opinion, because gossip is a social currency I pass to others, not a commodity I routinely
create. As gossiper, my function would be to merely keep it in social circulation.
Synonyms such as rumours, tittle-tattle, whispers, carnards, scandal, hearsay, dirt, buzz
or scuttlebutt suggest that, while neither good nor evil, gossip is still unfavourable to
its subject and hence potentially harmful to reputation.1258
In democratic regimes, the law takes only a tangential interest in gossip. It is
concerned with protecting speech but only to the extent it does not wipe out any future
chance I have for advancement or social engagement.1259 The rationale is to avoid one of
two extremes: the triggering of a chill of expression if too harsh, or the enabling of
circulation of one’s secrets if too lenient. If the latter, the gossip subject might find it
harder to engage in self-exploration if “every false step and foolish act is chronicled
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forever in a permanent record.”1260 US First Amendment law is clear that not all speech
is deserving of equal protection.1261 As expresses by the US Supreme Court, as a society
we have determined that speech of private concern should merit less protection than
speech of public concern.1262
One solution to the dual nature of online speech, ie speech that contains
references that are more reliable in one space and spontaneous, emotional, graffiti-like
speech in the other, is to create a bifurcated online space. As such, one space would
foster the perpetuating of good speech and articulate debate while the other would be
more of a verbal mosh pit or gossip fest. Both spaces would call for some sort of
standard of care, a measurement of responsibility to one’s neighbor under privacy law.
Using false names and locations, for example, when engaging in either space would
have to be agreed upon or eliminated. While the notion of regulation of the spaces
would be discouraged as defeating the objective of free expression, creators and users of
each space would have to reach consensus on the gradients of speech permitted: hate
speech would not be treated in the same way as extortion or blackmail; gossip might be
redefined or lower standards of proof required. Any disputes would call on more
“nimble remedies” as Solove suggests.1263 Particularly for digital natives who have
experienced the freedoms of online speech without the censures of defamation, a process
of accountability could be created, in the vein of ethical review that would generate a
spirit of responsible stewardship towards a shared digital environment.
Anonymous defamation is an online behavior that ethical review could
effectively address. Blogging that has an anonymous author/publisher or that does not
identify the target of a defamatory remark is particularly menacing because it implants
cues to guarantee identification of the target by the viewer but escapes judicial review
for three main reasons: 1) most bloggers lack deep pockets; 2) actual malice is difficult
to prove, and 3) speedy corrections are more easily achieved in blogs than in other
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media. 1264 One legal approach is to treat blogging as its own culture and hence
deserving of more lenient court treatment. 1265 Dr. Glenn Reynolds recommends
litigation but with a higher standard of proof for claimants of anonymous defamatory
blogs, taking into account the context and highly idiosyncratic speech they use.1266
Daniel Solove argues a counter view, that bloggers should have greater accountability
because, although we tend to think of blogs as “something that enhances the freedom of
the little guy”, the countervailing freedom from privacy invasion is equally
important.1267 That view is supported by S. Elizabeth Malloy of the University of
Cincinnati who cites the permanence of such online postings and the lack of Internet
regulation that could be of assistance to the defamed plaintiff.1268 This chapter argues
that a bifurcated space with extra-legal, ethical review could address the vulnerability of
defamation victims to anonymously generated content that can undeservedly destroy
their carefully maintained reputation.
In the concluding chapter I examine how the introduction of man-machine
interoperability in the new Web 3.0 era affects some of those important concerns about
reputational privacy.
5.4

Conclusion
Previous chapters have analyzed the most prominent discrepancies between the

policies of the EU and US regarding informational privacy. In this chapter we have
examined two initiatives that expose those differences in haut relief: the EUDR
represents a European-led, uniformly enforced, institutional approach to privacy
protections that, with the accelerating penetration of the Internet market calls for a
meeting of minds and political will in order for the digital economy to thrive. It is
1264

Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1157 (2006).
1265
Id.
1266
Id at 1187.
1267
Solove, Two Bloggers, supra fn 1258, 1195.
1268
S. Elizabeth Malloy, Anonymous Bloggers and Defamation: Balancing Interests on the Internet, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1187 (2006) (criticizing the case of Doe v. Cahill 884 A. 2d 451 (Del. 2005)
for setting too high the requisite proof for disclosure of the name of the defendant blogger: that
the claim is brought in good faith; that attribution is materially related to their claim; and that
disclosure could not be obtained from any other source.)

287

crafted as a protectionist and punitive legal mechanism to provide EU residents with
higher standards of protection than those of ‘adequacy’ accepted under the previous US
Safe Harbor agreements. EU legislators aim to balance protecting the individual with
generating a vibrant digital economy that includes digital access in all its benign uses.
The result of such harmonization will be predictably beneficial for one-stop-shopping
compliance for industry as well as the development of human rights to access, erasure,
and transparency of data handling. Enforcement of such rights has been promoted by
the European Commission as swift and effective.
For America, policy aims are more industry driven and constitutionally focused
on free speech including economic speech. Data protection and privacy legislative
initiatives are sectoral, decentralized, and based on a self regulatory, user notice-andchoice model. Data minimization objectives held by EU regulators do not fit
ideologically with commercial tracking practices of US Internet companies that
generate and foster behavioural advertising. Recent efforts by the FTC to bring a
federal hand to personal data protection have met with considerable industry resistance.
Despite such protectionist steps as the US Speech Act to shield journalists from
US enforcement of foreign libel judgments, and the finding in the Google Spain decision
that Internet companies are data controllers with respect to information involving EU
citizens, there is considerable interest and effort at higher levels in collaborating on
what all western states agree is a privacy crisis. As suggested elsewhere in this
dissertation, precedent for EU/US collaboration exists in the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, a regime of bilateral consensus on trade, and agreements to
share information systems between states to facilitate the digital compatibility of the
flow of data, money, and goods. Transnational and international organizations continue
to meet and debate the contours of an Internet future, particularly as defined by the
pressing Internet governance issue, including the World Summit on Information
Society (WSIS+10), Article 29, Transparency International, and the Internet Society.
For the most part, participation is voluntary and enforcement potential is sorely
lacking.
Several quasi-judicial or extra-legal systems are emerging to deal with data
breaches and reputational harms that are escalating at an alarming rate, if takedown
requests of Internet companies are any indication. One such judicial-type authority is
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the administrative staff of Web and Internet companies like Google and LinkedIn that
autonomously devise their takedown standards. Another is the corps of legal experts
who craft terms of use contracts between social media providers and subscribers that
comprises a mini-system of obligations and liabilities all its own.
Of increasing promise for addressing reputational protections are extra legal
activities such as the ad hoc assemblage of online communities to lobby for user interests
where unilateral actions by companies and institutions threaten reputational privacy.
Another emerging practice is that of online review and ranking systems where positive
accomplishments or services of individuals can be promoted and false claims can be
unearthed. This chapter has also proposed a more formal adjudicatory two-tiered
system addressing harms caused by social media language that is stripped of context
and body cues to assist interpretation.
In the concluding chapter, I consider those dynamics in light of the web 3.0 era
of man-machine co-functioning that is already making our lives easier but culturally,
ethically, legally, and socially more complex.
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CHAPTER VI
6.0

CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Summary of Major Findings
This chapter concludes this study and makes recommendations for further

research. In this dissertation, I have examined the effectiveness of legal and extra legal
responses to breaches of what I call reputational privacy in the current era of new
media. This era is comprised of both web 2.0 uses of digital media (marked by human
generated communications) and web 3.0 uses (integrating human communications with
computers, sensors, and other non-human elements). Both web uses are evolving
simultaneously, web 2.0 primarily for interpersonal and informational exchange, and
web 3.0 for ‘smart’ technological functions such as efficient heating of our homes,
driverless vehicles, and automatic piloting of aircraft. As I shall discuss in this closing
chapter, however, Web 3.0 technology is evolving so quickly that the automation it
provides is moving well beyond inter-human communications and further into the interfunctioning of human and computer cognition. That development will call for even
more finely tuned legal and extra-legal responses for tomorrow’s intellectual and
technological academies.
I have organized the inquiry of this dissertation around three research
questions: 1) how well do existing legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and
informational privacy in the new media environment; 2) can new legal or extra-legal
solutions fill any gaps; and 3) how is the role of law pertaining to reputation affected by
the man-computer interoperability emerging as the Internet of Things. I will
summarize my findings under each title.
1) how well do existing legal mechanisms address loss of reputation and informational privacy
in the new media environment?
We have seen that there exists a distinct gap between the broad ranging
stigma we can suffer to our reputations through posted content and online data leaks
and the effectiveness of extant legal responses. One reason is that many of our laws are
designed to respond to real world time, geolocations, political boundaries, and
physiologically identifiable persons, all the while dealing with intangible property that
ignores those constraints. For example, in order to make a property claim for lost
reputation, our common law system still requires some element of control over that
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property by the claimant. Proof of content or data control is often unsuited to digital
behaviour around reputation because it is the societal nature of reputation to reside in
the control of others. Our social, financial, and professional worth can be magnified or
reduced through our own actions, but its ultimate measure is out of our hands. That
situation can be distinguished from copyright law where control over intellectual
property is the critical element of the claim. As well, law cannot deliver the satisfaction of
recovery in the straightforward manner of intellectual property claims: a stained
reputation can rarely be exchanged for a sterling one, a fundamental shortcoming that
removes much reputational injury from law’s purview.
For the persistent litigant in a defamation or breach of privacy suit, challenges
also arise with the cross-jurisdictional unevenness of laws, legal definitions and
standards of proof. Litigants must choose a system of law and a jurisdiction most
historically sympathetic to their case, a need that drives libel tourism. Those additional
procedural steps increase the uncertainty of outcome and compound the time, cost, and
emotional freight of litigation for the individual.
With new media, we are in unexplored legal terrain where every user can be a
generator and publisher of her own content, where publisher or reader or both prefer
anonymity that defies attribution, and where the reflexive state response is to tighten
local laws regarding access to online content, thereby exacerbating our sense of
vulnerability by increasing the sheer quantum of proof we must marshal in our case.
Such national laws produce a “balkanization” of the Internet, an insertion of legal and
code-architectured firewalls around individual jurisdictions to enable distinct real world
societies to deal with Internet exposure as their political ideologies dictate. 1269 As a
result, jurisprudence tends to follow national precedent, and be influenced by cultural
distinctions, rather than reaching across jurisdictions for collaboration.1270
I have noted that a significant number of international legal conventions, like
the UNDR and the ICCPR, are rich in their references to reputation rights in the
context of family life and privacy. My review of particular cases, sadly, reveals a lack of
1269
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reference of those instruments in regional and domestic law (EU) or federal and state
law (US). Their influence on local legal norms as revealed in judicial decision making is
therefore much diminished.
I also note that judges, primarily in the US, are cautious and sometimes
uninformed regarding new media; they often prefer to resolve a case focusing on
traditional legal principles that do not consider new conditions of sociality brought
about by emerging communications technologies and our interaction with them. I have
noted the challenge to judges of learning about the disruptive realities of such
technologies and attempting to balance their capabilities with legal principles that
evolve incrementally. I observe their preference for technologically neutral language in
order to appear consistent with what has gone before and to avoid having to revisit
their decisions in the future. I conclude, in terms of judicial practice, that there is a
judicial preference for cobbling traditional reasoning onto new media issues without
thinking further about how digital technology actually works or whether certain
principles of law have any utility or relevance in cyberspace at all.
Such findings are particularly apt for defamation claims. One example is the
preference of judges to look for the same elements of proof, to the same standards, when
dealing with cryptic, almost fractured, social media speech. Another is applying literary
or grammatical standards of interpretation for written correspondence to spontaneous
and ephemeral digital messaging. I suggest that digital speech might be a discrete form
of communication requiring a unique branch or system of law, or at minimum a separate
court staffed with new media experts, such as the Tokyo IP model or the historic equity
court based on fairness rather than on black letter law. I further note cases involving
defamation being framed in breach of confidentiality, insult or criminal defamation law
or other obliquely related causes of action, a practice that further muddles the
conceptual and procedural patchwork of legal reasoning regarding individual
reputation.
More promising, however, is the emergence of cross-Atlantic interest in new
mechanisms to address reputational privacy: a focus in Europe on gatekeeper liability
(ISPs primarily) to give individual Internet users control of what gets collected and
disseminated online (through the EUDR) and a reworking in the US of the light
regulatory approach to user protection through do not track policies. Countering those
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initiatives are prominent examples of the nationalization trend, such as the new Speech
Act in America to protect US journalists and online publishers from the enforcement of
foreign judgments in defamation, and the strong data protectionism for EU residents
offered by the EUDR. I will follow a description of the Speech Act with a discussion of
political initiatives that indicate growing international interest in more open but
informal collaborations regarding reputational challenges for individuals.
The 2010 Speech Act renders unenforceable any foreign defamation
judgments against US journalists, unless they are consistent with US laws and
procedures, including the US Constitution (including the First Amendment), section
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 1271 and US standards of due process.1272 In other
words, foreign judgments must be “consistent with that which a U.S. court would have
reached on the facts, if the defamation had been in the United States.”1273 “Defamation”
is defined in the Act as “any action or other proceeding for defamation, libel, slander, or
similar claim alleging that forms of speech are false, have caused damage to reputation
or emotional distress, have presented any person in a false light, or have resulted in
criticism, dishonor, or condemnation of any person.”1274 That definition incorporates
traditional torts of privacy, infliction of emotional harm, and defamation. Reference to
the Communications Decency Act 1275 exempts from legal liability any online intermediaries
such as individual users, ISPs, and publishers who post third party content as
journalists, ie stories of public interest. In theory the legislation and policy framework
exempts from enforcement US citizen publishers who post news stories on YouTube,
their own blogs, third party blogs as guest contributors, and even social media sites like
Facebook if the general public has access to such sources. The Speech Act does not
cover other user generated content.1276 The Speech Act applies to both state and federal
1271

Communications Act Of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 230 (as amended and called Communications Decency
Act Of 1996), supra fn 939 (providing immunity for online web host services regarding content
created by other companies.)
1272
Securing The Protection Of Our Enduring And Established Constitutional Heritage (Speech) Act, Part
VI, Title 28, (Pub. L. No. 111-223), 124 Stat. 2480 (10 Aug. 2010). (SPEECH Act).
1273
Emily C. Barbour, The SPEECH Act: The Federal Response to ‘Libel Tourism’, CRS Report For
Congress 7-5700 (16 Sept. 2010, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf
1274
S. 4101(1) [emphasis added].
1275
S. 230 states, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider".
1276
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Electronic Frontier Foundation,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230.
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courts and marks a rigorous policy objective of creating a uniform national response to
foreign judgments involving the issue of journalistic free speech.1277
Contrasting sharply with the wide berth granted free speech in the US Speech
Act and Communications Decency Act is the Google Spain decision. As discussed in earlier
chapters, the CJEU decision identified ISPs and Internet content hosts as controllers of
content with legal liability and pro-active responsibilities to individual data subjects
regarding privacy-sensitive content. The ruling was specific to the Spanish context in
which the facts unfolded, although legal principles regarding rights of erasure, for
example, are instructive for other Member States. One analyst of the CJEU decision
concluded that, “America is rigidly ideological about free speech, while Europe is
pragmatic and flexible.”1278 That conclusion might be too categorical for these digital
times, as we have seen in the conclusions to Chapters IV and V that the controversy
raised by Google Spain and its implications for reputational privacy are generating
robust debate in both EU Member States and in the US. Those jurisdictions are coming
closer to consensus regarding the two initiatives that will change the laws on personal
and data privacy as it affects reputation: DNT policies1279 and the EUDR.1280
On the macro stage, there is ongoing dialogue at high levels: the Hague

1277

Barbour, supra fn 1273 at 14 (arguing that “Although the SPEECH Act lacks an explicit
pre-emption provision, it applies to all “domestic” courts and defines a “domestic court” to
include both state and federal courts, notwithstanding any other provision of state law.”)
1278
Eric Posner, We all have the right to be forgotten, SLATE (14 May 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/the_european_ri
ght_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html (commenting that the judgment is
“hugely more protective of privacy interests than American law, which nearly always prevents
people from winning anything from search engines and publishers who have spread personal
information about them far and wide.”)
1279
Neelie Kroes, Why we need a sound Do-Not-Track standard for privacy online, Europa.eu, (11
Mar. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_20102014/kroes/en/blog/donottrack.html; see contra, Richard Beaumont, Do Not Track Gets Thumbs
Down from EU, The Cookie Collective (12 June 2014),
http://www.cookielaw.org/blog/2014/6/12/do-not-track-gets-thumbs-down-from-eu/ (reporting
that the Article 29 Working Party with EU Data Protection Authorities could not agree on its
European adoption that balanced user control and business interests).
1280
See, for example, Should the US Adopt the Right to be Forgotten? Video Debate, Berkman Center
For Internet & Society At Harvard University (11 Mar. 2015),
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/past-debates/item/1252-the-u-s-should-adopt-theright-to-be-forgotten-online (featuring Paul Nemitz and Eric Posner arguing for adoption and
Jonathan Zittrain and Andrew McLaughlin arguing against. The latter team won the debate.)
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Conference on the role of private international law in cross border data flows;1281 the
UN Resolution on a Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations;1282 the Declaration Of
Principles By The World Summit On The Information Society (WSIS);1283 as well as the
creation of privacy principles by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization
(APEC).1284
Despite the lack of enforcement bite of international legal conventions, there
has been a show of faith in the worth of the individual through broader recognition of a
human right to Internet access. For example, the parliament of Estonia passed
legislation in 2000 declaring Internet access a basic human right;1285 the Constitutional
Council of France effectively declared Internet access a fundamental right in 2009;1286
the constitution of Greece acknowledges the duty of the state to facilitate digitally
transmitted information;1287 Finland’s Ministry of Communications and Transportation
passed a decree in 2009 setting minimum standards of user access;1288 the special
rapporteur to the UN, Frank Le Rue, designated Internet access a human right in

1281

Cross-border Data Flows and Protection of Privacy, Report, Hague Conference On Private
International Law (March 2010), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff2010pd13e.pdf.
1282
Global Agenda For Dialogue Among Civilizations, G.A. Res. 56-6, U.N.Doc. A/56/L.3 and
Add/ 1, Nov. 21, 2001, Article 9: “Utilization of communication technologies, including audio,
video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue and
understanding throughout the globe and depict and publicize historical instances of constructive
interaction among different civilizations”. [emphasis added]
1283
Declaration Of Principles By The World Summit On The Information Society, WSIS03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Paris: UNESCO & Geneva ITU (Dec. 12, 2003) (to build “a peoplecentered, inclusive, and development-oriented Information Society”).
1284
APEC Privacy Framework, http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-andInvestment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx .
1285
Colin Woodward, Estonia, where being wired is a human right, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., (1 July
2003) http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0701/p07s01-woeu.html .
1286
Ian Sparks, Internet access is a fundamental human right, rules French court, DAILY MAIL (12
June 2009) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1192359/Internet-access-fundamentalhuman-right-rules-French-court.html.
1287
Hellenic Viii Revisionary Parliament, Constitution Of Greece, Article 5A, as revised by
parliamentary resolution (27 May 2008),
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156
aggliko.pdf.
1288
Decree Of The Ministry Of Transport And Communications On The Minimum Rate Of A
Functional Internet Access As A Universal Service,” FINLEX, 732/2009, (22 Oct. 2009),
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2009/en20090732 (emphasizing that “Every Internet
connection within the country must have a broadband speed of at least one megabit per
second, increasing to a speed of 100 megabits per second by 2015”).
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2011;1289 and a survey by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in March 2010
determined that almost 80% of participants from 26 countries believe that Internet
access is an inherent fundamental human right.1290 In a separate calculation, 85% of BBC
participants who do not have Internet access believe it should be a protected human
right. 1291 Each of those activities could lead to lobbying at high levels for more
dedication of resources to the digital divide problem.1292
In his 2011 report to the UN Council on Human Rights, Frank La Rue identified
the Internet as an enabler of other human rights because it “vastly expands the capacity
of individuals to enjoy their right to freedom of opinion and expression”, and it boosts
economic, social and political development, “thereby contributing to the progress of
humankind as a whole”. 1293 One of those “other human rights”, the right to
communicate, was promoted by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan in his message
on World Telecommunication Day:1294 he reminded the international community of the
millions of people in the poorest countries who are still victimized by the digital
divide.1295
The above illustrations support our ideological intention, as an international
community, to promote our human entitlement to reputational protection through our

1289

Frank La Rue, Report Of The Special Rapporteur On The Promotion And Protection Of The Right To
Freedom Of Opinion And Expression, UN Council on Human Rights, 17th Sess. agenda item 3, 2859, UN Doc./A/HRC/17/27 (2011) 28-59,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf. See also
Nicolas Jackson, United Nations Declares Internet Access a Basic Human Right, ATLANTIC (3 June,
2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/06/united-nations-declaresinternet-access-a-basic-human-right/239911/.
1290
Four in five regard Internet access as a fundamental right: global poll, BBC NEWS (8 Mar 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2010/03_march/07/poll.shtml
(explaining there were 27,973 adult participants including 14,306 Internet users, ethnology
included face-to-face or telephone interviews between 30 November 2009 and 7 February
2010 or urban samples, and polling was conducted for BBC World Service by GlobeScan.)
1291
Id.
1292
‘Digital divide’ can be defined as ‘inequality of access to the Internet’. Manuel Castells,
The Internet Galaxy 248 (2001).
1293
La Rue, supra fn 1289 at para 67.
1294

17 May 2003.
Bruce Girard, Sean O Siochru, Communicating in the Information Society, Paper for
Information Technologies and Social Development Project, United Nations Research Institute
for Social Development (Nov. 2003),
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/B6020CCE9EBC00FCC1256E
550059CB34?OpenDocument.
1295
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our Internet access. In practice, however, more violent or physically damaging acts
against human rights garner the headlines and the attention of those who apply the
UNDR and the ICCPR. Although technological innovation promises democratic
participation in the digital economy through education and healthcare, this dissertation
has identified several factors that create a risk of exclusion from those conversations:
state censorship; 1296 realistic fears of cyber-terrorism and digital attacks; and the
perceived tyranny of aggressive surveillance techniques by the state in the name of
national security. Each of those risks soundly affects the participation of the individual
in life online.
2)

Can new legal or extra-legal solutions fill any gaps?
In response to this research question, I have provided several tenable

possibilities such as emerging legal initiatives or less formal responses altogether. I
have reviewed the proposed EUDR that will require all exporters of personal data of
EU citizens to comply with stringent guidelines regarding the cross-border use of
individual personal data. That regime calls for closer collaboration between US Internet
companies and EU data authorities.
I have compared the EUDR regime with the US policy agenda for do not track
mechanisms that could become law for all Internet content carriers. At present, DNT
initiatives work on a notice-and-choice basis that requires the active decision making of
individual users. American regulatory agenda, steer-headed by the FTC, would see all
US-based Internet companies embed DNT mechanisms into its designs, thereby taking
the initiative for non tracking policies off the shoulders of individual users by creating a
federal regime. The active interest of the European Commission and Article 29
Working Party of data retention authorities suggests trans-Atlantic collaboration over
DNT policies is possible.
I have also proposed several extra-legal responses to protect reputational
privacy. Those suggestions include creating 1) project-specific monitoring communities,

1296

See further Aendrew Rininsland, Internet censorship listed: how does each country compare?
GUARDIAN (16 Apr 2012)
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list
(indicating which national governments are involved in filtering and the different levels of
formal activity).
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such as Facebook subscribers, to address intrusive practices of industry; 2) reputational
rating and review systems that build individual and institutional reputations and
informally weed out harms by unfounded attacks on reputation;1297 3) educational
programs for new media users regarding online citizenship, beginning with pro-active
self-regulation;1298 and 5) an inter-disciplinary mechanism for the ongoing study of the
epistemological nature of digital speech to more accurately distinguish risk causing
verbal behavior from mere socially offensive conduct.
I propose that legal and extra-legal solutions are not mutually exclusive but
collaborative; some of the latter already exist as suffers of reputational stigma take rebuilding into their own hands. There is a need for more individual awareness of the
Internet industry’s own system of reputational privacy law: its Terms of Use provisions.
I suggest a formalized study of those terms might reveal a layer of legality for
individual Internet use that provides additional issues regarding reputational control or
that suggests areas of consensus. Similarly, access to the criteria for successful take
down requests devised by Internet companies like Google could assist in arriving at a
list of ‘fair practices’ for removing harmful content. In that way, industry need not
always be an adversary in our quest for reputational integrity.
3)

How is the role of law pertaining to reputation affected by the man-computer

interoperability emerging as the Internet of Things?
This dissertation has shown how not all reputational effects relate to the privacy
of our home and family life. Much exposure of the identifying data we leave behind
during our online activities renders us vulnerable to its collection, retention, sale, and
analysis by authorities or commercial entities without our consent or even knowledge.
Those activities are included in this dissertation because, as I have illustrated, their
manipulation robs us of the control over our reputations that we need in order to
maintain the high esteem of our society.
The theme of user control gains complexity with our entry into the age of
human-computer integration, what we increasingly refer to as the Internet of Things.
or the connection through the Internet of devices or sensors that are sold to consumers
1297
1298

As first proposed by Ardia supra fn 10 at 321.
See further Gillespie, supra fn 1222.
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to communicate information between them. 1299 When computers are connected to
sensors and activators in order to assist human comfort, security, health, mobility or
access to information, data and images are produced that threaten to expose our
reputations and self-presentation in a host of new ways. Such augmentation of our
human capabilities poses questions regarding the role of law that we have only begun to
ponder. Future research, therefore, is needed to extend beyond this exploratory study
and develop recommendations for dealing with those increasing risks to reputation, as
accelerated by our entry into the era of the Internet of Things. 1300

1299

See further Tim O’Reilly, IoTH: The Internet of Things and Humans, Oreilly.Com YouTube
video, http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/04/ioth-the-internet-of-things-and-humans.html
(suggesting the more inclusive descriptor ‘human-computer’ to replace more historical
references to ‘man-computer’.)
1300
See further Internet Of Things: Privacy And Security In A Connected World, FTC (Jan. 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/11/internet-things-privacy-securityconnected-world; and also The Internet of Things is transforming everything from Formula One to
driverless cars, Internet Of Things Council, http://business.financialpost.com/2015/03/11/howthe-internet-of-things-is-transforming-everything-from-formula-one-to-driverless-cars/.
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6.1

Future Research
One place to start is to develop research threads introduced in this paper, such as

the construction of a methodology for measuring and comparing reputational harm.
While this dissertation has illustrated the intangible aspects of such injury, it has also
shown how those harms can be translated into loss of opportunity in the economic,
social, and professional sense. Those opportunities enable our contributions to the
society we entrust with our reputations. Unlike in Brandeis and Warren’s time, we now
recognize intangible harms in many areas of law. By devising a gradient of expressible
harms, for example, we could work towards recommendations for law reform that
would deliver more effective legal responses to personal reputational injury. Once harm
can be systematically measured, we can begin to assess the adequacy of our existing
responses through laws of defamation, privacy invasion, and data retention. Another
fertile area of research includes deconstructing digital speech to test this paper’s
proposal for a bifurcated space of legal and non-legal responses to communications that
result in online reputational damage. Further development of the quasi-adjudicative
function of Google personnel regarding take-down requests is warranted as well in
light of mounting pressure by US and EU authorities to formalize such processes. All of
those topics hold promise for more clearly defining the control of the individual over
personal reputation as we move into the human-machine interconnectedness of the Web
3.0 era.

300

Bibliography
1

Legislation

A

Constitutions
United States:

United States Constitution (4 March 1789) as amended.
Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1.
Conn. Gen. Statute §54-142a
Mont. Const. Art. 2 § 10.
European Union:
Constitution of Greece, Hellenic VIII Revisionary Parliament, rev’d (27 May 2008).
B

International Treaties & Conventions

American Convention On Human Rights, Organization of American States [OAS],
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (22
Nov. 1969).
American Declaration Of The Rights And Duties Of Man, Inter-American Commission
On Human Rights, Basic Documents Pertaining To Human Rights In The InterAmerican System, (2 May 1948) OEA/ser. L/V/II.82, Doc. 6 Rev. 1 (1992) (IACHR).
Convention ETS 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, (28 Jan. 1981).
Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 (3 Sept. 1953), as amended by Protocols 3, 5, 8, and 11 (entered
into force 21 Sept. 1970; 20 Dec. 1971; 1 Jan 1990, and 1 Oct. 1994) (ECHR).
Convention On The Rights Of The Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (20 Nov. 1989).
Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (13 Dec.
2006).
Global Agenda For Dialogue Among Civilizations, G.A. Res. 56-6, U.N.Doc. A/56/L.3
and Add/ 1 (21 Nov. 2001).
International Convention On The Protection Of The Rights Of All Migrant Workers
And Members Of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45-158, U.N.P.M. 69 (18 Dec. 1990).
301

International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (16 Dec. 1966) (ICCPR).
Protocol 14 to the Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental
Freedoms, amending Convention CETS No. 194 CE/ (1 June 2010).
UN, Declaration Of Principles By The World Summit On The Information Society,
WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E, Paris: UNESCO & Geneva ITU (12 Dec. 2003).
UN Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217 A Iii (10 Dec. 1948)
(UDHR).
C

Statutes
United States: Federal

Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 66 U.S.C. Title 47 (Pub. L. No. 98-549), 98 Stat.
1984 (26 January 1983).
Cable Television Protection and Competition Act, 102 Stat. § 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-385) (1
May 1991).
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (Pub. L. No. 105-277),
112 Stat. 2681-728 (21 October 21 1998).
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Pub. L. No. 104-104 (Tit. V), 110
Stat. 133 (Feb. 8, 1996).
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat.
1213 (16 Oct. 1986), am. 18 U.S.C. §1030.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Pub. L. 105-304) 112 Stat. 2860 (28
Oct. 1998).
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 1831 (economic espionage), 1832 (theft of
trade secrets) (Pub. L. 113-234) 114 Stat. 3488, (11 Oct. 1996).
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (Pub. L. 95-108)
100 Stat. 1848 [21 Oct. 1986).
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 1970, 15 U.S.C. 1681 (Pub. L. No. 91-508), §601, 84 Stat. 1128,
codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1681-1681x (26 Oct. 1970).
Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 106 U.S.C. (Pub. L. No. 106-102) 113 Stat. 1338 (12
Nov. 1999) (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act)

302

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§300 & 29 U.S.C. §§1181 et
seq (Pub. L. No. 104-191), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. §552a (Publ. L. No. 93-579), 88 Stat. 1896 (31 Dec. 1974).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. (Pub. L. No. 107-204), 116 Stat 745 (30 July 2002)
(An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes).
Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, Part VI,
Title 28, (Pub. L. No. 111-223), 124 Stat. 2480 (10 Aug. 2010) (SPEECH ACT).
United States: State
The California Online Privacy Protection Act, 370 A.B. (CalOPPA) as amended 27 Sept
2013.
California Student Online Personal Information Protection Act – SB 1177 (effective 1 Jan
2016).
International: European Union
European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October
2012, 2012/C 326/02.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) C 83/49 1 December 2009,
renamed, consolidated and amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ C 326, 26 Oct. 2012).
Directive 06/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
Retention Of Data Generated Or Processed In Connection With The Provision Of Publicly
Available Electronic Communications Services Or Of Public Communications Networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC (Doc. 32006L0024).
Directive 02/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002
Concerning The Processing Of Personal Data And The Protection Of Privacy In The
Electronic Communications Sector (Document 32002L0058).
Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998
laying down a Procedure For The Provision Of Information in the Field of Technical
Standards and Regulations (Doc. 31998L0034).
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on
the Protection Of Consumers In Respect Of Distance Contracts, Statement by the
Council and the Parliament re Article 6 (1) - Statement by the Commission re Article 3
(1), first indent (Doc. 31997L0007).
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on
the Legal Protection Of Databases (Doc. 31996L0009).

303

Directive 00/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, In Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market (Doc. 32000L0031) (e-commerce directive).
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection Of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data Access To, And Interconnection Of, Electronic
Communications Networks, Domain Name Regulation (Doc. 31995L0046).
Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council On The
Protection Of Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And On
The Free Movement Of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) 2012/0011
(COD) (1 January 2013).
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July
2007 on the Law Applicable To Non-Contractual Obligations [Rome II].
Regulation (EC) No 733/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
April 2002 on the Implementation Of The EU Top Level Domain (Text with EEA
relevance) (Doc. 32002R-733).
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction And The Recognition And Enforcement Of
Judgments In Civil And Commercial Matters (Brussels I).
Uniform Benelux Law on Marks (amended by the Protocol of November 10, 1983,
amending the Uniform Benelux Law on Trademarks and by the Protocol of December
2, 1992, amending the Uniform Benelux Law on Marks).
Domestic: EU Member States
Bulgaria
Code Penal (C. Pen.) art. 146 and 147, art. R.645-1.
Finland
Code Penal (C. Pen.) 39/1889 as amended, ch 24(9).
Decree Of The Ministry Of Transport And Communications (Finland) On The
Minimum Rate Of A Functional Internet Access As A Universal Service, of 22 October
2009, FINLEX.
France
Code Penal de France, Art. R.645-1.

304

Press Freedom Act of 29 July 1881 (Loi Du 29 Juillet 1881 Sur La Liberté De La
Presse).
Law On Information Technology, Data Files And Civil Liberties of 6 January 1978 (Loi
Informatique Et Libertes), Act N°78-17, as amended.
Germany
The Hesse Data Protection Act 1970 (Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz) , Gesetz und
Verordungsblatt I (1970), 625 (Hesse, Ger.).
German Federal Data Protection Act of 1977 (BDSG), Gesetz zum Schutz vor MiBbrauch
personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung (Bun- desdatenschutzgesetz BDSG) of 27 January 1977, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI] 1 201 (Ger.).
Sweden
Swedish Data Act 1973 (Datalagen [1973] Svensk For-Fattningssamling, 11 May 1973,
289) (Swe).
Switzerland
Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP; SR 235.1) (19 June 1992) (Status as of 1
January 2014), Fed. Ass. Swiss Conf., based on Articles 95, 122 and 173 paragraph 2 of
the Federal Constitution.
United Kingdom
UK Defamation Act 2013 (England And Wales) No. 3027 (C. 125).
UK Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42.
d

Jurisprudence
United States:

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. [ABC] et al., Petitioners v. Aereo, Incl, f.k.a. Bamboom
Labs, Inc., 712 F. 3d 676 (2014).
Anderson Columbia Co., Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc., No. 2001 CA 001728, 1st Cir. Fla, filed
Aug. 28, 2001; ot’d by the Fla S. Ct in No.sc06-2174 (Oct. 23, 2008).
Apex Tech. Grp. Inc. v Doe, No. MID-L-7878-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 23, 2009).
Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012), rev’d in part, 730 F.3d 368(4th
Cir. 2013).
Blumenthal v Drudge and America On-Line Inc., 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
305

Calder v. Jones 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
Cochran v. Tory, (No. BC239405, 2002 WL 33966354 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 2002),
vacated 544 U.S. 734 (2005).
Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio 347, 358 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1845)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Doninger v. Niehoff (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2011).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985)
eDate Advertising v X and Olivier Martinez & Robert Martinez v MGN Limited, [2011]
EUCJEU C-509/09 & C-161/10, [2012] QB 654.
EF Cultural Travel v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
Re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, Case No. 13-md-02430, U.S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. CA (San
Jose 2014).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
Google Inc v. Joffe et al, 9th U.S. Cir. C.A. No. 11-17483 (Sept. 10, 2013).
Re Google Inc. Street View Electronic Communication Litigation, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N.
Dist. CA, F.Supp.2d 1067, (2011).
Gordon & Holmes et al. v. Love, Motion for Summary Judgment BC462438, Sup. Ct Cal.
(Dec. 29, 2013)
Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1975).
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 3:07-cv-585, 2007 WL 954245 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 29, 2007)
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Sch., No. 1098 (4th Cir. 2011).
Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 07-4465 (3d Cir. Jun. 13, 2011).

306

Lorraine Martin v. Hearst Corp. et al., Dist. Conn. No. 3:12-cv-01023-MPS, doc 58, U.S.
Dist. Ct, Dist. Conn. (2013).
Lorraine Martin v. Hearst Corporation Case 13-3315, filed 17 March 2014, US Ct App.2nd
Circ.
New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. (1964).
Obsidian Financial Group., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232–34 (D. Or. 2011)
Obsidian Finance Group v Cox, Case §12-35238, C.A. 9th Cir. Dist. Ct Ore. (Nov. 6,
2013).
Paul v Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, (1976)
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927).
Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., Case No. 13-cv-04303, U.S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. Ca (San Jose).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (HL).
Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Rose v. Hollinger International, Inc., 882 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. 2008).
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
Search King, Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc. No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at§4
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
Seelig v Infinity Broadcasting, 97 Cal. App. 4th 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 915, 925-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
United States v. Anthony Douglas Elonis, Case No. 12-3798 (US App. Ct. 3rd Cir. 2013).
United States v. Google Buzz (FTC File 102 3136)
United States v. Snapchat (FTC file 132 3078).
United States v. Google Inc. (No. CV 12-04177 SI (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012).
307

Vicki Van Valin v. Google Inc. Class action complaint 18 U.S.C. §2511 et seq.
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisdmitisme (LICRA), Plaintiff’s
Application for Declaratory Relief, 169 F. Supp. 2d. 1181(N.D. Cal. 2001).
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168,
1171 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Youssoupoff v Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Limited [1934] 50 TLR 581, CA.
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
European Union Member States
Belgium
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1997).
England
Case de Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1606).
Cooper v. Greeley, 1 Denio 347, 358 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1845)
Gee v. Pritchard 36 ER 670 (Chancery Ct 1818)
Max Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Limited, [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB).
McCormick v England, 494 S.E. 2nd 431. (S.C.Ct.App. 1997)
McKennitt v Ash, QB 73 [2008].
Parmiter v Coupland [1840] 6 M&W 105.
Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, HL.
Smith v. Advfn PLC, All E.R.(D) 335 (Q.B.D.).
Estonia
Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, §§ 7, 94, EUR. CT. H.R. (October 10, 2013).
France
Dailymotion / Nord-Ouest production et autres, Cour d’appel de Paris 4ème chambre,
section A (6 May 2009).
Ligue contre le racisme et l'antisémitisme et Union des étudiants juifs de France c. Yahoo! Inc. et
Société Yahoo! France (May 22, 2000 and November 22, 2000) No RG:00/0538 [LICRA
v. Yahoo!]

308

L'Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF) & La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme [LICRA I] Inc. & Yahoo! France, T.G.I. Paris, May 22, 2000.
Oliver Martinez & Robert Martinez v MGN Limited (25 October 2011) Tribunal de
grande instance de Paris, France.
Max Mosley v Google Inc. and Google France, TGI Paris, Court of First Instance, RG#
11/07970 (6 Nov. 2013).
Jean Yves L. dit Lafesse / Myspace, TGI Paris Ordonnance de référé (22 June 2007).
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APPENDICES
Appendix A

Acronyms

AES
ARPANET
ARPS/DARPA
CNIL
DIR 2000/31/EC

Advanced Encryption Standard
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Administration
National Commission of Informatics and Freedom (Fr)
Directive On Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society
Services, In Particular Electronic Commerce, In The
Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive )
Directive On The Retention Of Data Generated Or
Processed In Connection With The Provision of Publicly
Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public
Communications Networks (E-Privacy Directive)
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense (US)
Data Protection Authorities
Deep Packet Inspection
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
European Economic Community
European Convention on Human Rights (formerly
‘Charter of Fundamental Human Rights’ until Treaty of
Lisbon was entered into force 1 December 2009
establishing the EU)
European Court of Human Rights
European Network and Information Security Agency
Proposed General Data Protection Regulation 2012/0011
Federal Communications Commission
Fundamental Rights Agency
Federal Trade Commission
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
International Court of Justice
Information Commissioner’s Office (EU)
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
Information and Communications Technology
Automated Biometric Identification System
Internal Revenue Agency
Internet service providers
International Telecommunications Union
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme
Directive On The Protection Of Individuals With Regard
To The Processing Of Personal Data And On The Free
Movement Of Such Data (Dir 1995/46EC)
Nordic Council of Ministers Network
National Security Agency
National Science Foundation Network

DIR 2006/24/EC

DHS
DoD
DPA
DPI
ECPA
EEC
ECHR

ECtHR
ENISA
EUDR
FCC
FRA
FTC
IACHR
ICANN
ICJ
ICO
ICCPR
ICT
IDENT
IRA
ISP
ITU
LICRA
95 DIRECTIVE
NORDUNET
NSA
NSFNet
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OAS
OECD
OSCE
PII
PRC
P2P
SNS
TFEU
UGC
UNHR
W3C
WSIS

Organization of American States
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development
Organization for Security and Co-operation
Personally identifiable information
People’s Republic of China
Peer-to-peer
Social Networking Service
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
User-generated content
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
World Wide Web Consortium
World Summit on the Information Society

367

Appendix

B

Maps, Charts, Pictograms

Map 1

Internet Population and Penetration
Source: Mark Graham & Stefano de Sabbato, Oxford Internet Institute
using World Bank data. The 2011 data are visualized with a hexagonshaped cartogram in which the size of each country is drawn based on its
population of Internet users.
http://geography.oii.ox.ac.uk/?page=internet-population-and-penetration
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Pictogram

World’s Biggest Data Breaches
Source: Information is Beautiful (partial screenshot)
http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breacheshacks/
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Map 2 Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union, a comparative overview for
journalists, civil society and policymakers (January 2015).
Source: International Press Institution
http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/user_upload/OOB_Final_Jan2015.pdf.
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Chart 1

Criminal Offences related to the Protection of Honour, EU Member
States and Candidate Countries
Source: Out of Balance: Defamation Law in the European Union and Its Effect
on Press Freedom, International Press Institute (January 2015) (partial
screenshots)
http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/user_upload/OOB_Final_Jan2015.pdf.
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Appendix C

Lexicon

Algorithm

a self-contained set of operations to be performed in a particular
sequence by a computer. Algorithms exist that perform
calculation, data processing, and automated reasoning.

Anonymization:

a process of removing personally identifying information obtained
from cookies as well as from the IP address that could identify the
user.

Bandwidth

the available capacity for transmitting online information,
expressed in bit-rates (bits/second). One byte per second (1 B/s)
corresponds to 8 bits/s.

Big Data

data sets so large in volume, speed, or variety that they are
difficult to process, analyze, search, share, store, or transfer.

Caching

the automatic storage of data or content that duplicates original
values stored elsewhere on a computer. It generally represents a
search or search history of a user.

Cookies:

data sent from a website a user has viewed; they are stored in a
user's web browser while the user is reading or viewing that
website. Every time the user loads that website, the browser
sends the cookie back to the server to notify the website of the
user's previous activity (HTTP cookie, web cookie, Internet
cookie, or browser cookie).

Cyborg

a technologically enhanced human featured in children’s comics
and videogames.

Dark Net

net-speak for the hidden underbelly of the Web, home to both
rogues and political activists, and accessed only with the help of
specially designed anonymizing software.

Deanonymization:

the insertion of sufficient identifiers (address, birth date) into data
so that disclosure of an individual is achieved.

Deep packet inspection: a form of filtering that examines data packets as they pass an
inspection point; it is used to locate activity such as protocol noncompliance, viruses, spam, or other unauthorized intrusions and
re-route it to a different destination, such as a spam file, or
collected for statistical analysis.
Deindividuation:

a psychological state arising from a lack of attention of others and
resulting in the loss of inner restraints.
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Domain Name:

a name used to establish a unique online identity. Organizations,
governments, institutions, etc. can choose a domain name that
corresponds to their name, helping Internet users to reach them
easily (eg: yorku.ca). There is a hierarchy of names: top-level
domain names can be assigned to countries [ca (Canada), ch
(china)] or other entities [gov, edu, .ocm, org, net]. ICANN
assigns domain names.

DNS server

(Domain Name System) a naming system for computers or other
resources connected to the Internet that offers a translation
(resolution) of human-memorable domain names into the
corresponding numeric Internet Protocol (IP) addresses needed
for the purpose of computer services and devices worldwide. It
serves as an Internet directory service.

Disinhibition
can

The de-inhibiting effect of behavior prompted by anonymity; it

Dropbox

a file hosting or cloud storage service operated by Dropbox, Inc.
to allow users to create a special folder on their computers that
can be accessed by the user from any computer.

Hacktivism

indicates anonymous group action to convey a political message
through manipulation of a website.

HTML

(HyperText Markup Language) the standard language used to
create web pages, written in the form of tags enclosed in angle
brackets (eg: <html> ).

IP address

(Internet Protocol address) a set of rules or standards that are
used by computers to communicate with each other across a
network, such as the Internet. A DNS server is used to convert a
URL (york.ca) to an IP address, which is a number
(209.191.93.52) that routers use to direct bits of information to its
destination.

present as a more aggressive or punitive level of human activity.

Internet Service Provider: (ISP) a commercial entity that provides services for
accessing, using, or participating in the Internet (commercial,
community-owned, not-for-profit, or private). Examples include
Bell, Rogers, Shaw, Orange, AOL, or AT&T.
Layers of the Internet: often described as the physical layer (computer device, computer
wires that connect devices), the logical layer (layer of code or
computer language that enables the physical layer to function);
and content layer (all information conveyed by the physical layer).
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Mainframes

a high performance computer used for large data compilation and
storage, historically considered to involve a centralized as
opposed to the later distributed method of computing.

Metatags

provide metadata about an HTML document. It is located within
the <head>. It will not be displayed on the page, but will be
machine decipherable. Metatags are used to specify page
description, keywords, author of the document, when it was last
modified, etc. Metadata can be used by browsers (to illustrate how
to display content or reload page), search engines (keywords), or
other web services.

Operating system:

software that manages the computer's memory, processes, and
all of its software and hardware in a computer. For example, the
Apple IOS system.

OSI

(Open Systems Interconnection) a computer protocol or set of
guidelines for implementing networking communications between
computers. For example, TCP/IP (Transmission Control
Protocol and Internet Protocol), HTTP, and FTP.

Platform

the environment or underlying system that software needs for its
operation. The operating system of a computer is an example,
such as Windows 2000, Mac OS X or IBM’s S/390.

Protocol

a set of guidelines for enabling network communications between
computers. The system of protocols which was developed over the
initial development of the Internet became known as the TCP/IP
Protocol Suite, after the two initial protocols developed:
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP).

Pseudonymization:

the process of substituting one ingredient, such as a name, for
numbers or other characters that can mask direct identification of
the user.

Router

the traffic-directing device that forwards data packets between
computer networks. For personal computers, a router can be used
to transmit emails, log onto various Internet sites, or stream
videos.

Selfie

a self photograph taken with a mobile phone or hand-held digital
camera.

Sharding

the automated procedure of breaking up data into fragments for
storage in different storage facilities or locations.
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Streisand Effect:

the phenomenon, named after American entertainer Barbra
Streisand, where the publicity engendered by an invasion of
privacy lawsuit far exceeds the original intrusion

Social networking service: (SNS) web-based services that allow individuals to create a
public profile and a list of similar-interest users with whom to
share connections, and view and cross the connections within the
system.
Tagging

device to identify persons in an online photograph. It occurs in
two ways: through a user that is then locked into the memory of
networking sites through facial recognition software; and using
the insertion of single words on a site that provides a link to that
photograph.

Twibel

Libel using the Twitter social media platform.

URL

(Uniform Resource Locator) indicates the location of a file on the
web (Yahoo.com). It is expressed in English, designed for people
to remember.

Web browser

a software application used to retrieve or present information on
the Web. Examples include Safari, Mozilla Firefox, Internet
Explorer, and Google Chrome.

Web 2.0

The second generation of the World Wide Web that is focused on
the ability of people to collaborate and share information online.
Also known as the generative Internet.

Web 3.0

The third generation of Internet-based services characterized by
intelligent or smart functions that link computers to sensors or
the Internet to complete a function without direct human
intervention.

Wireless

(Wi-Fi) any type of computer transmission of information that
uses wireless (cable-less) data connections, such as radio
communications.

World Wide Web

(the Web) an information system of online documents accessed
via the Internet using software installed on the user’s computer as
a web browser.
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